For Antananarivo, diversifying its partners does not mean being able to do without any of them. Since Michaël Randrianirina took power, Madagascar has sought greater room for manoeuvre between Moscow and its traditional partners, without breaking with Europe or the financial institutions on which part of its economy depends.
A transition under close regional scrutiny
The change of power in October 2025 remains the starting point for this new diplomatic phase. Protests led by Gen Z, initially fuelled by water and electricity cuts, challenged Andry Rajoelina’s government. The defection of Capsat soldiers accelerated the crisis. Colonel Randrianirina subsequently took the helm of the transition. Rajoelina’s departure aboard a French military aircraft was reported by several media outlets, although accounts of the circumstances surrounding his departure were contradictory.
Madagascar is not merely an issue of domestic politics. An island state in the Indian Ocean, it occupies a strategic position on maritime routes near the Mozambique Channel. It is also a member of SADC, the Southern African Development Community, which has called for inclusive national dialogue and a roadmap towards new elections. Its communiqué sets out monitoring deadlines in 2026.
The region therefore has two related concerns: political stability in Madagascar and a return to a credible constitutional order. For residents, the issue is more immediate. The transition must respond to expectations voiced in the streets, particularly over essential services, while laying the groundwork for an end to the crisis. The political timetable will also affect the confidence of economic partners.
Moscow gains visibility as Western ties endure
Russia has made a series of gestures since the seizure of power. Military contacts, announcements of cooperation and the opening of a Russian cultural centre in Antananarivo have raised the profile of its presence. On 19 February 2026, Randrianirina met Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin during his first state visit to Moscow. The meeting confirmed the importance both governments attach to closer bilateral ties.
This rapprochement is not enough, however, to establish that Madagascar has chosen a new camp. The transitional government says it wants to pursue a foreign policy “in all directions” and describes itself as non-aligned in global conflicts. In principle, this approach means expanding partnerships without automatically adopting the positions of any one power. How it will translate into concrete decisions, particularly on defence cooperation and economic agreements, remains to be seen.
Caution is also warranted because of the ties already established with Western countries. France retains a historic relationship and interests in the Indian Ocean. The European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are among the economic partners that Malagasy officials cannot ignore. Political scientist Adrien Ratsimbaharison notes that Malagasy elites are also familiar with the legacy of ties with the Soviet Union during Didier Ratsiraka’s time, but that current economic needs make a clean break with the West unlikely.
Room for manoeuvre, but at what cost?
For the authorities, competition between partners could open up options: securing equipment, training or investment from several capitals. Researcher Juvence Ramasy believes Madagascar’s position in the Indian Ocean increases the strategic interest in the island. In this view, Antananarivo is seeking to take advantage of rivalries rather than align itself with a single partner.
But this “balancing act” has its limits. Closer military cooperation may raise questions about transparency, civilian oversight and long-term dependence. Likewise, investment promises are useful only if they lead to verifiable projects and benefits for the country. Diplomatic announcements primarily benefit leaders seeking support; their impact on households, businesses and regions depends on the agreements reached and how they are implemented.
Russia’s previous involvement in Madagascar also points to the need to distinguish visibility from results. Under Didier Ratsiraka, the country had already maintained close ties with Moscow. More recently, mining cooperation involving Russian interests failed to revive state-owned company Kraoma’s operations on a lasting basis, according to an investigation by Le Monde on Russia’s ambitions in Madagascar. This experience is a reminder that a partnership on paper guarantees neither lasting jobs nor fairly distributed benefits.
Credibility will also be decided in Antananarivo
The transition’s foreign policy will be judged abroad, but also at home. The young people who mobilised in 2025 did not merely challenge a president: they expressed expectations concerning public services and government accountability. If diplomatic choices remain disconnected from these priorities, a succession of visits and agreements risks seeming abstract to much of the population.
SADC provides an important regional framework for monitoring what comes next. Its call for a Malagasy-led dialogue places the transition under a dual obligation: to maintain relations with a range of partners while offering guarantees on political inclusion and preparations for elections. The roadmap and reports expected by the regional organisation will make it possible to assess the progress announced.
Across Africa, the Malagasy case is a reminder that states can seek to diversify their relations without necessarily breaking with long-standing partners. But non-alignment cannot be measured by rhetoric alone. It is tested by the transparency of agreements, the ability to defend national priorities and the existence of an accepted political timetable. Madagascar’s diplomatic balance will remain fragile until these external commitments are matched by tangible progress in the transition and in everyday life.



