Dakar tightens its grip on national cyberspace
In a country where public services are rapidly going digital, the question is no longer just how to launch platforms. They must also be defended. In Senegal, cybersecurity has become an issue of sovereignty, administrative efficiency and continuity of essential services. The government now wants to go further with a more centralised system designed to monitor, detect and handle incidents before they paralyse the state or strategic operators.
The move is part of a trajectory already under way. The New Deal for Technology, launched in Dakar in February 2025, promised to strengthen digital sovereignty, secure infrastructure and reduce dependence on foreign solutions. The transformation is therefore not merely technical. It concerns Senegal’s ability to control its data, networks and decision-making tools.
A clearer framework, but an architecture to consolidate
On 13 July 2026, the Minister of Telecommunications and Digital Technology brought public- and private-sector stakeholders together to discuss the security of information systems underpinning critical infrastructure. The consultation was part of preparations for implementing the future legal framework to protect these vital assets. The ministry emphasised prevention, detection, response to attacks and coordination between stakeholders.
According to the draft bill presented to the National Assembly, Senegal plans to establish a National Cybersecurity Authority, a national CERT, sectoral CERTs and Security Operations Centres, or SOCs — operational centres that monitor alerts and coordinate responses. Institutionally, this is not a case of starting from scratch. A 2021 decree had already established the General Directorate of Intelligence and Information Systems Security, presented as Senegal’s national cybersecurity authority. The new structure is therefore intended above all to expand and clarify the existing architecture.
This distinction matters. In government departments, banks, telecommunications, energy and tax services, cybersecurity is not just a firewall. It requires rules, trained teams, reporting procedures and a clear chain of command. Without these, every incident becomes an isolated problem instead of being treated as a systemic risk.
The facts behind the urgency
The regional environment is also pushing Dakar to move faster. INTERPOL warned in 2025 that cybercrime was rising sharply in Africa and increasingly targeting critical infrastructure and public databases. The organisation noted that two-thirds of the African countries surveyed considered cyber offences to account for a medium to high share of crime. Its report called for stronger regional cooperation, prevention and response capabilities.
Senegal is therefore not operating in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is moving within a West African region where criminal networks are crossing borders with growing ease. ECOWAS has also adopted a regional cybersecurity and cybercrime strategy recommending that each member state establish a dedicated national authority. Senegal’s decision thus fits a regional drive towards convergence, rather than standing as a lone exception.
The national significance of the issue is also evident in recent warning signs. Official statements from the presidency have repeatedly stressed in 2025 and 2026 the need to control cyberspace, secure national data and make the state’s information systems more coherent and interoperable. These priorities reflect a concrete concern: the more the administration goes digital, the more exposed it becomes to service outages, data theft and disruption to decision-making chains.
What this means for the state, the economy and citizens
For the state, the issue is immediate. A national CERT can reduce response times during an attack, standardise alerts and prevent each ministry from working in isolation. Sectoral CERTs can tailor responses to the realities of healthcare, public finances, telecommunications or transport. SOCs add continuous monitoring, which is essential in an environment where attacks respect neither working hours nor administrative borders.
For businesses and users, the expected benefits are more tangible than they may seem. Better protection for digital identification, tax or payment systems limits service interruptions and builds trust. That trust, in turn, is essential to the growth of the digital economy. The presidency has already put cybersecurity at the heart of the New Deal for Technology, which also aims to develop digital identity, digitise public services and foster the emergence of local champions.
The issue is also an economic one. Senegal has every reason to secure its infrastructure if digital technology is to create value and jobs. The GSMA estimates that by 2030, well-targeted digital reforms could generate 1,100 billion FCFA in added value and 280,000 jobs in the country. This scale shows that a successful cyberattack threatens more than a server: it can undermine an engine of growth.
The country is making progress, but capabilities still need to be strengthened. The ITU ranks Senegal at level 3 out of 5 in its 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index, with a score of 67.17 out of 100, reflecting solid foundations that remain incomplete. The organisation assesses five pillars: legal, technical, organisational, capacity development and cooperation. It is precisely in the latter two areas that efforts must intensify if Dakar is to turn strategy into operational protection.
A trend that extends beyond Senegal
The debate in Senegal extends beyond Dakar and concerns all of West Africa. States across the region are digitising services, interconnecting their economies and opening up more space for mobile payments, digital civil registration, online taxation and paperless administrative procedures. This modernisation creates value, but it also expands the attack surface. In this context, cybersecurity is becoming basic infrastructure, on a par with energy or roads.
Senegal therefore wants to combine digital ambition with institutional protection. The aim is clear: to prevent the digitisation of the state from becoming a permanent vulnerability. The next step will be the effective adoption of the legal framework, followed by its implementation on the ground. It is there, far more than in announcements, that the credibility of Senegal’s cybersecurity architecture will be tested.



