A safety net for savings in a still highly concentrated system
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the money of households, businesses and the state is increasingly flowing through banks. But until now, there has been no clear mechanism to protect depositors if a bank were to fail. In a country where trust in banks remains a fragile asset, this gap weighs on savers as well as on financial stability.
The issue concerns more than Kinshasa. It affects the entire Congolese financial architecture, which remains heavily concentrated in the capital and in Haut-Katanga. The Central Bank of Congo notes that these two areas alone accounted for 89% of bank deposits at the end of June 2026, with 68% in Kinshasa and 21% in the copper-rich province. In other words, a large share of national savings depends on a handful of urban centres and institutions.
What Kinshasa is actually planning
On 11 September 2026, the Congolese government adopted a draft decree establishing, organising and setting out the operations of a Deposit Guarantee Fund. Presented by the finance minister, the text must still go through the regulatory process before it can take effect. At this stage, the executive has not yet published all the details of the planned mechanism. The deposits covered, compensation limits, exclusions, method for calculating contributions and the Fund’s resources remain to be specified.
The government intends to establish a public institution of a technical nature with legal personality. Its mission would be twofold: to protect bank customers’ deposits and strengthen the stability of the financial system. This approach is in line with the prudent bank-resolution standards already recommended in assessments of the Congolese financial sector. The Fund would thus become part of the financial safety net, alongside banking supervision and crisis-management mechanisms.
The context lends weight to this reform. At the end of June 2026, outstanding bank deposits stood at $20,397.35 million, or more than $20.4 billion, according to the Central Bank of Congo. Deposits had risen by 9.1% over the month and by 25.6% year on year. The same note says this growth was driven by an increase in deposits in both local and foreign currencies, with an important role played by public administration, state-owned enterprises and small and medium-sized businesses.
Fourteen years of work, and a long-acknowledged gap
The idea is not new. The first steps date back to 2012, when the Central Bank of Congo set up a steering committee tasked with advancing the project. At the time, the aim was already to reassure depositors, preserve public confidence and limit the impact of a bank failure on the system as a whole. The central bank had also sought support from German financial cooperation, through KfW, to assist with the preparatory work.
In 2017, the central bank considered most of the necessary preconditions to have been met. But the mechanism’s establishment ran into two obstacles: disagreements over the Fund’s legal form and governance, followed by the withdrawal of German cooperation. The file remained on hold even as the banking sector continued to grow. The 11 September 2026 Council of Ministers meeting therefore marks less a break with the past than a political decision to take charge again of a project suspended for too long.
In the meantime, the principle was enshrined in law. Article 69 of Law No. 22/069 of 27 December 2022 on the activities and supervision of credit institutions requires banks to join a deposit protection scheme established by the government. It refers to a decree by the prime minister, deliberated by the Council of Ministers, to set out the mechanism’s organisation, conditions for intervention and funding. Article 195 specifies, however, that the rule applies only once the system has been effectively put in place.
What it means for depositors, banks and the state
For depositors, the issue is simple: knowing that a mechanism exists if a bank stops making payments. In a country where deposits are largely denominated in foreign currencies, the presence of a guarantee fund could reduce fears about banking risks and encourage formal savings. It could also promote the growth of current and savings accounts and, eventually, lending to the economy.
For banks, the scheme brings a new discipline. A guarantee fund is not a gift. It also entails a contribution obligation, and therefore a cost. But that cost can be accepted as the price of confidence. Comparable schemes already exist in several African countries. Kenya, for example, operates a deposit guarantee scheme through the Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation. In southern Africa, SADC is working to harmonise banking and financial practices among its member states, including the DRC, which has been a member since 1998.
For the Congolese state, the question is broader. Kinshasa is seeking to modernise its financial framework while preserving macroeconomic stability. The Central Bank of Congo describes an economy that remains resilient, with real GDP growth expected to reach 5.7% in 2026 and nominal GDP projected at $120.4 billion. But this strength is tempered by vulnerabilities: the geographical concentration of deposits, high dollarisation, exposure to security shocks in the east and continued reliance on a handful of major economic centres.
A banking reform with regional reach
The issue extends beyond the DRC. In central and southern Africa, monetary authorities are increasingly seeking to build safety nets capable of absorbing banking crises without destabilising household savings. Across the sub-region, deposit guarantee schemes, bank-resolution frameworks and stability funds are now part of the debate. The DRC is therefore moving in a direction many African countries have already taken, but with a delay it is now trying to make up for.
The concrete point to watch now is the content of the implementing decree. It will determine whether the Fund is genuinely accessible to small depositors, what share of savings will be protected, how banks will finance the mechanism and how quickly compensation can be paid in a crisis. In the DRC, the reform’s credibility will depend less on the announcement than on its final design.



