At Rubaya and Lomera, the war is also being fought in the mines
In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the subsoil is not just a source of wealth. It is also a war front. When artisanal miners disappear, are beaten or forced to work under threat, families, local buyers and the entire survival economy bear the brunt.
The case is particularly significant at Rubaya, in Masisi territory in North Kivu, and Lomera, in Kabare territory in South Kivu. The two sites are in a region where fighting, illegal taxes and smuggling networks have already been documented by the UN and several Congolese media outlets.
What the investigation says
Amnesty International accuses the AFC/M23 movement, which the organisation says is backed by Rwanda, of committing serious human rights abuses in these mining areas. In its summary, published on 21 September 2026, the rights group says it interviewed 26 people and describes cases of torture, arbitrary detention, forced labour and forced recruitment between January 2025 and March 2026.
The organisation also says it documented the deaths of 18 miners. Ten were allegedly beaten to death, two shot dead and six abducted before being found dead. According to Amnesty, these acts could amount to war crimes. The report also describes miners being forced to dig for more than a week at a time in coltan tunnels at Rubaya and at the Lomera gold mine.
Amnesty says that security guards, some of whom allegedly identified themselves as Rwandan and spoke Kinyarwanda, collaborated with M23 fighters. The organisation is calling on states and companies to stop buying gold and coltan routed through Rwanda until traceability and accountability have been established.
Rubaya, a strategic mining stronghold
Rubaya is no ordinary mine. Since the AFC/M23 took control of the site, UN experts have described an organised system for taxing, transporting and marketing minerals. The group of experts has reported a monopoly over Rubaya coltan and a smuggling network into Rwanda.
Congolese media outlets such as Radio Okapi and Actualité.cd reported these findings in the spring and summer of 2026, noting that quantities moved to Rwanda had already been estimated at more than 120 tonnes a month in 2024 in UN reports. Such volumes do more than feed clandestine supply chains. They also reshape local power dynamics between mine-site bosses, traders, de facto authorities and populations forced to keep working.
South Kivu, with Lomera, illustrates the same shift. Where artisanal mining was supposed to support villages, under armed control it has become a place of coercion, extraction and fear. For diggers, the difference is stark: earn a day’s wages or risk being beaten, forcibly recruited or locked in a tunnel.
An economic battle as much as a military one
The stakes extend beyond the DRC. Coltan from Rubaya, a key mineral for electronics, moves through international supply chains in which Rwanda is often presented as a regional hub. The UN, NGOs and several press investigations have already flagged export volumes that are difficult to reconcile with Rwanda’s declared production.
The case also shows that security in eastern Congo remains tied to the war economy. Recent UN and MONUSCO reports continue to describe active fighting, troop movements and parallel administration in areas held by the AFC/M23. In other words, the issue of minerals is not simply one of commercial fraud. It goes to the very capacity of the Congolese state to re-establish its presence across its territory.
Rwanda, for its part, continues to reject accusations of supporting M23. Kigali regularly disputes reports attributing a military or economic role to it in the Congolese crisis. But Amnesty’s latest allegations are part of a broader sequence in which sanctions, UN reports and NGO investigations converge on the issue of minerals and external support for the rebel movement.
What this case means for the DRC and the region
In the DRC, the issue first affects artisanal miners, local traders and families who depend on mining. It also affects Kinshasa, which is seeking to regain control of the eastern provinces without worsening an already severe humanitarian crisis. Finally, it affects the neighbours of East Africa, since mineral supply chains, trade flows and security rivalries extend far beyond the Congolese border.
At continental level, the case raises a straightforward question: how can strategic minerals be secured without allowing armed groups, corruption networks or parallel administrations to set the rules of the market? The answer has implications for the DRC, Rwanda, the Great Lakes region and, more broadly, the credibility of African mechanisms for traceability and combating illicit exploitation. The next developments to watch are the official responses from Kinshasa and Kigali, as well as the reception of Amnesty’s report by regional partners and UN bodies.



