A border zone that remains a flashpoint
In northern Ethiopia, Tigray has never ceased to be an area of tension. Between the aftermath of the 2020-2022 war, rivalries over western Tigray and front lines close to Sudan, every clash revives the same question: does the peace signed in Pretoria really hold on the ground? The risk is not only military. It also affects trade routes, displaced people and the political balance between Addis Ababa, regional authorities and the neighbours Sudan and Eritrea.
This latest alert comes amid an already pressured regional environment. The Horn of Africa remains shaped by the war in Sudan, tensions between Addis Ababa and Khartoum, and mutual suspicions over support for armed groups on either side of the border. The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, has closely followed the Ethiopian issue since the 2022 talks. It continues to stress the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, particularly the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.
Fighting reported near Shererina
The basic facts are clear: clashes have resumed between Ethiopian federal forces and fighters linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, in the Shererina area of western Tigray, near the Sudanese border. Tigrayan officials accused the federal army of attacking their positions. At the same time, security sources and African media confirmed a resurgence of violence in north-western Tigray, particularly in contested areas such as Tselemti and its surroundings.
The geographic detail matters. For years, western Tigray has been the focus of territorial and political rivalries. It is a strategic area, both for administrative control and for the movement of people and cross-border flows towards Sudan. In a country where regions wield real political influence, the question of local boundaries can quickly become a national issue. An attack or retaliation in this area should therefore not be viewed merely as a military episode. It is part of a dispute over sovereignty, movement and the return of displaced people.
The latest developments also have very tangible consequences for civilians. In January 2026, clashes had already led to disruption of civilian flights to Tigray, followed by calls for calm from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Union Commission. These warnings showed that, beyond the military front lines, daily life remained vulnerable: transport disrupted, population movements restricted and access to aid undermined.
The weight of the past remains heavy
The earlier conflict is essential context. The Tigray war, which began in 2020, officially ended with the Pretoria agreement signed on 2 November 2022 between the federal government and the TPLF, under African Union mediation. The agreement ended open fighting, but not all disputes: incomplete disarmament, the status of contested areas, the return of displaced people and the security of Tigrayan populations remain sensitive issues. The AU continued to call for the full implementation of the ceasefire in 2023 and 2024.
The war’s human toll also remains a matter for caution. The most widely cited estimate in African and international diplomatic circles is around 600,000 deaths, a figure attributed to former African Union mediator Olusegun Obasanjo and subsequently reported by several leading media outlets. Other sources, including UN bodies, note that the exact total remains uncertain because of the information blackout, destruction and mass displacement. What is not disputed, however, is that millions of people were affected, and more than a million remained displaced, according to 2026 situation reports.
For Addis Ababa, the stakes go beyond Tigray. A sustained resumption of fighting would complicate internal stabilisation at a time when the federal state is already facing other areas of insecurity, notably in Amhara and some outlying areas. It would also weigh on the economy, in a country where aviation, logistics corridors and regional market activity depend heavily on the stability of northern routes. For Tigray’s residents, the questions are more immediate: the safety of villages, access to healthcare, the return of families and the resumption of trade with the rest of the country.
Relations with Sudan add another layer of complexity. Khartoum and Addis Ababa regularly trade accusations of supporting hostile forces. In this climate, any incident near the border can be interpreted as a signal or provocation. The war in Sudan, which has upended the balance in the neighbourhood, further increases the risk of spillover. In the Horn of Africa, crises almost never remain confined to a single territory. They overlap, feed into one another and weaken regional security mechanisms.
A warning for the whole Horn of Africa
This latest episode also highlights a broader political reality: in Ethiopia, peace is measured by more than the signing of a document. It is judged by civilian movement, the functioning of local administrations, effective disarmament and Addis Ababa’s ability to manage regional disputes without reopening fronts. For the African Union and IGAD, vigilance therefore remains focused on three points: preserving the ceasefire, clarifying the status of disputed territories and protecting populations caught between multiple chains of command.
At continental level, Tigray remains a test of the credibility of African mediation. The case has shown that a negotiated solution can stop an open war. It also shows that a peace agreement alone cannot erase the deep-rooted causes of a conflict. As long as questions of internal borders, political representation and local security remain unresolved, northern Ethiopia will remain a barometer of stability in the Horn of Africa.



