In Pretoria and across the provinces, South Africa’s municipal election campaign is also being played out on the security front. In several local authorities, seeking local office means overseeing budgets, public contracts and essential services. This can expose candidates and elected officials to deadly rivalries.
Between 1 January and 30 September 2026, at least 43 people were killed in 45 suspected politically related attacks in South Africa, according to data from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), reported by several media outlets. The toll remains attributed to the organisation until all the cases have been independently confirmed by the courts.
Local elections under intense pressure
South Africans will go to the polls on Wednesday 4 November 2026 to elect new municipal councils. The date was announced by President Cyril Ramaphosa and then confirmed by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is responsible for organising national and local elections.
The elections will choose representatives to municipal authorities, the bodies that administer water, waste, local electricity, roads and some aspects of urban planning. They will therefore have a direct effect on daily life, far beyond relations between political parties.
The vote follows a national turning point. In 2024, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since the end of apartheid. The party now governs as part of a government of national unity alongside several rival parties.
At municipal level, this new configuration could speed up the formation of coalitions. It could also intensify competition for control of councils, executive positions and public resources. The 2026 local elections will thus be watched as an early indicator ahead of the 2029 national elections.
KwaZulu-Natal at the centre of concern
According to data attributed to the GI-TOC, the victims include political officials, municipal councillors, members of civic organisations and representatives of traditional structures. Thirteen victims were linked to the ANC and eight to the uMkhonto weSizwe Party, or MK Party, a formation associated with former president Jacob Zuma.
KwaZulu-Natal province accounts for most of the recorded attacks. Located in the east of the country, it remains a decisive electoral battleground. It is home to Durban, a major port city, and Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital.
The province has seen political clashes, internal power struggles and targeted violence for several years. The presence of criminal networks in some areas further complicates efforts to identify motives. An attack may stem from a party conflict, an economic rivalry, a settling of scores or several factors at once.
KwaZulu-Natal is not the only flashpoint, however. Gauteng, which includes Johannesburg and Pretoria, ranks second in the cited tally, with ten incidents. In this highly urbanised province, pressure centres in particular on access to public contracts, neighbourhood management and political control of major municipalities.
In September, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) called for an urgent investigation after two candidates for municipal councillor were killed in separate incidents in KwaZulu-Natal. The statement was a political warning, but it cannot, on its own, establish the judicially determined motive for the killings.
Violence that first affects local-level actors
Political assassinations in South Africa do not involve only national figures. They often target people close to communities: ward councillors, branch officials, activists, traditional leaders or local organisers.
This proximity explains their impact. In rural areas, the death of an elected official can disrupt mediation between residents and the administration. In cities, it can derail a campaign, change the balance on a council or create a climate of fear in neighbourhoods.
The economic effects are also tangible. Formal businesses may suspend operations in an unstable municipality. Small traders and informal-economy workers, meanwhile, often bear the disruption without having access to comparable protection mechanisms.
Political violence is therefore not simply a matter of individual security. It undermines local representation and can reduce civic participation. When a candidate withdraws, a rally is cancelled or a witness refuses to speak, the election loses some of its democratic significance.
A longstanding fault line between local power and criminal networks
The GI-TOC has documented links between targeted killings, organised crime and political competition in South Africa for several years. In a study published in 2024, the organisation had already highlighted the weight of politically motivated killings among targeted homicides studied since the early 2000s.
The phenomenon is part of a national context marked by high levels of crime, but it has a particular logic. Those suspected of ordering attacks may be seeking not so much to seize national power as to control a local decision, a contract, an appointment or an electoral territory.
South African authorities have a special task team responsible for investigating political assassinations, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. Its effectiveness depends, however, on witness protection, the quality of investigations and prosecutors’ ability to link perpetrators to those who ordered the attacks.
The handling of cases by the courts will therefore be a major test. Arresting gunmen is not enough if the networks that finance, organise or protect the attacks remain beyond reach. The state’s credibility will also be measured by its ability to publish verifiable results.
A test for South African democracy and SADC
The issue extends beyond national borders. South Africa is the leading economic power in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional organisation comprising 16 countries. Its elections are therefore followed by its neighbours, particularly because of its political and commercial role.
A stable South African municipality supports continuity in services, trade and regional investment. Conversely, the prolonged spread of targeted violence can weaken trust in local institutions and fuel criticism of traditional political parties.
The 4 November vote will offer an early indication of the parties’ ability to campaign in a pluralistic and fragmented environment. Particular attention will need to be paid to incidents in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, voter turnout, coalition results and the judicial follow-up to recorded cases.
For the ANC, the challenge will be twofold: to defend its historic foothold while responding to the decline recorded in 2024. For the MK Party, the IFP and other parties, the challenge will be to turn electoral gains into municipal control without allowing local competition to descend further into violence.



