In Goma, a new coalition bringing together political figures and armed groups is further blurring the line between opposition and insurgency. For residents of the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the immediate concerns remain security and the continuation of negotiations, as the conflict reshapes the balance of power in Kinshasa.
An armed alliance adds to fragile diplomacy
The war in eastern Congo is being fought on several fronts: armed conflict, national political rivalries and international negotiations. The Congo River Alliance (AFC), a politico-military coalition associated with the M23, is taking part in the Doha process with the Congolese government. Rwanda is also party to separate discussions launched in Washington on tensions between the two countries.
These frameworks have not ended hostilities. In August 2026, representatives of Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 met in Switzerland with Qatar, the United States, Togo, the African Union and Switzerland to assess the Doha commitments. They discussed, among other things, ceasefire monitoring and a roadmap for the next stage of negotiations.
Togo’s role as an African Union mediator is a reminder that the search for a solution does not depend solely on foreign capitals. But the multiplication of mediation efforts has yet to produce a lasting settlement. Civilians in the eastern provinces remain exposed to fighting, displacement and the disruption of essential services.
FRN puts Kabila centre stage
On 12 October in Goma, Joseph Kabila took the helm of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN). The coalition brings together groups previously united within the AFC, including the M23. His adviser Claude Ibalanky said the movement intended to act “by all necessary means, including the use of force”. The creation of the FRN was reported by several media outlets, including the Associated Press; the Congolese Press Agency reported the reactions it prompted in the country.
The choice of Goma is no accident. The city in North Kivu has been under M23 control since its offensive in January 2025. By announcing the coalition in the city, its founders are asserting a political presence in territory where Kinshasa’s institutions no longer control the situation as they once did.
Joseph Kabila led the DRC from 2001 to 2019. The High Military Court sentenced him to death in absentia on 30 September 2025 on several charges, including treason and insurrection. He contests the accusations, which his camp describes as politically motivated. The verdict, reported by the Congolese Press Agency and international media, has sharpened the confrontation between the former president and the current authorities.
Belgium’s response came against this backdrop. On 21 October, Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot called it “deplorable, incomprehensible and unacceptable” for a former head of state to lead a politico-military movement seeking power by force. He called on the parties to preserve the Doha and Washington processes, respect the ceasefire and protect civilians.
Condemnation does not resolve the political question
Brussels’s statement explicitly condemns the use of arms as a route to power. It also highlights a central contradiction: a coalition claiming to seek political refoundation includes a group engaged in a war against the Congolese state. This tension between its stated political project and its military methods will weigh on the FRN’s credibility with Congolese actors and mediators.
Belgium’s response is not, however, the only view expressed in the DRC. On 18 October, the Alliance for a Citizen Generation, a Congolese political party, denounced the creation of the front and called on the African Union, SADC and the East African Community to become more involved. This position reflects part of the political debate; it does not represent all Congolese views.
For Kinshasa, the coalition represents a further political and military challenge. For people in the affected provinces, the consequences are measured less by diplomatic statements than by whether they can travel, attend school and regain living conditions less exposed to fighting. The national authorities must also keep institutions functioning in territories where their control is contested.
The issue is also testing regional mechanisms. The DRC is a member of SADC and the East African Community, two organisations called on to coordinate their positions with the African Union. Tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa give the conflict a regional dimension, without reducing Congolese actors to mere proxies for neighbouring countries.
The next test will be negotiations
The diplomatic priority is to determine whether the FRN intends to participate in commitments already made under the Doha process or is seeking to impose a new balance of power. In August, representatives of the AFC/M23 and the Congolese government had reaffirmed their willingness to continue discussions and agreed on a monitoring mechanism. The realignment announced in Goma could complicate this work, but its practical effects remain to be established.
The situation also places responsibility on African and regional mediators. They will have to maintain channels for negotiation without confusing political dialogue with the automatic legitimisation of violence. For residents of the east, the most immediate test will remain the verifiable implementation of the ceasefire and the protection of civilians.



