For families who have waited decades to learn what happened to their loved ones, one question remains: why were so many crimes referred to the authorities after the end of apartheid never prosecuted? Thabo Mbeki’s testimony on 19 October 2026 puts that question at the heart of a South African judicial inquiry, without yet providing a definitive answer.
A commission to examine the delays
In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established in 1996 under Nelson Mandela’s presidency, collected testimony about political violence committed during apartheid. Some perpetrators could obtain amnesty if they fully disclosed the nature of political crimes. Those who did not apply for it, or were not granted it, remained liable to prosecution.
The TRC referred about 300 cases to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for investigation and possible prosecution, according to a review commissioned by the institution. Only a small number resulted in convictions. Time is now complicating the judicial process: witnesses and suspects have died, while evidence may have disappeared.
On 29 May 2025, President Cyril Ramaphosa established a commission of inquiry chaired by Sisi Khampepe, a former Constitutional Court judge. Its task is to determine whether pressure prevented the police or prosecutors from investigating TRC cases, and whether public officials were involved. It may also recommend further investigations or prosecutions. The allegations remain to be established: the commission is not mandated to presume anyone’s guilt.
Mbeki rejects allegations of a deal
Thabo Mbeki led South Africa from 1999 to 2008, after Nelson Mandela. Appearing before the commission in Johannesburg, he denied ordering cases to be dropped or reaching a secret agreement with army and police officials to shield them from prosecution.
The former president acknowledged meeting officers from the former defence force and the South African police. But, according to his testimony, one meeting concerned the difficulties those officials faced with the amnesty process and a request for former president F. W. de Klerk to appear before the relevant commission. Mbeki maintains that the meeting was not about negotiating immunity. South African media outlet TimesLIVE and the Associated Press report these details.
Mbeki also defended his 2003 parliamentary address, delivered after the TRC’s final report was submitted. He says it rejected a general amnesty and recognised the NPA’s authority to decide whether to prosecute. He argues that the NPA must explain why cases referred by the commission did not progress. This is his account; investigators must compare it with the documents, testimony and decisions of the time.
The debate also concerns prosecutorial independence
The issue goes beyond the responsibility of a former head of state. It touches on the functioning of South African institutions after 1994: could the government influence investigations, and did the judicial authorities exercise their independence? The commission is examining the period from 2003 to the present, spanning several administrations. It will therefore have to distinguish between decisions, responsibilities and levels of evidence.
Victims’ families and survivors, supported by the Foundation for Human Rights, are seeking explanations for the delays and want justice to acknowledge the consequences of these dead ends. Twenty-five families and survivors launched legal proceedings against the state in January 2025. For them, the delay is not an abstraction: it may make it impossible to identify those responsible and deprive their loved ones of a court hearing in their lifetime.
The NPA, for its part, says it has revived cases. In April 2025, it welcomed a High Court ruling on prosecutions relating to the deaths of activists known as the “COSAS 4”. The court rejected objections challenging, among other things, the possibility of prosecuting crimes against humanity committed before 1994. The example shows that proceedings remain possible, but does not resolve the question of how hundreds of other cases have been handled.
Disagreement also surrounds reparations. The government presents the commission as a means of establishing the facts and guiding decisions on what should follow. The families, meanwhile, have maintained their legal action over constitutional damages. The inquiry could shed light on institutional responsibility, but it does not automatically replace criminal trials or guarantee individual redress on its own.
A test for South African democracy
The case resonates across southern Africa, where South Africa’s experience of transitional justice is often viewed as an attempt to reconcile truth-telling, reconciliation and criminal accountability. The SADC, a regional community bringing together southern African states, is not responsible for this national inquiry. But its outcome will shape how the region assesses a democracy’s ability to reopen old cases without prejudging the findings.
For South Africans, the issue concerns both trust in the prosecution service and the practical meaning of equality before the law. For families, it is about truth and recognition; for institutions, it is about demonstrating that past decisions can be examined impartially. Mbeki’s hearings are continuing, while other former officials are also due to testify. The next decisive step will be the commission’s report and recommendations, expected after its work is complete: they will need to clarify what has been established, what remains contested and what judicial action is still possible.



