In Goma, the war in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is taking on a new political dimension. By taking the lead of a movement bringing together the AFC and M23, Joseph Kabila is placing a former head of state at the heart of an armed coalition, with potential consequences far beyond the eastern provinces.
From political rivalry to a politico-military coalition
The Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN) was announced on 12 October 2026 in Goma. Joseph Kabila is leading it. The new structure succeeds the Congo River Alliance (AFC) and the March 23 Movement (M23), whose leaders feature in its organisational chart. Corneille Nangaa and Bertrand Bisimwa are among its vice-presidents, according to Radio Okapi and the Associated Press news agency.
This realignment does not mean that the conflict is already spreading militarily across the country. It does, however, change its political significance. Kabila led the DRC from 2001 to 2019. His official entry into an alliance linked to M23 gives it the face of a former president, as well as national political networks. The true reach of those networks and their ability to mobilise beyond the east remain uncertain.
The break with Félix Tshisekedi is part of a longer history. After the disputed 2018 election, Kabila and Tshisekedi shared power. Their alliance broke down in 2020, when Tshisekedi sought to build his own parliamentary majority. Since then, the former partners have become adversaries. Kabila was sentenced to death in absentia in 2025 by the High Military Court. He has rejected the accusations. The proceedings and their outcome remain a major element of the political confrontation.
A local war within a regional crisis
Since 2025, M23 and its allies have controlled key centres in North Kivu and South Kivu, including Goma and Bukavu, according to reports by Radio Okapi and the United Nations. The war affects residents of captured cities, rural communities and displaced people in different ways. It is also disrupting cross-border trade and economic activity, particularly in areas where roads and markets depend on access to these cities.
The crisis extends beyond Congo’s borders. Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting M23; Kigali rejects the allegations. In its Resolution 2773, the UN Security Council called for an end to the M23 offensive and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory. These diplomatic positions do not, on their own, resolve the security and governance issues affecting the Great Lakes region.
On 27 June 2025, the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington. But this bilateral text does not directly resolve the conflict between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23. Talks between the Congolese government and the rebellion have also begun in Doha, under Qatari mediation. The consolidation of the FRN complicates these efforts: interlocutors and the balance of power are shifting as fighting continues.
Legitimacy to build, peace to preserve
For FRN leaders, the alliance offers a way to claim a national opposition to Tshisekedi’s government and coordinate forces previously grouped under the AFC/M23. For the government, it heightens the threat of an armed challenge backed by a figure who has already held power. But national political leadership guarantees neither popular support nor extensive military control. The presence of a former president is not enough to establish that the coalition speaks on behalf of the Congolese people.
In Kinshasa, the confrontation could weigh on institutional debate and electoral prospects. In the east, the most immediate consequences concern civilian safety, displacement and the possibility of renewed fighting. The interests of residents do not necessarily coincide with those of armed leaders or political figures. At this stage, the coalition has not presented a verifiable path for turning its political project into a negotiated settlement.
The issue also affects relations between the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), two regional organisations involved in mediation and security efforts. The UN has documented efforts to bring regional processes closer together with those of the African Union. Their effectiveness will depend in part on the ability of the parties to coordinate their initiatives, without reducing negotiations to a tête-à-tête between states or movement leaders.
The next question is therefore a practical one: will the FRN take part in peace talks as a political interlocutor, or will its announcement first reinforce the military approach? The answer will affect the Doha talks, the implementation of the DRC-Rwanda agreement and security conditions in the east. For the Congolese people, the stakes go beyond the rivalry between Kabila and Tshisekedi: the question is whether institutions and mediation can still contain a regionalised conflict.



