In New York on 22 September 2026, António Guterres did more than deliver a farewell speech. He left African states with an open question: what is multilateralism worth if it recognises the continent’s crises but continues to limit its role in global decision-making?
After two terms at the helm of the United Nations, the Portuguese secretary-general will leave office on 31 December 2026. His final opening address to the General Assembly focused on four urgent challenges: wars, inequality, climate disruption and artificial intelligence. For Africa, these issues are not separate. They intersect in public finances, food security, access to energy and digital sovereignty.
A decade marked by closer ties with the African Union
Since taking office in January 2017, António Guterres has regularly described the African Union as a key UN partner. The relationship has been structured around a common framework for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights.
In May 2026, the two organisations reaffirmed their cooperation at their 10th annual conference in Addis Ababa. They focused in particular on Agenda 2063, the African Union’s roadmap for transforming the continent, and the Sustainable Development Goals. The May 2026 joint UN–African Union communiqué nonetheless highlights the scale of the challenges: protracted conflicts, humanitarian crises, inequality, debt and declining respect for international law.
This institutional closeness was also evident at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa in February 2026. Guterres said the absence of a permanent African seat on the Security Council had become “indefensible”. He summed up his position in direct terms: “We are in 2026, not 1946.”
The demand is not new. It is a longstanding African Union position, known as the Ezulwini Consensus. The continent is seeking at least two permanent seats and five additional non-permanent seats on the Security Council. The African Union, rather than an external body, should determine how they are allocated.
Guterres’s address to the African Union shows an important shift in UN language. Africa is presented not merely as a place where the UN operates, but as a political force involved in defining international rules.
From the Sahel to Sudan, the limits of international action
Guterres’s record in Africa is nevertheless mixed. In the Sahel, the United Nations has had to contend with growing distrust among transitional authorities, the advance of armed groups and competition from new security partners. In Mali, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission, Minusma, left the country in December 2023 after the Malian authorities demanded its withdrawal.
Mahamat Saleh Annadif knows this period at first hand. The Chadian diplomat has served as his country’s foreign minister and as the UN special representative for West Africa and the Sahel. His career illustrates the role of African officials in mediation efforts, as well as the tensions between international mandates and the expectations of the governments concerned.
In several countries, the UN’s presence is now judged by very tangible results: protecting civilians, supporting national institutions, helping displaced people and ensuring access to essential services. A peacekeeping operation cannot replace a political agreement. Guterres reiterated this to the Security Council on 18 September 2026, calling for such missions to be deployed only when they are underpinned by a solid ceasefire or a credible political strategy.
This approach directly concerns Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. In these countries, civilians bear the cost of the fighting, while diplomatic decisions often remain far removed from the affected areas. Cooperation between the UN and the African Union can improve mediation, but it does not resolve disagreements between member states or rivalries on the Security Council.
Climate, debt and resources: Africa’s other front
The second strand of Guterres’s record concerns development. He has frequently called for reform of the international financial system, which he considers too costly for developing countries. For African states, the problem goes beyond aid alone. It affects borrowing costs, budgetary room for manoeuvre and the ability to invest in electricity, transport, water and healthcare.
At the Africa Forward summit in Nairobi in May 2026, the secretary-general stressed the need to process critical minerals and other resources from the continent locally. His message echoes a demand made by many African governments: extraction must no longer be separated from value creation, skilled employment and the protection of communities.
Climate change makes this urgency even greater. Africa has contributed relatively little to historical emissions, but faces high adaptation costs. African states are therefore calling for more accessible finance, more grants and fewer loans that could increase debt. In Nairobi, Guterres also championed Africa’s industrial transformation and renewable energy production.
For national capitals, the issue is diplomatic. For local authorities and businesses, it is immediate: securing affordable finance, ensuring access to energy and creating value chains that do not end with the export of raw materials.
Artificial intelligence, a new test of sovereignty
In his 22 September speech, Guterres put artificial intelligence on a par with war, climate change and inequality. He called for the technology to be regulated before its uses outstrip states’ capacity to govern it.
For Africa, the issue carries two risks. The first is the digital divide: without infrastructure, local data and skills, African countries could remain mere users of systems designed elsewhere. The second concerns rights. Automated tools can influence access to credit, recruitment, surveillance and the flow of information.
But artificial intelligence also offers opportunities. It can support agriculture, healthcare, education and the management of electricity grids. Africa’s priority, then, is less about joining a technological race than securing a place in setting standards, producing data and sharing the value created.
After Guterres, the question of representation
The secretary-general’s departure will not bring the relationship between the UN and Africa to an end. Rather, it will open a new phase. African states will need to defend their priorities in the process of choosing Guterres’s successor, reforming the Security Council and reorganising peace operations.
The secretary-general’s record is therefore twofold. He has raised the profile of African demands, particularly on representation and financial reform. But he has not changed the balance of power that continues to block these reforms.
The significance of his legacy will now depend on collective decisions. The African Union will seek to speak with a more coherent voice. African countries will also have to balance their national interests, regional commitments and ambition to influence the global order. The question will no longer be simply whether the UN is “on Africa’s side”. It will be whether Africa finally has the means to participate fully in decisions that shape its future.



