An outbreak does not always begin where it is first noticed. Before Ebola spreads between people, a single contact between an infected animal and a human may be enough. But nearly 50 years after the virus was discovered, several stages of this transmission remain poorly understood. Reducing its origins to a certain story about bushmeat or blaming a particular animal would be misleading.
In 1976, the first outbreak in what is now DR Congo
The Ebola virus was identified in 1976, after an outbreak around Yambuku, in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then called Zaire. The first known patient was an adult man admitted to hospital at the end of August. Retrospective research has clarified his role, but cannot establish with certainty how he contracted the virus. The account of a proven infection after buying wild meat should therefore not be presented as established fact.
The Yambuku outbreak caused 318 cases and 280 deaths. Transmission then accelerated, particularly within families and at the medical centre, where injections using inadequately sterilised equipment contributed to the spread of infection. In other words, the possibility of an initial animal-to-human transmission is not enough to explain an epidemic: healthcare, close contact and funeral practices can also create chains of transmission.
Ebola is a zoonosis, an infectious disease that can pass from animals to humans. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), contact with the blood or bodily fluids of infected animals — including primates and forest antelopes — can expose people to infection. Once the disease is present in humans, it can also spread through direct contact with a sick or deceased person, or with contaminated objects.
The role of animals remains a scientific question
Fruit bats are often cited as a possible reservoir for some Ebola viruses. However, the natural reservoir of the Bundibugyo species, which is responsible for the current outbreak, has not been identified. Scientific authorities stress that no live virus of this species has been isolated in bats. Evidence of exposure to other Ebola viruses does not, on its own, prove that a species caused an outbreak.
This distinction also matters to communities living near forests. Blaming a species without evidence can lead to unnecessary culls and harm ecological balance without protecting public health. Great apes and some antelopes can become infected and transmit the virus through contact with their tissues or fluids. But they can themselves fall victim to the infection; this does not prove that they are the natural reservoir.
Changes to the environment can nevertheless alter opportunities for contact between people and animals. The opening of tracks, mining, agriculture and logging bring workers and activities into areas that were previously less frequented. Hunting and the transport of wild animals can then increase interactions. This is a plausible risk to monitor, not proof that deforestation alone explains every outbreak.
A health emergency affecting several provinces
The current outbreak was declared in May 2026 in eastern DR Congo. It is caused by the Bundibugyo virus. According to figures from the Congolese health ministry published on 13 October and reported by several media outlets, the toll had reached 9,066 confirmed cases and 4,381 deaths. These figures describe the course of the epidemic; they do not prove its animal origins. The WHO had previously reported that it had spread to several provinces, with insecurity, displacement and access to healthcare presenting challenges.
This strain also poses a particular medical challenge: there is no approved vaccine or specific treatment for disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus. Supportive care, rapid diagnosis, appropriate isolation and contact tracing therefore remain essential. Residents’ trust and participation in surveillance matter as much as logistics. Without them, alerts may come late and sick people may seek care too late.
The consequences vary from place to place. In urban centres, proximity to health services can make screening easier, even though travel facilitates the movement of people. In rural areas and remote mining sites, distance, insecurity and a shortage of facilities make access to tests and care more difficult. Prevention measures must also take livelihoods into account: banning hunting without food or economic alternatives risks making households more vulnerable without addressing the causes of risk.
Human, animal and environmental health are interconnected
The ‘One Health’ approach links the health of humans, animals and ecosystems. It encourages information-sharing between medical, veterinary and environmental services. In practice, this can include monitoring diseases in animals, investigating unusual alerts and developing prevention messages with the communities concerned. Early detection does not replace care: it can help enable action before chains of transmission become established.
For DR Congo, the challenge extends beyond the affected areas. Movement and trade link the provinces to neighbouring countries. The WHO and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the African Union’s public health agency, are therefore also monitoring regional preparedness. DR Congo is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a framework for regional cooperation, while the health emergency directly affects the countries along the eastern border.
The central lesson is not that the forest is a threat, nor that a particular animal is responsible. Transmission routes must be documented, exposed people protected and accusations without evidence avoided. In Kinshasa as in the provinces, the response will depend on the quality of healthcare, surveillance and dialogue with residents. Monitoring the epidemic and research into the Bundibugyo virus will help establish more clearly what is known — and what remains to be discovered.
To understand the available data, consult the latest WHO updates on the outbreak in DR Congo, information from Africa CDC and details from the Convention on Migratory Species on bats and Ebola.



