Oil gave Libya the means to wield influence far beyond its borders. But the power built around Muammar Gaddafi also rested on a system that concentrated authority and prevented the emergence of autonomous institutions. At his death, on 20 October 2011, this contradiction became one of the country’s greatest challenges.
From coup to power without checks
On 1 September 1969, a group of officers overthrew King Idris. Muammar Gaddafi, then aged 27, took the lead of the new regime. Inspired by Arab nationalism and the example of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, he presented the change as a break with the monarchy and foreign influence.
Libya, independent since 1951, has substantial oil reserves. The government tightened state control over the sector and secured a larger share of its revenues. This policy fuelled public spending and gave Tripoli the resources to pursue an ambitious foreign policy. It did not, however, create a political mechanism capable of durably limiting the head of state.
In the early 1970s, Gaddafi set out his doctrine in the “Green Book”. He rejected multiparty politics and argued that popular committees should exercise power. In 1979, he relinquished his official positions but retained real authority. The absence of organised political competition and the repression of opponents curtailed the prospects for a change of power.
This model produced a paradox: the state could fund large-scale projects and intervene in the economy, while political decision-making remained concentrated around the leader and his circle. Libyans had no sufficiently autonomous institutions to arbitrate a succession or channel a national protest movement.
An Arab ambition, then an African one
On the international stage, Gaddafi initially sought to promote Arab unity. Regional disagreements limited this strategy. He then turned towards Africa, where oil revenues supported investment and diplomatic initiatives. In 2008, traditional leaders gathered in Benghazi bestowed on him the symbolic title of “King of Kings of Africa”.
He went on to champion integration projects, including a common currency and an African army. These proposals did not lead to continental institutions capable of implementing them. Libya is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, which also brings together Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. But this organisation did not become a lever for political unification comparable to the ambition Gaddafi had proclaimed.
This diplomacy sometimes strengthened his influence among African leaders. It did not turn his projects into a continental consensus. The title of “King of Kings” was political theatre, not a mandate conferred by the African Union or the continent’s populations.
The 2011 uprising and the fall of the regime
In February 2011, in the wake of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrations broke out in Libya. The regime’s armed response and the escalation of the conflict precipitated a war between government forces and insurgent groups. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions, then authorised measures to protect civilians. NATO began air strikes in March.
The African Union simultaneously proposed a roadmap based on a ceasefire, humanitarian aid and dialogue among Libyans. The initiative represented an African diplomatic path, but did not end the fighting. Differences among Libyan and international actors over the terms of a transition limited the prospects for an agreement.
On 20 October 2011, Gaddafi was captured in Sirte after a convoy was attacked. He died the same day. The exact circumstances remain controversial: the UN Commission of Inquiry was unable to determine whether his death constituted an unlawful execution and called for further investigations. Human Rights Watch also called for an independent investigation.
A legacy that outlasts the leader
The fall of the regime was not enough to build a reunified state. Institutions weakened by decades of personalised rule, the presence of armed groups and political rivalries have complicated the transition. Since then, divisions between rival authorities have affected security, public services and the management of oil resources.
The consequences are not the same everywhere. Residents of Tripoli and other cities rely on services administered by rival authorities. In regions far from decision-making centres, access to services and political representation are also major concerns. Fluctuations in oil production and institutional blockages can, in turn, affect public finances and economic activity well beyond the energy sector.
Libya’s trajectory is a reminder that a strong international presence and abundant resources cannot replace institutions capable of resolving disputes. For the African Union and its Maghreb neighbours, the issue remains tied to regional stability, population movements and the circulation of weapons. The challenge now is to turn mediation initiatives into arrangements accepted by Libyan actors, without confusing the end of a regime with the building of a lasting political order.



