Can a political idea survive the man who shaped it, especially when the state, institutions and armed forces remain contested? In Libya, fifteen years after Muammar Gaddafi’s death, Gaddafism remains less a programme ready for revival than a legacy of memory, rejection and unresolved questions.
A doctrine, but also a system of power
The “Green Book” remains the defining text of Gaddafism. In it, Muammar Gaddafi advocated a “third way”, presented as an alternative to capitalism and communism. But this doctrine alone is not enough to describe the regime established after he came to power in 1969.
The Jamahiriya — a term for a system presented as power exercised by the masses — was based on popular committees and an official political organisation. In practice, power was highly centralised around Gaddafi. The redistribution of oil revenues strengthened the role of the state, while local structures could serve both as conduits and as instruments of control.
This system changed over the decades. Its rhetoric combined references to Islam and Arab nationalism, followed by Pan-African ambitions and opposition to the influence of Western powers. Its legacy therefore amounts to more than a book or its slogans: it also encompasses institutions, economic policies and practices of government.
Between the promise of participation and repression
The contradiction is central. The regime claimed to practise direct democracy, but repressed political opposition and competing visions of national identity. Nationalisation and redistribution policies also caused tensions, particularly over property and economic autonomy.
Oil revenues enabled the state to fund policies and alliances. They also concentrated a substantial share of resources and decision-making at the top. This combination of redistribution, political control and personalised power gave Gaddafism a distinctive imprint, difficult to separate from the trajectory of Libyan society.
Abroad, the regime supported anti-colonial and revolutionary movements, as well as groups that several governments described as terrorist. These forms of support, together with clashes with the United States and European countries, led to international sanctions. Both sides of this record must be considered: the regime’s Pan-African influence and its repression at home, as well as the controversies surrounding its alliances.
An African memory shaped by 2011
Gaddafi gradually turned towards Africa after often strained relations with Arab leaders. Libyan investment and support for some development projects fostered a positive memory among some African elites and officials. This memory varies between countries and generations; it does not mean that Libya’s political model was adopted elsewhere.
The regime’s fall in 2011 also left a lasting regional impact. The movement of weapons from Libyan stockpiles helped fuel conflicts in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, although it was not their only cause. Sahelian crises also have their own political, social and security dynamics. Analyses by the Institute for Security Studies in Africa and research on the movement of weapons document this regional spread. The ISS analysis of weapons in the Sahel and research on arms transfers from Libya shed light on this mechanism without reducing the region’s instability to a single event.
The international intervention in 2011 also remains a subject of debate. The African Union had put forward a roadmap and mediation efforts, notably under South Africa’s leadership. Its high-level committee called for a ceasefire, national dialogue and a political transition. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised measures to protect civilians; the military campaign that followed contributed to the regime’s downfall. For several African officials, the gap between the proposed mediation and the military outcome remains a source of mistrust. The South African statement on African Union mediation records this.
A divided Libya, a legacy without an obvious heir
Libya did not undergo a simple change of government in 2011. The uprising became militarised, civil war pitted armed Libyan factions against one another, and foreign intervention shifted the balance of power. After the regime fell, figures from the former system were marginalised, though some later joined different political and military camps.
Since then, the country has remained marked by rivalry between the authorities based in Tripoli and the dominant forces in the east, although alliances continue to shift. This fragmentation complicates efforts to rebuild shared institutions and hold a political process accepted by the different actors. It also makes the re-emergence of a unified Gaddafist movement difficult.
The death of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, confirmed by the Libyan prosecutor’s office on 4 February 2026 after a gunfight in Zintan, marks a turning point for supporters of the former ruling family. The Libyan News Agency, LANA, reported the official confirmation; the Associated Press also corroborated the announcement with officials and representatives of Saif al-Islam. The detailed circumstances of his death remain distinct from the established facts about his death. The prosecutor’s confirmation reported by LANA and the Associated Press report confirm the reported date and location.
His disappearance does not close the question of Gaddafist memory. Rather, it highlights the difficulty of turning that memory into a shared political project in a country where institutions remain contested and experiences of the former regime are deeply divided.
A legacy shaped by Libyan history
Gaddafism was not replicated in identical form in another country. Its model was rooted in a specific society, history and resources: the end of the colonial period, the discovery of oil, the rise of the state, and then decades of isolation linked to sanctions and embargoes. These factors transformed relations between the state and the population.
Fifteen years after 2011, the debate therefore goes beyond nostalgia or rejection. It concerns the institutions capable of representing Libya’s diversity, the sharing of resources and society’s role in public decision-making. For the countries of the Sahel and the African Union, Libya’s experience is also a reminder that an intervention or regime change can have lasting regional consequences when political transition and the security of weapons stockpiles do not follow.



