Thursday, November 19, 2026

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EconomyEdition AlgeriaAlgeria

End of oil revenues threatens African budgets and stability

Expected global oil demand declines expose highly dependent African states. Budgets, jobs, currencies and public services could come under pressure if diversification remains too slow.

Contemporary ministry building in Abuja, with a few unidentified staff entering in the morning light.

When oil stops being an all-weather safety net

The debate is no longer abstract for several African states. When an economy funds its salaries, subsidies and part of its imports with crude oil, even a modest slowdown in global demand can quickly become a test of stability. The issue is therefore not only about energy. It is also fiscal, social and political.

This shift is visible in recent projections from major industry institutions. The International Energy Agency estimates that global oil demand could peak at around 2030, at about 102 million barrels per day, before gradually declining. At the same time, global sales of electric cars continue to rise, gradually reducing oil’s place in mobility.

African economies remain highly exposed

In North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, exposure remains high, but takes different forms. Algeria remains one of the clearest examples: according to the World Bank, oil and gas accounted for 13% of GDP, 83% of exports and 46% of budget revenues between 2020 and 2024. In other words, the core of the state remains tied to hydrocarbons, even as the authorities have embarked on reforms to attract more private investment.

Nigeria illustrates another kind of vulnerability. The country has a larger and more diversified economy than some other producers, but oil remains a sensitive pillar of public finances. The IMF notes that in 2024 oil revenues accounted for 30% of public revenues, while the authorities continue to face weak tax collection outside the oil sector. This means a sustained fall in prices or export volumes would quickly affect the federal budget.

Angola offers a useful counterpoint. The country remains heavily dependent on oil, with about 60% of public revenues and more than 95% of goods exports linked to oil, according to the World Bank. Yet Luanda has made progress on macroeconomic stabilisation and is seeking to diversify its revenues. Growth in non-oil sectors such as services, fishing, diamonds and agriculture shows that a transition is possible, even if it remains incomplete.

What falling demand changes in practice

The first shock is felt in public finances. When exports slow, revenues fall, foreign currency becomes scarce and the deficit can widen. Governments must then choose between borrowing more, cutting spending or delaying projects. This is the mechanism worrying public-sector economists in countries where salaries, subsidies and major infrastructure projects depend heavily on crude oil.

The second shock affects employment. An economy too concentrated on oil creates few direct jobs relative to the needs of a young population. When public investment slows, the private sector is in turn hit by the contraction. The effects are immediate in services, construction, logistics and local subcontracting. The social risk therefore stems not only from falling prices, but also from the chain reaction they trigger.

The third shock concerns the currency and purchasing power. Fewer export earnings in foreign currency weaken the exchange rate, make imports more expensive and put pressure on consumer goods. In countries where the state still heavily subsidises energy, transport or certain basic goods, room for manoeuvre quickly narrows. This is often when pressure is felt by urban households, civil servants and small informal businesses.

Diversification: more than a slogan

A serious response does not mean replacing oil with a single miracle sector. It requires a range of growth drivers: light and heavy industry, petrochemicals, mining, agri-food, logistics, finance, digital technology, solar and wind energy, and services. The IEA itself notes that oil is likely to retain an important role in petrochemicals and aviation, even as its place in road transport declines. The transition therefore does not mean an abrupt disappearance, but a change in priorities.

In Africa, diversification is already under way on a small scale, but it takes time, skills and patient capital. The World Bank stresses the need to broaden access to finance, strengthen the private sector and invest in human capital. The African Union, for its part, has put natural resource governance at the centre of its 2025 agenda, a sign that the issue extends far beyond energy markets alone. It also concerns the quality of the state and its capacity to turn resource revenues into a productive base.

Countries with financial headroom, sovereign wealth funds and solid infrastructure can cushion the shock. But this security is not permanent. Even in Gulf economies, the real question now concerns the depth of diversification, not just the non-oil share of GDP. For African producers, the challenge is even tougher, because fiscal space is narrower and social safety nets are often thinner.

A transition to watch closely

The issue now goes beyond the barrel. It concerns how African states fund their economic sovereignty, protect their budgets and create jobs beyond resource revenues. If global demand slows faster than expected, the winners will be countries able to export something other than crude. The others will have to absorb, sooner than expected, an adjustment long postponed.

In the short term, attention is focused on three points: the pace of global demand, the ability of African producers to balance their public accounts, and the speed at which their non-oil economies gain depth. This is where the real “post-oil era” will be decided: not by oil’s disappearance, but by the end of its monopoly on growth and power.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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