Beyond the ceasefire, the question of what comes after Gaza
In the eastern Mediterranean, summits are no longer just about aligning communiqués. They are becoming places where the post-war period, the post-blockade era and sometimes the end of diplomatic illusions take shape. At El-Alamein, Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cyprus’s Nikos Christodoulides wanted to discuss Gaza, but also energy security, maritime borders and regional stability. The three capitals know that none of these issues can move forward in isolation.
For Cairo, this trilateral format is no mere formality. It is part of Egyptian diplomacy’s effort to retain control of the Palestinian dossier while strengthening its links with Athens and Nicosia. Those links also matter to the economy: electricity interconnection, gas, maritime affairs, the management of flows and the security of routes in the Mediterranean. Egypt is speaking here both as an Arab power bordering Gaza and as an African actor on the shores of a strategic area connecting the continent to Europe.
What the three leaders agreed at El-Alamein
Meeting on 8 September 2026, the three leaders reaffirmed their cooperation on peace, security and stability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. On Gaza, they called for the implementation of the second phase of Donald Trump’s comprehensive plan to end the conflict, as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803. The UN text provides for a transitional framework, including reconstruction, early recovery and international coordination.
The Egyptian president stressed a central point: humanitarian aid must enter Gaza “fully, sustainably and without hindrance”. He also rejected any form of forced displacement of Palestinians, as well as any change to the demographic composition of the Palestinian territories. This is not a new position. It reflects Cairo’s consistent stance, reiterated in its recent statements, in which Egypt rejects any option that would empty Gaza of its population or diminish the prospect of a viable Palestinian state.
The summit also renewed support for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the borders of 4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The three countries also defended the geographical, political and legal unity of the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, they rejected the idea of a lasting separation between the two Palestinian territories, which would further fragment Palestinian political representation.
A message directed at Gaza, but also at Beirut and Tripoli
The El-Alamein declaration did not stop at Gaza. The three governments also called for an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, while supporting the strengthening of Lebanese institutions, particularly the army. Finally, they reaffirmed their support for Libya’s sovereignty and territorial unity, and for the holding of simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. This is significant: it places stability in the Levant and the Maghreb within the same diplomatic framework.
For Egypt, this regional perspective has a clear logic. Cairo wants to prevent an escalation in Gaza, Lebanon or Libya from spilling over into its own security priorities. The country shares a border with Gaza, closely monitors eastern Libya and views the eastern Mediterranean basin as an area where trade routes, energy competition and military balances intersect. In this context, de-escalation is not a slogan; it is a condition of national security.
Energy, the summit’s other, less visible issue
The trilateral dialogue is not only political. It is also economic and energy-related. The GREGY project, an electricity interconnector between Egypt and Greece, was highlighted as a future corridor for transmitting green electricity across the Mediterranean. According to publicly available technical documents, the infrastructure would have a capacity of 3,000 MW and a link of around 954 kilometres between Wadi El-Natrun in Egypt and the Attica region in Greece.
This type of project changes how the partnership is viewed. It connects Egypt’s energy transition to European needs, while giving Egypt a potential role as an exporter of clean energy. For Athens and Nicosia, it is also a way to anchor the eastern Mediterranean more firmly in European infrastructure. For Cairo, the stakes are broader still: diversifying its markets, attracting capital and gaining influence in future electricity and gas value chains. Natural gas, meanwhile, remains another area of cooperation with Cyprus, with the idea of transporting volumes to Egyptian facilities before re-exporting them.
In a tense regional environment, this link between security and energy is not marginal. It shows that in the eastern Mediterranean, alliances are built as much around cables and terminals as around diplomatic platforms. Egypt, which has already made its energy and maritime agreements a lever of influence, continues to engage with Europe without abandoning its Arab and African roots.
What this says about Egypt’s trajectory and the African dimension
This summit illustrates a broader trend: Egypt is seeking to turn its geographical position into the power to mediate. It presents itself as a bridge between Africa, the Arab world and Europe, as well as an indispensable interlocutor on Gaza. This stance has direct effects. It raises Egypt’s diplomatic profile, supports its energy interests and allows it to influence discussions on Gaza’s reconstruction, at a time when funding and international guarantees are becoming decisive.
At the continental level, the stakes extend beyond the Palestinian dossier alone. The summit is a reminder that African states on the Mediterranean are not mere spectators to Middle Eastern crises. They take part in arrangements that shape aid flows, energy corridors and security balances. For the African Union, and more broadly for the capitals of the continent’s north, the question remains the same: how can regional stability be defended without leaving other powers to determine the post-conflict settlement alone? The answer will lie in the plan’s next stages, in the implementation of reconstruction in Gaza and in partners’ ability to maintain humanitarian access and Palestinian political continuity.



