In Bombori, promised security gave way to fear
In central Mali, the question is no longer simply who controls a village. It has become broader: who answers for the dead when an operation meant to restore order ends up striking civilians? On 10 July 2026, in Bombori, in the Mopti region, nine villagers were killed, including four children, according to Human Rights Watch.
Bombori is not an isolated case. The same month, another attack attributed to Africa Corps, the Russian military structure under the control of Russia’s Ministry of Defence, was already accused of killing eight civilians in Kyrnia, also in the Mopti region. Human Rights Watch and the Associated Press have both reported that these strikes are part of a wider cycle of violence, as fighting in Mali has intensified since April 2026.
A case that goes beyond the battlefield
Mali remains at the heart of the central Sahel, where armed jihadist groups, national forces and their foreign allies clash in rural areas often far from decision-making centres. Mopti has become one of the epicentres of this diffuse war, marked by reprisals, suspicions of support for armed groups and sweep operations that regularly affect Fulani communities. Human Rights Watch notes that this region is also an area where community tensions have been exploited for several years.
The context is also institutional. Since 29 January 2025, Mali has no longer been part of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, following the joint withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. On the legal front, Bamako notified its withdrawal from the Rome Statute, which underpins the International Criminal Court, on 24 June 2026. The withdrawal will take effect only on 24 June 2027, meaning that until that date Mali remains legally bound by the treaty.
What the report says about Bombori
In its investigation published on 20 August 2026, Human Rights Watch describes an operation carried out at dawn on 10 July. According to witnesses interviewed by the organisation, more than a hundred Africa Corps fighters arrived in pick-up trucks and on motorbikes, accompanied by Malian soldiers who mainly served as interpreters. Men and adolescent boys from the Fulani neighbourhood were reportedly rounded up, beaten and questioned about possible links to jihadist groups.
The NGO says six civilians were shot dead as they tried to flee, and that three young men were then taken to a base of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, GSIM, also known as JNIM. Their bodies were later found: one decapitated, the other two with their throats cut and their hands tied behind their backs. HRW says it gathered this information from witnesses, without claiming to have completed a full judicial verification, but with a body of corroborating accounts.
The profile of the victims makes the picture even grimmer. According to the report, the nine dead were five men aged between 19 and 34 and four children aged between 6 and 17. The organisation also says it conducted 13 interviews remotely between 19 and 30 July, including four with eyewitnesses. This cross-checking matters, because information circulates poorly in central Mali and every toll must be treated with caution.
The question of responsibility can no longer be avoided
Assimi Goïta’s government based its security gamble on a simple promise: to take back control after the expulsion of French forces and the end of MINUSMA, the UN mission. Instead, Mali strengthened its partnership with Moscow, first with Wagner and then with Africa Corps. Wagner announced its departure from Mali on 6 June 2025, while Africa Corps, presented as a force more directly linked to the Russian state, took over.
This shift changes everything politically. When abuses are committed by a force closely connected to the Russian chain of command, Mali can no longer hide behind the idea of a mere external “contractor”. That is precisely the heart of Human Rights Watch’s warning: a state that allows a foreign force to operate on its territory, without a serious investigation or credible prosecutions, may itself incur responsibility.
For the population, the consequences are immediate. In the villages of the centre, security is no longer measured solely by the presence of soldiers. It is measured by the authorities’ ability to distinguish combatants from civilians, protect Fulani neighbourhoods as well as others, and prevent collective reprisals. When that distinction disappears, the rift between the state and its residents deepens, and armed groups gain ground socially as well as militarily.
A test for Bamako, and for the region
The Bombori case goes beyond Mali. It raises questions about the broader trajectory of the central Sahel, where three states led by juntas have chosen to distance themselves from ECOWAS and tighten their ties within the Alliance of Sahel States. This realignment weakens regional checks and balances, just as the region’s armies are relying increasingly on Russian partners for their operations.
It also weighs on international justice. Until 24 June 2027, crimes committed in Mali may still fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. After that date, the legal route will narrow, while the Court has been investigating the situation in Mali since 2013. In a context where the Sahelian criminal court announced by the AES is not yet operational, the risk is clear: the more the regional architecture is weakened, the harder it will be for victims to find a credible forum in which to assert their rights.
For Bamako, the challenge is now twofold. It must both respond to the armed threat in the country’s centre and prevent the fight against terrorism from becoming a machine for producing new grievances. That is where what happens next will be decided: by the Malian state’s ability to regain control of the chain of command, investigate alleged abuses and prove that the sovereignty it claims is not synonymous with impunity.



