An army at war, allies who need oversight
In Kinshasa, the question is no longer merely military. It is also budgetary, legal and political. When a country funds auxiliary fighters to the tune of several million dollars a month, transparency becomes a condition of credibility, not an administrative luxury. In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the war against the AFC/M23 remains active, every franc and every public dollar weighs on trust between the state, its soldiers and civilians.
The issue takes on particular significance because the Wazalendo are not a regular force in the conventional sense. The term refers to a constellation of local groups presented as patriots, fighting alongside the FARDC, but whose oversight on the ground remains uneven. The Congolese state sought to give them a framework through the Armed Defence Reserve, established by the law of 22 May 2023 and later clarified by implementing texts discussed by the Council of Ministers. In theory, the instrument was intended to structure civilian support for the defence effort. In practice, its implementation remains incomplete.
What the $4 million figure tells us
The debate begins with a simple point: the monthly allocation of $4 million for the support of the Wazalendo. Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba explained the amount in April 2026 before the National Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee, according to a report seen by the Congolese press. The mechanism presented relies on two channels: a fund within the Armed Defence Reserve’s spending chain and a special intervention fund intended for certain regional officials.
It is precisely this arrangement that MP Claude Misare, elected in Uvira in South Kivu, wants clarified. In a request addressed to the defence minister, he asks who receives what, under which rules, and with what results on the ground. His question touches on a sensitive issue in a time of war: how can loyal support for the army be distinguished from an opaque system for managing allied groups?
The debate goes beyond accounting. If substantial sums are announced but fighters say they lack equipment, pay or support, the gap fuels suspicion. It also drives local rivalries over the distribution of funds, control of routes and the influence of field commanders. In an area where the informal economy often depends on roads, markets and border crossings, every checkpoint becomes a centre of power.
The front line, roadblocks and the question of authority
In the east of the country, the front line does not account for the whole crisis. On several routes in South Kivu, road users have recently denounced checkpoints set up by some Wazalendo fighters between Uvira, Luvungi, Mwenga, Fizi and Baraka. Witnesses have reported levies ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 Congolese francs. The provincial authorities have called for the dismantling of unauthorised checkpoints. These actions are not an official state funding mechanism, but they show how difficult it is to ensure effective oversight on the ground.
North Kivu is also experiencing similar tensions. Recent clashes between the AFC/M23 and the Wazalendo have displaced more than 40,000 people on the boundary between Masisi and Kalehe, according to local sources cited by the Congolese press. In Walikale, other fighting has left villages reeling. This geography of conflict is a reminder that the Wazalendo are not merely a governance issue: they are also a direct security concern for civilians.
The Congolese government therefore faces a delicate equation. It needs armed auxiliaries to hold certain positions and support the FARDC. But it must also prevent these same groups from becoming autonomous actors who are difficult to discipline and are sometimes accused of abuses. Human Rights Watch noted in January 2026 that civilians in the Uvira area remained exposed to serious risks because of the Wazalendo, while its 2026 World Report refers to widespread abuses by allied militias in the east of the country.
What this debate says about DR Congo and the region
The controversy over the $4 million a month says something broader than the management of a single allocation. It highlights how DR Congo is trying to defend its territory in an environment where the regular army, reserves, self-defence groups and local authorities intersect. As long as the Armed Defence Reserve remains only partly operational, the risk of law, emergency measures and informality existing side by side will remain high.
For Kinshasa, the issue is also institutional. Clarifying the status of the Wazalendo, integrating them into a precise framework, identifying chains of command and tracking payments would strengthen the authority of the state. This is also the point made by the Congolese press when it highlights the need to move away from an improvised approach to security. Otherwise, the war risks generating its own economic circuits, competing loyalties and grey areas.
The implications are regional. The conflict in eastern Congo remains linked to the balance of power in the Great Lakes region and to security dynamics in Central and East Africa. Every shift in Uvira, Masisi or Walikale has repercussions for population displacement, cross-border trade and the scope for action by regional organisations. DR Congo, already facing several fronts, will therefore have to strike a balance quickly between military support, budgetary oversight and discipline among allied forces. That is where what comes next will be decided, far beyond the $4 million figure.



