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In DR Congo, FDLR protocol exposes fragility of Kinshasa-Kigali peace deal

Kinshasa says the FDLR have signed a protocol for demilitarisation and cantonment. The initiative tests the credibility of the Washington agreement, but Kigali is already disputing its scope.

Press photo in Kinshasa showing officials in suits during a regional protocol meeting

In Kinshasa, a political signal and a test of credibility

In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, every move intended to lay down arms is closely scrutinised. The protocol announced in late July concerning the FDLR does more than change the language of diplomacy; above all, it tests Kinshasa’s ability to turn a peace commitment into a practical mechanism on the ground.

The issue, however, goes beyond the DRC alone. It is part of a regional sequence involving the Luanda and Nairobi processes, the role of SADC and the East African Community, and US facilitation of the Washington agreements signed on 4 December 2025 between Kinshasa and Kigali. The joint EAC-SADC summit also called for the implementation of the concept of operations intended to neutralise the FDLR and organise the disengagement of foreign forces not invited onto Congolese territory.

What Kinshasa says it has secured

The Congolese government says the FDLR, a Rwandan Hutu armed group, have signed a protocol on demilitarisation, demobilisation and cantonment. Regional Integration Minister Floribert Anzuluni described this step as progress in implementing CONOPS, the operational framework intended to translate the commitments made in Washington into security measures.

According to Kinshasa, the approach has two stages: first awareness-raising, then, if necessary, a phase of neutralisation by force. The Congolese authorities also argue that Kigali has often used this issue as a pretext to justify its military presence in eastern DRC and, more broadly, the pursuit of economic interests in the region. This position has remained consistent in official Congolese discourse for several years.

One point is particularly significant: the government says it has been running an awareness-raising campaign targeting FDLR fighters since October 2025. The late-July announcement therefore follows a period of preparation, rather than emerging as an isolated event from a diplomatic vacuum.

Why Kigali rejects the announcement

Rwanda’s response was immediate. Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe called the announcement a “non-event” and challenged the protocol’s legal standing, saying it was inadequate under the Washington framework. Kigali argues that the obligation set out in CONOPS is not merely a commitment in principle, but a structured process with an implementation timetable.

This difference is not merely semantic. It shows that peace between the DRC and Rwanda still rests on a fragile mechanism, with each side trying to prove that the other has failed to honour its part of the bargain. Kinshasa wants to show that it is acting on the FDLR issue. Kigali, for its part, believes the priority remains the evacuation of the fighters and an end to any alleged support for groups hostile to Rwanda.

On the same day, Reuters, in a report carried by several media outlets, said a copy of the protocol showed an agreement in principle on disarmament, demobilisation and cantonment, subject to security guarantees and protection against any forced extradition to Rwanda. This detail is important: it suggests that the text does exist, but that it remains dependent on trust-building conditions that have yet to be fully met.

A military issue, but also a question of governance

On the ground, the stakes are high for people in eastern Congo. A protocol alone does not protect civilians, reopen roads or restore the normal movement of goods. That is why regional decisions also refer to a ceasefire, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the reopening of Goma airport and the securing of routes between Goma, Sake and Bukavu. The FDLR issue is therefore only one piece of a larger puzzle.

For Kinshasa, the challenge is twofold. First, it must reduce the ability of an armed group that has been part of the region’s security thinking for years to cause harm. It must then loosen the diplomatic stranglehold that allows Rwanda to portray the DRC as a constant source of threat. In this political battle, proof of good faith is almost as important as military action itself.

For the population, the debate is much more tangible. In Kinshasa, it is seen as a matter of state and sovereignty. In North Kivu and South Kivu, it translates into specific expectations: safe roads, the return of displaced people, economic breathing space for markets, and an end to forced displacement that leaves households and small traders vulnerable. Disarmament campaigns only make sense if they are followed by a lasting path out of armed-group activity and a real state presence.

A sequence to watch across the Great Lakes region

The continental significance of the issue is clear. The DRC occupies a central place in the Great Lakes security architecture, where the African Union, SADC, the EAC and successive mediation efforts are still seeking a stable formula. The joint EAC-SADC summit called for a technical monitoring mechanism and a roadmap setting out immediate, medium- and long-term measures. This means the issue remains open and that no announcement on its own is enough to close the matter.

The next step will therefore be verification. Observers will look at whether the protocol is followed by effective cantonment, whether the fighters concerned actually leave active zones and whether parallel commitments on the withdrawal of foreign forces also advance. Until both movements progress together, the FDLR issue will remain a major sticking point between Kinshasa and Kigali, with direct repercussions for the stability of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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