When a rare metal becomes an instrument of sovereignty
In Kinshasa, cobalt is no longer just a raw material. It has become a test of power. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which supplies most of the cobalt mined worldwide, every decision on export volumes is now seen as an economic, industrial and political choice all at once. The stakes go beyond mining: they affect public revenues, employment, the country’s place in the battery supply chain and its ability to impose its own rules on a highly concentrated market.
This shift is part of a broader regional context. In Central Africa, the DRC is seeking to turn its strategic resources into a lever for development, as several African states try to regain control over critical minerals, trade flows and local processing. In this case, Kinshasa is acting according to its own calculations, but also under the scrutiny of Asian industrial groups, carmakers, battery manufacturers and investors watching the country’s regulatory stability.
Congolese supply under control as the global market tightens
The starting point is simple. The International Energy Agency estimates, in its Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, that a cobalt deficit could emerge as early as 2026. The agency says the gap between expected supply and projected demand is widening, largely because of export quotas introduced by the DRC, the world’s largest producer. The IEA also notes that demand for cobalt remains strong, even though the growth of LFP batteries, made from lithium iron phosphate and containing no cobalt, is slowing its long-term rise.
In Kinshasa, this international assessment aligns with an objective openly stated by the authorities. The government temporarily suspended exports of raw cobalt from 22 February 2025, then introduced a quota system. In its account of the Council of Ministers meeting on 21 March 2025, the Presidency said the price of cobalt had risen from 21,150 dollars to 33,300 dollars per tonne after the suspension, and presented the measure as a way to protect national economic interests and gain greater control over the supply chain.
Official figures from the Ministry of Mines show the scale of the shock. In the 2025 financial year, Congolese cobalt production reached 100,015 tonnes, but exports amounted to only 44,333.90 tonnes, with shipments falling to almost zero in the second half of the year after the suspension decided in February. These figures confirm that a substantial amount of ore remained outside the traditional export circuit.
The quota announced for 2026 is set at 96,600 tonnes, according to information published by the Congolese authorities and reported in the specialist business press. But the real question is not just the authorised volume. It is whether Kinshasa can retain control over the pace of shipments, accumulated stocks and sanctions imposed on operators. This is where the Authority for the Regulation and Control of Strategic Mineral Substance Markets, ARECOMS, becomes central.
For the DRC, cobalt is first and foremost about added value
The Congolese strategy rests on a clear wager: reduce dependence on raw exports and push the industry to undertake more processing locally. The Ministry of Mines stated this plainly at a meeting with the IMF: the suspension of raw cobalt exports is presented as a strategy for economic and industrial sovereignty, with the aim of creating jobs and capturing more added value in the country. This approach matters both to public finances and to the emerging Congolese industry.
But this lever comes at a cost. For some operators, particularly those for whom cobalt remains a by-product of copper, the restrictions alter technical and commercial calculations. The Congolese state can adjust quotas, withdraw benefits from actors deemed to have committed fraud and manage strategic stocks, but it also risks creating uncertainty among buyers. The IEA notes that markets will now have to factor in discretionary interventions by ARECOMS, which could support prices while making supply flows less predictable.
At the same time, the DRC is not starting from scratch. Official 2025 statistics show that the country remains a copper giant too, with 3,485,269 tonnes produced and 3,403,006.63 tonnes exported. This matters because Congolese cobalt is closely linked to the copper economy. Kinshasa’s ability to influence the cobalt market therefore also depends on the health of the wider mining complex in Katanga.
For Congolese households, the benefit of firmer prices is not automatic. A higher global price can boost state revenues, but only if tax collection, traceability and redistribution follow. Without that, the increase first benefits the balance sheets of large companies and the best-placed intermediaries, while the local economy captures only a limited share of the value. This is precisely the imbalance Kinshasa says it wants to correct.
What this battle signals for Central Africa and the continent
The significance of this issue extends beyond the DRC. Cobalt has become part of the geopolitics of critical minerals, alongside copper, lithium and rare earths. In African debates on industrialisation, the question is no longer just who extracts, but who refines, who processes and who sets the rules of the game. The stakes are particularly clear in Central Africa, in the DRC, where the state is seeking to move from being a mere supplier to becoming a market architect.
The next step will therefore be decisive. If quotas remain in place and strategic stocks are managed coherently, Kinshasa can prolong pressure on global supply. If, on the other hand, the rules change too quickly, the signal sent to industrial companies could backfire. In any case, the DRC has already achieved something rare in commodity markets: forcing the rest of the world to pay close attention to what is decided in Kinshasa.



