In Kigali and Brussels, the resumption of dialogue does not mean their differences have disappeared. It does, however, restore an essential diplomatic channel as the crisis in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to affect the balance of power in the Great Lakes region.
Dialogue resumes after 18 months of tension
Belgium and Rwanda decided to restore diplomatic relations on 22 September 2026. The announcement was made in New York, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, by their foreign ministers.
The joint statement provides for the reopening of the embassies in Kigali and Brussels in the near future. The two governments say they want to maintain an “open, frank and transparent” dialogue, despite continuing disagreements on several international issues.
The resumption comes after a break announced on 17 March 2025. On that day, Kigali ended diplomatic relations with Brussels. The Rwandan government accused Belgium of supporting Kinshasa’s position in the conflict between the Congolese authorities and the AFC/M23 in eastern DR Congo.
Belgium responded by declaring Rwandan diplomats persona non grata. The decision followed sanctions adopted by the European Union against Rwandan officials and members of the AFC/M23. The European Union is a political and economic organisation comprising 27 European states which adopts common measures in several areas, including international sanctions.
In a joint statement published by Rwanda’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kigali and Brussels confirmed their intention to restore relations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
DR Congo crisis at the heart of the dispute
The dispute between the two countries is rooted in the war destabilising North Kivu and South Kivu. The AFC/M23, an armed coalition that includes the M23, has taken control of several areas and major Congolese urban centres since the beginning of 2025.
Kinshasa accuses Kigali of providing military support to the M23. United Nations reports have also documented the decisive role attributed to the Rwandan army in the movement’s advances. Rwanda rejects this account. It says it is acting to prevent attacks by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, an armed group present in eastern DR Congo and made up in part of former figures linked to the 1994 genocide.
This divergence explains the sharp deterioration in relations between Kigali and Brussels. Belgium, the former colonial power in Rwanda, DR Congo and Burundi, has defended the territorial integrity of DR Congo and supported European measures against Rwandan officials.
The Rwandan government viewed this position as an alignment with Kinshasa. On 17 March 2025, the Belgian authorities confirmed the break initiated by Kigali and denounced the measure as “disproportionate”, while calling for discussion channels to be preserved.
The two countries had not, however, started from an untroubled relationship. Before the official break, Kigali had had no ambassador in Brussels since 2023. Belgium, for its part, had not appointed an ambassador to Kigali since 2024. The March 2025 crisis therefore intensified an already ongoing deterioration.
Why Brussels and Kigali are opting for de-escalation
For Belgium, restoring relations means regaining direct access to the Rwandan authorities. That access could matter in discussions on DR Congo, as several mediation efforts seek to bring Kinshasa and Kigali closer together.
Qatar has hosted talks between the parties. The United States has also stepped up its diplomatic involvement. In this context, Brussels risked losing its ability to exert influence in a region where its history, networks and understanding of the actors remain important.
The resumption of dialogue does not therefore amount to approval of Rwandan policy. Belgium’s foreign minister, Maxime Prévot, has maintained his government’s position on DR Congo’s sovereignty and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory. Restoring relations opens up space for discussion. It does not resolve the disagreement.
For Kigali, the decision also serves practical interests. Belgium is home to a sizeable Rwandan diaspora. Family, academic, economic and administrative exchanges have been complicated by the closure of diplomatic missions.
The break has also affected co-operation. Development programmes have been suspended or reviewed. Visa applications, professional mobility and some projects run by non-governmental organisations have been affected by the confrontation.
The resumption of relations could therefore facilitate consular services and restore some bilateral co-operation. It does not, however, guarantee the immediate resumption of funding. European decisions related to the conflict in eastern DR Congo remain a separate issue from the conduct of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Rwanda.
An issue for the East African Community
The rapprochement is taking place in a complex regional environment. Rwanda and DR Congo are members of the East African Community, an organisation that aims to strengthen the economic and political integration of its member states.
This membership has not prevented the crisis from worsening. It highlights the limits of regional institutions when member states pursue opposing security interests. The M23 issue also pits several African and international mediation frameworks against one another.
Belgium is not a member of the East African Community. It can nevertheless exert influence through the European Union, the United Nations and its historical ties with the Great Lakes countries. For that influence to be useful, it will now have to be underpinned by dialogue with Kigali, Kinshasa and the African organisations concerned.
A normalisation to watch
The next steps will be practical: appointing diplomatic representatives, reopening embassies and restoring consular services. How these decisions are implemented will offer an initial indication of the agreement’s durability.
The Congolese issue will remain the main test. If fighting continues or new sanctions are imposed, relations between Belgium and Rwanda could quickly become fragile again. Conversely, regular discussions could allow Brussels to defend its positions without breaking off contact with Kigali.
In the Great Lakes region, this normalisation is therefore neither a full reconciliation nor a change of allegiance. Rather, it reflects a shared calculation: to preserve direct dialogue, limit the human and diplomatic costs of the rupture, and remain engaged in a conflict whose consequences extend far beyond the borders of DR Congo and Rwanda.



