How drones are reshaping Sudan’s war
In Khartoum, the war is no longer confined to the front lines. It is also being fought in the skies above cities already battered by sieges, water and power cuts, and mass displacement. In Sudan, the intensive use of drones has turned an already deadly conflict into a war of attrition against civilians.
The shift is most evident in the centre of the country, but its effects extend much further. North Kordofan, with El Obeid as its regional capital, remains one of the most sensitive pressure points. A logistical hub between Khartoum, Darfur and the south of the country, the city is home to displaced people, vital infrastructure and armed units. Further west, the area around Tine, in North Darfur, is also a reminder of the porous border with Chad, where the effects of the Sudanese conflict are being felt on both sides.
Heavy toll, repeated warning
The latest available data show that drone strikes killed more than 1,100 civilians in Sudan between January and June 2026, according to the UN human rights office. The United Nations estimates that, over the same period, they accounted for about 80% of conflict-related civilian deaths. At the beginning of May, the same toll already stood at 880 civilian deaths between January and April. This is no isolated phenomenon. It is becoming the conflict’s main means of destruction.
The picture is particularly clear in Kordofan. The UN reported strikes around El Obeid as early as May, while Sudanese organisations monitoring violations documented a series of attacks in June on markets, civilian vehicles, petrol stations and shelters for displaced people. In North Kordofan alone, a local association recorded several waves of attacks during the month, with civilian deaths in El Obeid and Abu Zabad, as well as on roads used by fleeing families.
On 22 June, the African Union headquarters also expressed concern over the escalation around El Obeid and the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Sudan. The organisation called on the parties to cease hostilities, respect international humanitarian law and protect civilians, while urging external actors not to worsen the war. This reminder matters. It shows that Sudan is no longer just a matter of the political transition interrupted in Khartoum. It has become a regional crisis.
High-tech warfare, very real crisis
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has adapted. According to ACLED, drones now dominate the war in Sudan, with strikes reaching further, becoming more mobile and proving harder to intercept. The organisation also notes that both sides have adjusted their supply chains and aerial tactics. In practice, this means fewer visible head-on battles, but more precision attacks on civilian targets or infrastructure that makes daily life possible.
This shift is changing people’s lives. In El Obeid, strikes are hitting petrol stations, electricity and water supplies. This is hampering evacuations, complicating medical care, disrupting the transport of goods and driving up the cost of basic foodstuffs. For displaced families, the danger no longer comes only from fighting on the ground. It also comes from makeshift shelters, queues for water, markets and secondary roads. For local authorities, managing the emergency becomes almost impossible whenever a power station, fuel depot or road is targeted.
The conflict is also having cross-border effects. Strikes near the border with Chad are putting additional pressure on host areas, where refugees are arriving in regions that are already fragile. The UN has warned that attacks around Tina and the Chad-Sudan border are intensifying pressure on land, water and basic services. In other words, the war in Sudan is not destabilising Sudan alone. It is also undermining the balance between neighbouring countries across the Sahel and the Sudano-Sahelian belt.
What this phase says about what comes next
June confirmed a risk already identified by the United Nations: the rainy season is no longer enough to slow the war. Drones allow military pressure to be maintained despite difficult ground conditions. This is a major strategic shift. It prolongs the war, reduces the protection available to civilians and makes local stabilisation more difficult, including in areas where displaced people had begun returning gradually.
What happens next will depend on two factors. First, whether the warring parties can contain the escalation around El Obeid, Darfur and the country’s central triangle. Second, whether African and UN mechanisms can impose concrete limits on arms transfers and attacks on civilians. At this point, Sudan illustrates a reality that now spans the continent: in several African conflicts, the question is no longer just who controls the ground, but who controls the skies.



