In Khartoum, the currency question is no longer just about the value of a banknote. It affects wages, food purchases, family transfers and businesses’ ability to continue operating. After more than three years of war, Sudanese authorities are preparing a new phase in the replacement of the Sudanese pound, but the operation alone will not be enough to restore confidence.
A reform being carried out in areas controlled by the authorities
On 21 September 2026, General Ibrahim Jaber Ibrahim, a member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, chaired a meeting in Khartoum of the Higher Commission tasked with changing and replacing the currency. The governor of the Central Bank of Sudan, several ministers and representatives of the relevant administrations took part.
The Minister of Culture, Information, Antiquities and Tourism, Khalid Al-Aïssar, described the meeting as the culmination of discussions that had been under way for more than a year and a half. The plan initially provides for implementation in states considered safe by the authorities. The commission also wants to speed up the opening of bank accounts and the use of payment applications.
This approach builds on operations already under way in several regions. Sudan’s Ministry of Culture and Information says earlier phases involved, in particular, the 500- and 1,000-pound notes, with a rollout in Khartoum, Gezira state and some localities in White Nile state in spring 2026.
The authorities link the replacement of banknotes to several objectives: limiting counterfeiting, reducing the circulation of cash that is difficult to monitor, curbing gold smuggling and strengthening oversight of public payments. The Central Bank also wants to improve connections between banking applications and government departments.
However, the available information does not support the claim that a new monetary unit, with a value different from that of the current pound, has already been officially announced. At this stage, this is a plan to replace and reorganise the circulation of money, with the full timetable and practical arrangements still to be clarified.
War has disrupted economic networks
Since fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces began in April 2023, the economy has operated in a fragmented way. Institutions, banks, markets and transport routes are not everywhere subject to the same authorities. This division complicates the movement of goods and makes exchange-rate monitoring particularly unstable.
The war has also shifted the de facto administrative centre to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, while Khartoum remains at the heart of the political and symbolic battle. Areas retaken by the army and those controlled by the Rapid Support Forces may apply different rules. A monetary reform carried out in only some regions therefore risks creating several zones of financial circulation.
The Sudanese government links the pound’s depreciation to an “economic war” waged alongside the fighting. This is the official narrative and should be distinguished from documented economic factors: falling production, disrupted exports, the public deficit, destroyed infrastructure and a weakened banking system.
An economic analysis of the Horn of Africa estimates that Sudanese inflation reached about 170% in 2024, driven by the currency’s collapse and rising housing, transport and food costs. Estimates may vary depending on the markets observed, since the official rate and rates applied in parallel channels do not always coincide.
The exchange rate cited in reports from Khartoum is said to have risen from 7,000 to 8,000 pounds per dollar in a matter of weeks. This level has not been confirmed by an accessible independent statistical series among the sources consulted. It nevertheless illustrates a widely documented trend: the Sudanese pound has lost significant value since the start of the war.
Changing banknotes is not enough to stabilise the currency
Replacing a currency can temporarily reduce the circulation of stolen or counterfeit banknotes, or cash hoarded outside the banking system. It can also help the authorities better identify account holders and speed up digital payments. In a country where banks have been damaged or closed in several areas, these aims remain difficult to achieve.
The main risk concerns households that depend on cash. Small traders, market vendors, day labourers and displaced families rarely have regular access to a bank branch or a stable internet connection. A short exchange period could lead to queues, lost savings and higher fees charged by intermediaries.
Businesses face a similar challenge. Importers need foreign currency to pay for goods. Agricultural producers need reliable payment channels to buy seeds, fuel and equipment. In rural areas, a monetary reform poorly timed with harvests or livestock movements could further disrupt trade.
Combating gold smuggling is another concern. Gold remains one of Sudan’s main sources of foreign currency, but some of its production bypasses official channels. The commission responsible for monetary reform therefore wants to combine the banknote change with market monitoring, digital tracking and improved revenue from agricultural and livestock exports.
These measures will not have lasting effects without a recovery in production and improved security. A currency that is harder to counterfeit does not create foreign-exchange reserves. Nor does it restore supply chains destroyed by the fighting. Stability will therefore depend as much on monetary policy as on the ability to revive economic activity.
A test for the Sudanese state and IGAD
The issue extends beyond Sudan’s borders. The country is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, an organisation in the Horn of Africa involved in regional mediation efforts. The currency crisis also affects neighbouring countries, particularly through refugee movements, cross-border trade and pressure on food markets.
South Sudan is particularly exposed. Some of its oil exports depend on infrastructure that runs through Sudan. Any further disruption to payments, transport or foreign-currency revenues could therefore affect both economies, although Sudan’s difficulties should not be conflated with those of its neighbour.
For the Sudanese authorities, the next step will be to specify the exchange dates, the banknotes involved, the guarantees offered to savers and the regions covered. It will also be necessary to establish how areas where the Khartoum administration has no effective control will be dealt with.
The reform will thus be judged by a simple measure: its ability to allow Sudanese people to pay, save and trade without losing another share of their income each day. In the current context, replacing banknotes is an administrative tool. Restoring confidence will depend on peace, production and a financial system accessible across the country.
Sources consulted: Sudanese news agency SUNA on the meeting of 22 September 2026, Sudan’s Ministry of Culture and Information on the phases of currency replacement, Akhbar Wadi al-Nil on the commission’s objectives, economic note on the Horn of Africa and inflation in Sudan.



