In Tunisia, a reform of Decree-Law 54 reduces the threat of prison for a first online dissemination of false information. But it does not end the debate over freedom of expression. The law retains a substantial financial penalty and keeps prison sentences for repeat offences.
A law born after the 2022 political crisis
Decree-Law No. 2022-54 was promulgated on 13 September 2022, in a Tunisia already profoundly transformed by the decisions taken by President Kaïs Saïed since July 2021. It officially targets offences relating to information and communication systems.
Article 24 concerns, in particular, the dissemination of false news, rumours or information presented as liable to harm public security. Before the reform, some offences could carry up to five years in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars. The sentence could reach ten years when the acts targeted a public official.
The law quickly moved beyond the sole field of cybercrime. Journalists, lawyers, commentators, activists and social media users have been prosecuted under it. Tunisian rights groups and the National Union of Tunisian Journalists have denounced wording they consider too broad.
The reform was published in the Official Gazette of the Tunisian Republic on Wednesday 30 September 2026. It stems from Decree-Law No. 2026-1, which provides for the revision of the 2022 decree-law. Publication of the law in the Official Gazette confirmed the change in the criminal regime.
Prison ruled out for a first offence
The most visible change concerns Article 24. For a first offence involving the online dissemination of false information or rumours, the prison sentence has been scrapped. The penalty is now a fine of between 10,000 and 20,000 dinars.
The measure is therefore not a full decriminalisation. It replaces imprisonment with a heavy financial penalty. For many Tunisians, particularly those dependent on independent or informal work, a fine of this size can represent several months—or more—of income.
Prison remains possible in cases of repeat offences. The new framework thus retains a strong deterrent logic. It also leaves open a central question: how will courts distinguish deliberate false information from a journalistic error, political commentary or criticism expressed on social media?
The Tunisian government says the aim is to combat defamation, rumours and content liable to provoke unrest. In November 2025, Justice Minister Leïla Jaffel told representatives of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and the National Council of Regions and Districts that Article 24 did not target opinions, but the dissemination of false news and defamation.
This official interpretation remains disputed by human rights organisations. Amnesty International has documented several prosecutions of journalists and public figures for critical remarks. Human Rights Watch also argues that the concepts used in the decree-law could allow disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression.
An easing that does not settle the dispute
The reform follows several high-profile cases. Lawyer and commentator Sonia Dahmani was notably convicted in cases linked to her media statements. Journalists Mourad Zeghidi and Borhen Bsaïes have also been prosecuted under Decree-Law 54.
These cases have given the law a far broader political reach than its technical title suggests. The issue is no longer only the fight against false information. It concerns the conditions under which a Tunisian citizen can criticise the authorities, comment on a court ruling or debate a sensitive subject without risking criminal prosecution.
The 30 September reform does not, by itself, specify how proceedings already under way will be reconsidered. Nor does it say whether convictions handed down before it entered into force can automatically benefit from the new regime. These points will have to be clarified by the courts and the authorities responsible for implementing the law.
The change could nevertheless reduce the immediate use of imprisonment in some new cases. It does not remove investigative powers, prosecutions or the risk of a financial penalty. For newsrooms and content creators, legal uncertainty therefore remains a cause for caution, or even self-censorship.
A national issue in a fragmented regional space
Tunisia is not part of a regional economic community comparable to ECOWAS in West Africa or SADC in southern Africa. It belongs to the Maghreb, where the Arab Maghreb Union remains largely inactive politically and institutionally. Tunisian debates nevertheless form part of a wider North African trend: the regulation of social media is becoming a major instrument for controlling public space.
This trend affects different groups in different ways. Political leaders may see it as a means of curbing disinformation campaigns. Journalists also see the risk of increased pressure on investigations and commentary. Associations, for their part, fear that prosecutions will target critical voices more often than genuine, coordinated manipulation operations.
The impact also varies across regions. In Tunis, media outlets have lawyers, established newsrooms and international visibility. In inland regions, a user facing prosecution may have fewer resources to challenge an investigation or penalty. The same law can therefore have very different effects depending on social standing, public profile and access to legal defence.
The next battle will be fought over implementation
The retreat from prison for a first offence is a real change. It is not enough, however, to settle the debate that has been under way since 2022. The reform’s impact will depend on court rulings, the definition adopted for false information and the treatment of political speech.
Observers will also follow the progress of cases already decided, particularly those involving journalists and public figures. In Tunisia, the Decree-Law 54 issue thus remains a test of the balance between digital security, people’s reputations and freedom of debate. Across Africa, it illustrates a question set to grow in importance: how can disinformation be fought without turning the law into a tool for monitoring public speech?



