A mission under pressure as the UN seeks to review its tools
In Kinshasa, the question is no longer simply when MONUSCO will leave. It has become more nuanced: what should a peacekeeping mission do, with what resources, and how far can it go without becoming an instrument of war? This question comes at a pivotal moment for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where expectations for security remain high, especially in the east, and every change to the mandate has a direct bearing on civilian protection, the state’s room for manoeuvre and relations with armed groups.
The debate goes beyond DR Congo alone. On 26 August 2026, the UN Secretary-General presented his thinking on the future of peace operations, with a clear direction: more targeted mandates, focused more closely on politics and security and, where the mandate requires it, the protection of civilians. The idea is part of the wider effort by the UN to make missions more agile, suited to conditions on the ground and to the resources actually available.
In DR Congo, this debate has particular resonance. MONUSCO, established under that name in 2010, remains one of the most sensitive operations in the UN system. The Security Council has already extended its mandate until 20 December 2025, acknowledging the persistence of tensions in the country’s east and the pressure of the conflict with M23. The Council’s next meeting must therefore decide whether to renew the mission, adjust its priorities or accelerate the withdrawal further.
What the UN report means for DR Congo
The Secretary-General’s report does not propose a new mandate for MONUSCO. But it provides an important political framework. First, it calls on peacekeeping missions to refocus on the functions where they have a clear comparative advantage: supporting political processes, helping to stabilise ceasefires and protecting civilians when the situation requires it. This idea echoes the older doctrine of “targeted” peacekeeping, already advanced by the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.
Second, the report reaffirms an important limit: a peace operation is not designed to wage war over the long term or to impose a political solution on its own. For DR Congo, this line is essential. For years, MONUSCO has been caught between two conflicting expectations: on the one hand, protecting the population and supporting the Congolese state; on the other, leaving more quickly, because some in the public consider it ineffective or too exposed in the conflict in the east.
The situation on the ground has also changed. The mission now provides logistical support to an initial mission tasked with verifying the ceasefire between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23. This role reflects the new part the UN is seeking to play: less a combat force and more a source of technical and political support for verification mechanisms, in the hope of maintaining a minimum level of credibility on the ground.
But this shift does not dispel the tensions. The question of “neutrality” remains at the heart of criticism of the mission. The AFC/M23 has already accused MONUSCO of taking Kinshasa’s side, portraying it as a belligerent force. In a conflict where perceptions count almost as much as the front lines, a multilateral mission can quickly become trapped in a partisan interpretation, even when its mandate remains limited by the Security Council.
The human cost also highlights the severity of the situation. MONUSCO began in 2010, after MONUC, and the mission has suffered heavy losses among its personnel since its creation. In May 2026, the head of the mission recalled that 469 peacekeepers from 53 countries had lost their lives since the UN presence in DR Congo was established in 1999 under the name MONUC. The figure of 311 personnel killed since 2010, from all causes, cited in the current debate, underlines the same reality: the mission operates in an environment where the safety of civilians and international personnel remains precarious.
Kinshasa, the east of the country and the regional equation
For the Congolese government, the challenge is twofold. In Kinshasa, it must preserve political sovereignty and prevent a withdrawal that is too rapid from creating a security vacuum. In the eastern provinces, by contrast, it must secure tangible results: reduce pressure from armed groups, secure roads, protect communities and enable the gradual return of the administration. Between the two, the population expects less in the way of diplomatic formulas than visible effects on daily life, trade, travel and schooling.
This tension explains why the debate over MONUSCO’s mandate is also a debate about transition. A more targeted mission may be clearer and more realistic. But it can succeed only if the Congolese authorities, the armed actors concerned and regional mechanisms all play their part. In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, past experience shows that a poorly calibrated withdrawal can leave a vacuum, while an overly broad mandate can dilute responsibility and fuel frustration.
The continental dimension is equally clear. The United Nations is seeking to adapt its peace operations to a world in which conflicts are more numerous and complex. If the thinking launched in 2026 leads to more precise mandates, DR Congo will be a full-scale test: can a major stabilisation mission transform itself without losing its role in protection and political support? The answer will matter for other African theatres where the United Nations is present, from the Central African Republic to South Sudan, and more broadly for relations between the UN, the African Union and regional organisations expected to take on greater responsibility.
In December, the Security Council will therefore have to weigh three very practical factors: which tasks to retain, what resources to commit and the pace of withdrawal. Behind these technical choices lies a simple political question: how can a mission be brought to an end without leaving security unfinished? For DR Congo, the answer lies neither in an unlimited presence nor in a symbolic exit. It depends on a narrower mandate, verifiable guarantees and a better-defined balance of power between Kinshasa, armed groups and regional partners.



