Can a national currency have just one “father”? In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the question has resurfaced nearly 30 years after the launch of the Congolese franc. It pits two men against each other, but above all points to a reform carried out in an emergency and to the still incomplete trust placed in the national currency.
A reform born in a fragmented country
In 1998, the currency change came after years of political and monetary instability. The new zaïre, introduced in 1993, had failed to restore confidence. In several regions, means of payment and monetary practices coexisted uneasily. Reuniting this space was therefore a practical concern for trade between provinces, as well as a symbol of sovereignty.
The Central Bank of the Congo (BCC), the institution responsible for issuing currency and conducting monetary policy, says the first banknotes denominated in Congolese francs entered circulation on 30 June 1998. The monetary unit had been established by decree-law on 17 June. The BCC describes the reform as an initiative of the new political authorities, implemented by the institution. The official history of Congolese monetary signs confirms these dates.
The launch took place a few weeks before the start, in August 1998, of the Second Congo War. The conflict would quickly weigh on the economy and on the stability the reform sought to achieve. Nevertheless, the new currency marked the return of national monetary unity after the fragmentation of previous years.
Two accounts, different stages
The debate resumed during an audio discussion organised on X on Tuesday 6 October 2026, hosted by journalist Stanis Bujakera Tshiamala. Jean-Claude Masangu Mulongo, governor of the BCC from 1997 to 2013, argued that the work had been collective within the Central Bank. He referred to a team tasked with preparing the banknotes, the economic framework, the withdrawal of the old currency and the practical arrangements for the launch.
Noël Tshiani, an economist and former presidential candidate, disputes this account. In a response published on 8 October, he says the design process began between 20 May and 1 August 1997, before Masangu’s appointment, and that the selection of companies to produce banknotes and coins was already under way. He also claims a role in the decision not to depict Laurent-Désiré Kabila on the notes.
Masangu gives a different account of this episode. According to him, Kabila refused to have his portrait appear on the banknotes and asked for Patrice Lumumba to be depicted instead. This explanation, like the precise role claimed by Tshiani, remains attributed to its protagonists: the publicly available material consulted does not make it possible to independently settle their dispute. The Congolese account of the discussion reports Masangu’s remarks; another DR Congo media outlet reports Tshiani’s challenge.
These accounts do not necessarily describe the same stage. Taking part in early discussions, guiding a political choice, leading the Central Bank, designing banknotes and organising their circulation are distinct responsibilities. A reform of this scale involves decision-makers, technical experts, service providers and staff responsible for distribution. Working archives and administrative decisions would provide a firmer basis than retrospective statements for establishing each person’s contribution.
The official currency versus the dollar
The dispute over paternity draws attention to a more enduring question: what did the reform change for Congolese people? The franc restored an official unit of account and an instrument of monetary policy. But its introduction was not enough to erase habits formed during episodes of inflation and depreciation.
The BCC acknowledges that high dollarisation reduces demand for the national currency and limits the effectiveness of its instruments. In other words, when households and businesses set some prices, save or enter into contracts in dollars, the Central Bank’s decisions on the franc have less influence across the economy as a whole. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also link dollarisation to the political turmoil and hyperinflation of the 1990s.
This monetary coexistence is not experienced in the same way everywhere. Household transactions and incomes, traders’ exchanges, business contracts and public payments do not all face the same constraints. For people paid in francs but facing prices expressed in dollars, exchange-rate movements can directly affect purchasing power. For the BCC, the preference for the dollar complicates the transmission of monetary policy.
The Central Bank reiterates that the franc is the official currency of the DRC and that it aims to strengthen confidence in its circulation. However, credibility does not stem solely from the date of issue or the identity of its designers. It also depends on price stability, the management of public finances and the currency’s ability to serve in everyday transactions.
A national and regional issue
The DRC belongs to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a regional cooperation organisation. The 1998 reform remains first and foremost a national story: it sought to reunite a vast territory and assert monetary sovereignty amid severe tensions. Its legacy nevertheless highlights an issue shared by African central banks: an official currency does not automatically become the main store of value or the preferred means of setting prices.
In Kinshasa and across the other provinces, the test lies less in debates over legitimacy than in the practical use of the franc and the confidence it inspires. The dispute between Masangu and Tshiani, reignited in October 2026, has yet to establish their respective roles. Instead, it invites a distinction between the stages of the reform and an assessment of its legacy: monetary unity was restored, but the dollar’s place shows that rebuilding confidence remains unfinished business.



