In Kinshasa, a military case becomes a test of procedure
In the corridors of the High Military Court, the debate now goes beyond the responsibility of a few generals. It raises a broader question: how far can a service attached to the Presidency of the Republic intervene in proceedings involving state security, military discipline and individual freedoms? In Kinshasa, this case has become as much a test of procedure as a trial.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is emerging from a period in which internal security, the war in the east and pressure on institutions have narrowed the political space. In this context, proceedings involving senior officers take on particular significance. They concern not only the people facing charges, but also the chain of command, confidence in the Congolese army and the credibility of military justice.
What the defence is challenging
On Thursday 13 August, defence lawyers completed the filing of their preliminary pleas before the High Military Court. Their position is clear: they are asking for the exclusion of the official records drawn up by the National Cyber Defence Council, or CNC, a specialised service attached to the Presidency of the Republic and often said to have been created in 2023.
The defence first argues that the agent who drew up these records did not have the status of a judicial police officer. It also argues that the CNC has no authority to carry out stops, arrests, searches, detentions or interviews. This point is central, because a large part of the prosecution’s case rests on these acts and on evidence gathered during the initial investigations.
The case concerns army general Christian Tshiwewe Songesha, former chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and former military adviser to the head of state, as well as several other senior officers. Recent hearings have already referred to charges of conspiracy, treason and failure to obey orders, according to documents submitted to the court.
According to several accounts circulated since the trial opened, the arrests allegedly took place at night, with the detainees taken to secret detention sites before being transferred to Ndolo military prison. The defence says it was struck by the conditions of these arrests. It argues that these methods undermined the regularity of the proceedings from the outset.
The CNC, a contested service at the heart of the state apparatus
The CNC has become one of the most closely scrutinised bodies in the Congolese security landscape. Several Congolese human rights organisations, as well as the DRC’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH-RDC), have expressed concern in recent months about arrests deemed abusive, detention without sufficient judicial oversight and violations of defence guarantees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has also raised concerns about arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions in the DRC.
The heart of the problem is not only legal; it is institutional. The DRC does have a system of military justice, and the High Military Court has jurisdiction to try certain offences committed by military personnel, in accordance with the Military Judicial Code. But the question here concerns the evidence, how it was gathered and the precise role of a specialised service that is not part of the conventional judicial police.
This tension is not new. For several months, the CNC has been cited in other cases involving officers, political figures and opposition members. Human rights organisations have spoken of an extensive, sometimes opaque, use of this security tool. Its supporters say it is an instrument for protecting the state against hybrid threats, particularly in a country where cyberspace, political communication and military security increasingly intersect.
What 27 August will say about Congolese military justice
The auditor general and the public prosecutor have announced a forceful response for the 27 August hearing. The court will then have to decide whether to uphold the preliminary pleas raised by the defence. This is a decisive moment. If the case proceeds to a hearing on the merits, the trial will enter its most sensitive phase: one in which the debate will no longer concern only procedure, but the strength of the evidence against the accused.
For the accused, the stakes are clear. Excluding the CNC records could weaken the backbone of the case, or at least require the prosecution to rely on other evidence. For the military institution, the stakes are broader. It must show that it can deal with serious allegations without giving the impression of either exceptional justice or corporatist insularity.
For the Congolese population, especially in a country where the army remains a central institution and insecurity still affects several provinces, this kind of trial sends a signal. It shows whether senior officers can be prosecuted without blurring the line between national security and political score-settling. It also shows whether military justice can resist the temptation of rushed proceedings.
At the regional level, the case matters beyond Kinshasa. The DRC is a pillar of Central Africa, but its security balances also have repercussions for the Great Lakes region and African mechanisms for preventing crises. When an army at war within its own borders or under judicial pressure publicly exposes its divisions, neighbouring countries, regional organisations and the African Union often see this as an indicator of institutional stability.
The next step therefore depends on one date: 27 August. On that day, the High Military Court will say whether it is proceeding to the merits of the case or opening a new procedural battle. Either way, the Tshiwewe trial will remain one of the most sensitive cases of the judicial year in Kinshasa, because it brings together military discipline, the powers of a service attached to the Presidency and the ability of Congolese justice to deliver an unequivocal ruling.



