A metal that funds the war and crosses borders
In Khartoum, the debate over gold is anything but abstract. It touches on war, desert routes, public revenues and armed networks that thrive on the parallel economy. In today’s Sudan, every kilogram that leaves the legal system deepens the crisis and weakens an already fragmented state.
The northern border with Egypt has become one of the most sensitive points in this war economy. Egyptian authorities recently carried out a major operation in the south of the country against networks linked to gold, smuggling, weapons and irregular crossings. The Sudanese army, for its part, has announced security operations in mountainous border areas, where mining trafficking overlaps with front lines and rivalries between armed forces.
In Sudan’s war, gold has become a strategic resource
Sudan is one of the continent’s major gold producers. In 2025, official production reached 70 tonnes, according to figures reported by Sudanese mining authorities and cited by several media outlets and specialist organisations. But legal production does not tell the whole story. Recent studies and investigations estimate that a considerable share of the metal leaves the country through informal channels, sometimes to fund the warring parties.
Since war broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, gold has taken centre stage in the belligerents’ financial survival. The United Nations Security Council has noted that the conflict has profoundly affected the gold trade, while several independent analyses describe a sector in which artisanal mining, smuggling and military networks are closely intertwined. In the north of the country, this reality overlaps with routes to Egypt and Libya, two major transit areas.
The head of the paramilitary forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and his associates are regularly named in investigations into the appropriation of gold revenues. Several public sources also note that the Dagalo family has controlled mining interests for years, particularly around Jabal Amer in North Darfur. But suspicions do not end there. Research reports and statements by observers point out that the Sudanese Armed Forces have also benefited, directly or indirectly, from gold-related flows as part of a long and costly war.
Sanctions tighten, but networks adapt
The issue reached a new stage in 2026. The European Union strengthened its sanctions regime against Sudan by explicitly targeting the gold trade, banning the purchase, import or transfer of gold originating in Sudan into or through the Union, or via third countries, after 15 July 2026. London took a similar course, announcing sanctions targeting gold networks, financial facilitators and structures linked to the conflict.
These measures respond to a conclusion shared by several Western capitals and African researchers: Sudanese gold does not merely circulate as a commodity; it fuels arms purchases, payments to fighters and the consolidation of power networks. The United Kingdom has summed up the situation by referring to illicit flows that feed the war chests of both sides. For Khartoum, this means fewer foreign-currency earnings, less control over exports and greater reliance on intermediaries operating outside the official system.
Available figures also show the scale of the outflow. Official trade generated about $1.5 billion in 2024 and 2025, but estimates suggest that much larger volumes were sold clandestinely. In a fractured economy, this is no accounting nuance. It is a loss of fiscal sovereignty, with direct consequences for wages, imports and the Sudanese state’s ability to regain control of its resources.
What this operation says about Sudan today
The operation announced around the Egyptian border is therefore not aimed only at isolated smugglers. It shows that Sudan’s war is also being waged through the economy. Controlling a mine, an airstrip, a desert corridor or a currency-exchange office can matter as much as a military advance. In the north and in Darfur, the battle for gold determines access to cash and, through it, the duration of the conflict.
For Sudan’s population, the stakes are tangible. Families are facing rising prices, forced displacement and scarce public services. Cities under state control are not spared, as tax revenues shrink and distribution networks remain unstable. Mining areas in rural districts face a different burden: precarious work, insecurity, the presence of armed men and pollution linked to artisanal extraction.
At the regional level, this issue extends far beyond Sudan. It involves Egypt, Libya, the Red Sea and Gulf refining markets. It also concerns the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which are monitoring a conflict that has become one of the most destabilising in North Africa and the Horn. As long as gold remains a currency of war, every mediation effort will remain fragile. The real question, then, is not only how to close a border, but how to cut the financial networks that prolong the war.



