A strategic oil zone under pressure
In Zawiya, Libya’s economy can turn on events lasting just a few hours. A terminal, a refinery, a power station. When one of these weak points is hit, the entire chain is shaken, from domestic supply to cargoes destined for export. In western Libya, this vulnerability is no mere theory: it remains one of the main obstacles to stability in the oil sector, which is vital to the country’s public finances.
The events are unfolding in a Libya still shaped by rival power struggles. In the west, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity controls the capital and relies on armed allies. In the east, the administration based in Benghazi, aligned with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s camp, retains decisive influence over part of the territory and several security levers. This fragmentation directly affects energy infrastructure, which remains both a national asset and a political frontline.
Zawiya, a key link in crude and fuel supplies
Since Sunday 9 August, and again overnight, drone attacks have targeted several facilities in Zawiya, according to information corroborated by the national oil company and the international press. The National Oil Corporation reported damage to equipment linked to storage, refining and electricity, while fires were reported at at least one fuel tank. No deaths were reported in the information reviewed.
The site is no ordinary one. Zawiya is home to the country’s largest refinery, an export terminal and associated power facilities. It is also a major transit point for crude flows from the south-west, particularly from the Sharara field. The national oil company has already warned that further attacks could force it to declare force majeure, meaning a temporary suspension of its contractual obligations because of a major external event.
In the hours that followed, fuel distribution was partially reorganised. The logistics company linked to the state group shifted some operations to a depot in Tripoli, while saying that deliveries to petrol stations were continuing and supplies remained available. This matters: in Libya, the impact of an attack is measured not only in lost barrels. It is also reflected in fuel movements, pressure on urban depots and the state’s ability to maintain control over the downstream oil sector.
Investors return, but the risk remains
The latest developments come as Tripoli seeks to make the sector more attractive. On 21 June 2026, the national oil company’s crude production reached 1,438,560 barrels per day, its highest level since 2013, according to the NOC. The stated goal is to reach 1.5 million barrels per day in the short term, then 2 million by 2030. Libya is seeking to turn a technical recovery into a lasting one.
This ambition is also underpinned by the gradual return of major international groups. In June, the NOC signed production-sharing agreements with Repsol, Türkiye Petrolleri, Eni, QatarEnergy and Hungary’s MOL, as part of the first licensing round in nearly 20 years. MOL confirmed it had signed a production-sharing agreement with its partners, while Reuters reports specified that the contracts followed the licensing round launched by the Libyan company.
In other words, capital is returning because the country’s subsoil remains promising, but it does not eliminate the security risk. If anything, the opposite is true: the more the sector advances, the more visible its vulnerability becomes. A refinery shut down, a damaged terminal or a weakened power station threatens more than exports. It also affects access to fuel, the functioning of public services and the budgetary balance of a state whose revenues remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbons.
What the Zawiya crisis reveals
The case of Zawiya illustrates a familiar Libyan paradox. The country has a substantial oil base, coveted reserves and strategic infrastructure on the Mediterranean. But it still lacks a lasting monopoly on the use of force around these assets. As long as armed groups, local rivalries or political pressure can affect energy sites, the sector’s recovery will remain exposed to sudden shutdowns, higher security costs and decisions imposed by coercion.
The implications extend beyond Libya. For North Africa, every disruption in Zawiya is a reminder of energy’s role in regional political balances. For the African Union, the case also shows that credible economic recovery depends on securing productive assets, consolidating institutions and reducing armed actors’ influence over strategic infrastructure. What happens next will depend on the Tripoli authorities’ ability to protect the west, as well as their capacity to stabilise relations between the country’s centres of power before the next investments run up against the same fault line once again.



