In autumn 2023, the question of Kidal went far beyond control of a city in northern Mali. For Bamako, bringing it back under state control was meant to prove that the transitional authorities could regain the military initiative. For Tuareg armed groups, the stakes concerned their positions, their populations and their ability to negotiate the future of northern Mali.
An offensive prepared amid a breakdown in relations
The Malian army’s advance towards Kidal was part of an offensive launched after relations between Bamako and the groups that signed the 2015 peace agreement rapidly deteriorated. The agreement provided, in particular, for better integration of northern fighters into the national forces and greater decentralisation.
The process nevertheless stalled after the two coups of 2020 and 2021. Mali’s transitional authorities subsequently called for the departure of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Minusma. Its withdrawal deprived the north of an international presence that had also served as a point of contact between the parties.
The last Minusma contingent left its base in Kidal on 31 October 2023. This accelerated the confrontation between the Malian Armed Forces, armed groups brought together within the Permanent Strategic Framework, and jihadist organisations active in the region.
The Permanent Strategic Framework then brought together several movements that had emerged from the former Tuareg rebellion. In the communications of some of these groups, the name Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, gradually took hold as a way of referring to the north’s independence project.
A convoy from Anéfis to Kidal
On 6 October 2023, about 120 vehicles left Anéfis, a town south of Kidal. The convoy carried Malian soldiers, Russian auxiliaries and fighters from the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad and the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies.
These two Tuareg groups had been integrated into the Malian military apparatus under arrangements stemming from the peace process. Their presence gave the operation a distinctive dimension. Bamako was not mobilising only its regular units. It was also relying on local actors familiar with the routes, tribal balances and constraints of the terrain.
In a statement, the Malian army’s general staff confirmed the launch of “large-scale air and ground operations in the Kidal region”. It referred to support from “Russian partners” and described the operation as a campaign to neutralise armed groups designated as terrorists, destroy their bases and restore the movement of people.
The statement did not specify the convoy’s exact destination. FLA officials nevertheless said the vehicles were heading towards Kidal. The city is about 100 kilometres from Anéfis, but the distance alone was no guarantee of rapid progress. Routes are difficult, there are few main roads, and attacks can halt a military convoy for several hours.
At first, independence groups left their response uncertain. Some officials said they were monitoring the army’s movements and had a strategy. This caution may have reflected a desire to avoid a direct confrontation in the city, but also an effort to gain a military advantage on the approach routes.
Control of Kidal, a major political stake
Kidal occupies a distinctive place in Mali’s political history. Since independence, the city has been at the heart of several Tuareg rebellions. For some people in the north, it symbolises demands for autonomy and political recognition. For the central state, by contrast, it represents a test of sovereignty.
The transitional authorities therefore had an interest in retaking Kidal. In 2014, the Malian army suffered a heavy defeat there during clashes that erupted after Prime Minister Moussa Mara’s visit. Since then, national forces had not directly controlled the city.
Retaking it was also intended to reinforce the political narrative advanced from Bamako. The military authorities had pledged to restore territorial integrity and reduce dependence on foreign partners. The use of Russian auxiliaries, however, showed that this strategy still relied on external cooperation, even if its nature had changed.
The Russian presence also fuelled concerns about the protection of civilians. The Malian authorities spoke of targeted strikes against armed groups. The FLA, for its part, denounced bombardments that had hit homes, shops and places frequented by travellers, migrants or gold prospectors. No full independent assessment was available at the time to determine the validity of these accusations.
The humanitarian situation deteriorated rapidly. Fighting, air strikes and fears of a ground offensive prompted some residents to leave Kidal and neighbouring towns. According to a note cited by the humanitarian monitoring of northern Mali, Kidal, Aguelhok, Anéfis and Tessalit had lost a significant share of their populations during the renewed hostilities.
A military advance that does not resolve the conflict
In the days after the convoy set out, fighting continued around Kidal. Malian forces used drones and air assets to strike enemy positions. Armed groups claimed attacks on moving convoys and said they had inflicted losses on the army and its allies.
The FLA and its partners eventually announced a withdrawal that they described as strategic. This opened the way for Malian forces to enter Kidal on 14 November 2023. The army then said it had retaken the city, while independence groups maintained that they had left the area to preserve their fighters and capabilities.
The recapture of Kidal was a symbolic victory for Bamako, but it did not eliminate the causes of the conflict. A military presence in a city does not guarantee lasting control of tracks, rural areas and borders. In this region, armed networks can move quickly between urban centres, desert corridors and areas near Algeria.
There was also a risk that independence groups and jihadists would benefit from the new confrontation. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, linked to al-Qaeda, could take advantage of the weakening of local agreements and mistrust between the state and some northern communities.
A signal to West Africa
The offensive towards Kidal resonated beyond Mali. It came as relations between Bamako and the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, were already severely strained following the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
The Malian authorities prioritised security cooperation with Russia and strengthened their ties with the military governments of Burkina Faso and Niger. This approach contributed to the gradual formation of a Sahelian political bloc distinct from ECOWAS.
For the countries of the region, the central question remained the same: can a military victory deliver lasting peace without a political agreement with local communities? The answer depended on Bamako’s ability to restore public services, secure roads, protect civilians and reopen dialogue on the representation of the north.
The recapture of Kidal therefore marked a turning point, but not the end of the crisis. It put the Malian army back at the centre of the balance of power. It also ushered in a more uncertain period, in which military sovereignty still had to be translated into effective administration and everyday security for residents.



