Thursday, November 19, 2026

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US sanctions: Rwanda preserves health and mining ties amid eastern Congo crisis

Washington is sanctioning Rwandan institutions and plans to remove the country from AGOA in 2027. Yet health agreements and tungsten sales sustain shared interests, while implementation of the peace deal with the DRC remains uncertain.

At a market in Kigali, Rwandan customers and traders exchange money during a mobile payment in an everyday scene.

US sanctions target Rwandan actors linked, according to Washington, to the conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Yet exchanges between Kigali and Washington are continuing. Health, strategic minerals and regional negotiations sustain shared interests, even as the two capitals disagree over the war.

This multi-layered relationship is now under pressure. On 2 November 2026, the US administration announced its intention to remove Rwanda from AGOA with effect from 1st January 2027. The programme gives certain African countries preferential access to the US market for some of their products. The announced decision is not yet an exclusion that has taken effect: it signals Washington’s intention, which will be followed in the coming weeks.

A regional crisis at the heart of the dispute

The disagreement is part of the conflict between the Congolese authorities and M23, an armed group active in the east of the DRC. Kinshasa, Washington and UN experts accuse Kigali of supporting the movement. The Rwandan government rejects these accusations and cites its own security concerns, particularly the presence in eastern Congo of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group of Rwandan origin.

The crisis directly affects two members of the East African Community (EAC), a regional organisation for economic and political cooperation. It also weighs on relations between countries in the Great Lakes region, where borders, trade and security issues are closely intertwined. An agreement reached between Kigali and Kinshasa in Washington in 2025 provides for commitments to de-escalation and economic cooperation. Its implementation nevertheless remains a major test.

On 28 October 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama, a financial institution linked to the security forces. Washington says these entities contributed to support for M23. This allegation must remain attributed to the US authorities: it is not, in itself, an independent judicial finding. In March, the United States had already targeted the Rwandan army and four of its senior officials.

On 2 November, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer justified the intention to withdraw Rwanda from AGOA by citing concerns over barriers to trade and investment, the rule of law, political pluralism and US interests in the region. This is Washington’s official framing. In the information verified here, Kigali has not provided a detailed response to the announcement.

Economic and health ties remain active

AGOA appears to account for a limited share of Rwanda’s trade with the United States as a whole. According to UN data for 2023, around $4.1 million of Rwandan exports benefited from the programme, out of total exports of $37.7 million to the US market. The loss of this benefit could nevertheless affect businesses and workers in the sectors concerned, although the available data do not allow its scale to be measured precisely here.

Meanwhile, health cooperation is continuing. In December 2025, the two governments signed a memorandum providing for up to $158 million in US support over five years, notably to combat HIV, malaria and other infectious diseases. Rwanda has pledged $70 million in additional funding. On 28 August 2026, Kigali and Washington signed an agreement intended to translate this framework into operational targets.

For the population, these commitments will have a practical impact only if they lead to funding being disbursed, medicines becoming available and health services being strengthened. National priorities, programme continuity and monitoring arrangements will therefore matter as much as the announcements. Health cooperation shows that sanctions do not automatically sever every channel between the two countries.

Minerals are another point of contact. In June 2026, Rwandan company Trinity Metals said that more than 320 tonnes of tungsten concentrate from its Nyakabingo mine had been shipped to a plant in Pennsylvania. The company estimates that these deliveries represent up to 20% of US consumption of primary tungsten concentrate. This figure comes from the company itself and should be read as such.

Tungsten is used in industrial and defence applications. For the United States, diversifying supplies may be of strategic interest. For Rwanda, these contracts can support an export-oriented mining sector. But the economic value of this trade also depends on mineral traceability and the security situation in the region. Economic integration projects between the DRC and Rwanda, which are themselves linked to the Washington agreement, remain contingent on political progress and verifiable cooperation.

Sanctions, negotiations and the credibility of commitments

Washington is thus seeking to put pressure on Kigali while retaining avenues for cooperation. This approach reflects a balance of power in which trade and health interests coexist with disagreement over security. Sanctions can increase the diplomatic and financial cost for the institutions targeted. However, they are not enough to guarantee a military withdrawal, disarmament or a reduction in fighting on the ground.

The consequences are not the same for everyone. The authorities and institutions under sanctions are directly exposed to US restrictions. Export businesses may lose preferential access, while patients and health facilities depend on health commitments being fulfilled. In border regions, it is civilians above all who live with insecurity and disruptions to activity caused by fighting.

For the EAC and the African Union, the stakes extend beyond bilateral relations. The credibility of regional agreements depends on mechanisms that can verify the commitments of all parties, without conflating political allegations with established facts. The next steps will therefore be concrete: determine whether AGOA withdrawal is confirmed, monitor implementation of the health partnership and see whether the security commitments between Kigali and Kinshasa bring about verifiable changes on the ground.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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