In Kigali and Kinshasa, the coming contest to lead the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) now goes beyond the purely linguistic sphere. For the first time, heads of state and government will have to choose between several candidates in a vote. At stake is the leadership of an organisation seeking to preserve its influence in a French-speaking world beset by serious political tensions.
An unprecedented vote for an organisation in transition
Louise Mushikiwabo, OIF secretary-general since 2018, is seeking a new term for 2027-2030. The Rwandan was reappointed in 2022 at the Djerba Summit in Tunisia. This time, she will face three other candidates.
The candidates are Juliana Amato Lumumba, representing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Coumba Bâ, a former minister and Mauritanian diplomat; and Dacian Cioloș, a former Romanian prime minister and former European commissioner. The four candidacies were submitted under the new procedure adopted by the OIF.
This is a significant change. Since the post of secretary-general was created in 1997, states have favoured diplomatic consultations and the pursuit of consensus. The reform now provides for a formal hearing of candidates, followed by an election by heads of state and government. The change gives greater visibility to the balance of power among members.
The candidates were heard on 30 June 2026 by the foreign ministers of full member states. The final vote is due to take place at the 20th Francophonie Summit, scheduled for 15 and 16 November 2026 in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital.
In an interview with France 24, Louise Mushikiwabo said she was not worried about the vote. She said she was “serene” and believed she had “reasons to think” she was “a strong candidate”. However, she declined to describe herself as the favourite.
Rwanda and the DRC at the heart of diplomatic tensions
Juliana Lumumba’s candidacy gives this election a particular dimension. The DRC and Rwanda have been at odds for several years over the situation in eastern DRC. Kinshasa accuses Kigali of supporting the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group active in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. Rwanda rejects the accusations and points to its own security concerns along the border.
This regional dispute now weighs on an institution intended to promote dialogue, cooperation and solidarity among its members. In Kinshasa’s eyes, the Congolese candidate may be a way to raise the issue of eastern DRC more prominently in French-speaking diplomatic forums.
Louise Mushikiwabo, a former Rwandan foreign minister, says the confrontation between Kigali and Kinshasa “has no place in the OIF”. She also argues that accusations and international measures targeting Rwanda should not prevent her candidacy.
This position illustrates the difficulty of the campaign. The OIF is not a military organisation. It has no mandate to resolve armed conflicts in the Great Lakes region. However, its decisions and statements carry political weight. Its secretary-general represents the organisation to states, coordinates its initiatives and engages on issues of peace, governance and cooperation.
In Kigali, Louise Mushikiwabo’s candidacy forms part of a strategy of international engagement pursued for several years. Rwanda is seeking to strengthen its role in African and multilateral debates. The Francophonie Ministerial Conference held in Kigali in November 2025 had already placed the Rwandan capital at the centre of the organisation’s agenda.
The Sahel, another sensitive issue for the next term
The next OIF leadership will also have to manage the consequences of the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The three countries, which belong to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), announced their withdrawal from the organisation in March 2025. They had previously been suspended following military takeovers in the region.
The AES authorities denounced what they regard as the selective application of sanctions and an infringement of their sovereignty. Their departures have reduced the OIF’s institutional presence in a strategically important part of West Africa. They also follow the three countries’ withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which took effect on 29 January 2025.
Louise Mushikiwabo said she had “very much regretted” the departure of the three Sahel states. However, she refused to see it as a personal failure. In her view, time will tell whether the countries wish to rejoin the French-speaking “family”.
The issue is broader than membership alone. In AES countries, French is still used in administration, education, the media and economic exchanges, even as military governments challenge some cooperation frameworks inherited from the previous period. A return to the OIF would therefore require political dialogue, as well as clarification of the organisation’s role.
For the public, the effects are tangible. Education networks, training programmes, university exchanges and some cultural initiatives may be affected by an institutional break. Administrations, teachers and students do not experience these changes in the same way as governments. In capital cities, withdrawal is a matter of diplomacy. In regional areas, it may mean losing access to certain programmes or partnerships.
An election that reaches beyond the French-speaking world
The OIF has 90 states and governments, including 53 members, five associate members and 32 observers. Africa occupies a central place within it. The continent accounts for a large share of the organisation’s members and political concerns. The Phnom Penh vote will therefore also indicate how the balance of power is shifting between Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Europe and other French-speaking regions.
Juliana Lumumba’s candidacy puts the DRC’s voice forward. Louise Mushikiwabo’s stands for continuity under Rwandan leadership. The Mauritanian and Romanian candidacies, meanwhile, are a reminder that the OIF is not confined to the African continent.
The next secretary-general will therefore have to meet several expectations. They will need to maintain cooperation programmes, restore trust with states that have distanced themselves and prevent bilateral crises from paralysing the organisation. They will also have to show that the Francophonie can serve as a forum for dialogue between governments with very different political paths.
The Phnom Penh meeting will test the strength of that ambition. Beyond the winner’s name, the voting process and the alliances formed around the candidacies will show what kind of Francophonie states want to build over the next four years.



