Mediterranean diplomacy also read through Gaza
At El-Alamein, Egypt put the eastern Mediterranean at the centre of the conversation, but the message reached beyond this maritime space. By hosting Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on 8 September 2026, Cairo brought energy cooperation, regional security and the Palestinian issue together in a single political sequence. The summit also underscored a constant in Egyptian diplomacy: Egypt wants to remain a point of support linking the Arab world, southern Europe and the Levant.
The choice of El-Alamein was no accident. This Mediterranean coastal city is now emerging as a venue for diplomatic projection, as the region continues to feel the effects of the war in Gaza, tensions in Lebanon and instability in Libya. In this context, the Egypt-Greece-Cyprus axis serves as a platform for coordination on highly practical issues: energy, migration, maritime security, reconstruction and international law.
Cairo, Athens and Nicosia align their positions
The joint statement issued after the summit confirmed a common diplomatic front on Gaza. The three leaders backed implementation of the second phase of Donald Trump’s comprehensive plan to end the conflict, as endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803. This phase is intended to pave the way for reconstruction, early recovery and the preservation of the unity of Palestinian territories. Resolution 2803 was adopted by the Security Council in November 2025 and is now serving as a reference point for several Arab and European capitals.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called for «full, sustained and unhindered» humanitarian access to Gaza, while rejecting any attempt to forcibly displace Palestinians. In the same statement, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus reaffirmed their support for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state within the borders of 4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and reiterated their commitment to the geographical, political and legal unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This position extends an Egyptian line already evident in Arab statements in Cairo on Gaza’s reconstruction and the need for a lasting ceasefire.
The Egyptian head of state also reiterated his categorical rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinians. This is not merely a declaration. It reflects Cairo’s fear that the conflict could spill over to Egypt’s borders and permanently alter demographic and political balances in the region. For Egypt, the Palestinian issue concerns national security, domestic stability and the country’s regional role. Official statements from the Egyptian presidency on the meeting also stress the full implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh ceasefire agreement and complete adherence to the US plan.
Lebanon, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean: an agenda beyond Gaza
The summit did not treat Gaza as an isolated issue. The three countries also called for an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, while supporting the strengthening of Lebanese institutions, particularly the army. On Libya, they reaffirmed their support for the country’s sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, reiterating the familiar call for foreign forces and mercenaries to withdraw and for presidential and parliamentary elections to be held. This sequence shows that Mediterranean capitals are seeking to stabilise an arc of crisis stretching from Gaza to Tripoli via Beirut.
For Egypt, this meeting also reflected an approach. Cairo is advocating a political solution rather than a military spiral, and is seeking recognition of this framework from neighbouring European partners. Greece and Cyprus, both members of the European Union, give Egypt a useful platform on maritime law, energy security and movement across the Mediterranean. The three countries also recalled in their statement that any maritime delimitation agreement must comply with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Energy, the engine of cooperation and a lever of influence
Behind the statements of principle, energy remains one of the most concrete drivers of the Egypt-Greece-Cyprus partnership. The GREGY project, a high-voltage electricity interconnector between Egypt and Greece, was cited as a project to pursue. The European Commission describes it as a subsea cable of about 950 to 954 kilometres linking the two countries’ electricity systems, with capacity of up to 3,000 MW and the aim of transmitting renewable electricity from Egypt to Greece and, more broadly, Europe.
Cypriot gas also occupies a central place. The scheme discussed at El-Alamein involves transporting gas to Egyptian infrastructure, then re-exporting it to European markets after processing. For Cairo, this arrangement strengthens the role of Egypt’s existing terminals and capacity. For Nicosia, it opens up a credible export route. For Athens, it places Greece within a new Mediterranean energy geography. The cooperation is therefore more than a political alliance: it creates a value chain in which each party is seeking strategic and economic gains.
In the same vein, the three countries discussed concluding agreements on maritime boundaries. This matters well beyond the triangle itself, since maritime boundaries, gas resources and energy corridors overlap in the eastern Mediterranean. Tripartite cooperation provides a framework for stabilisation, but also sends a political signal to other regional actors. The aim is to safeguard investment, limit incidents and preserve legal predictability in an area where any maritime boundary can become a source of tension.
Significance beyond the El-Alamein summit
The summit says something broader about Egypt’s African and Mediterranean diplomacy. Cairo wants to present itself as a pivot able to link Gaza’s reconstruction, regional security and energy integration with Europe. This ambition rests on two assets: a key geographical position and the ability to engage with several camps without being confined to a single bloc. At the continental level, this kind of meeting is also a reminder that North Africa has a bearing on the Middle East, energy and the law of the sea, not only on matters concerning its immediate neighbourhood.
The next step will be primarily diplomatic. The three capitals agreed to hold an eleventh trilateral summit in Cyprus, with no date announced. Until then, the question will be straightforward: can Resolution 2803 and the second phase of the US plan translate into tangible progress on aid, reconstruction and governance in Gaza, while regional tensions remain high? For Egypt, the answer will affect its regional credibility as much as its ability to turn crisis diplomacy into an agenda for stability.



