A legal text with much wider political stakes
In Kinshasa, a bill can sometimes carry more weight than a speech. That is the case with the law setting out the conditions for organising a referendum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It comes at a time when debate over constitutional revision has already heightened tensions in the Congolese political arena.
The issue therefore goes beyond procedure. In DR Congo, the 2006 Constitution, revised in 2011, strictly regulates constitutional amendments. Article 218 provides that an amendment is final only after a referendum, unless it is approved by a three-fifths majority of both Houses sitting in Congress. Article 220 prohibits any amendment concerning the number and length of the President of the Republic’s terms of office.
What the Constitutional Court approved
The Constitutional Court ruled the law constitutional, but entered reservations concerning thirteen articles: 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 23 and 43. It specified that the text could be published in the Official Journal, with its ruling annexed, so that its implementation takes account of those reservations.
This step was expected by the head of state, who had already referred the matter to the Court before any promulgation, invoking Article 160 of the Constitution, which concerns the review of the constitutionality of laws. The move was announced publicly in late June 2026, amid an already entrenched political controversy.
The Congolese Constitutional Council is therefore not blocking the process. It is setting conditions for it. In practice, this opens the way for presidential promulgation, but does not ease the political tensions surrounding the possible use of a referendum in a country where the issue of presidential terms remains legally sensitive and politically explosive.
Opposition on alert, between law and political leverage
The opposition coalition C64 has built its case against the government around the defence of the constitutional order. It brings together forces that see this sequence of events as a risk of a shift towards a new institutional architecture that could pave the way for a wholesale overhaul of the Constitution. This concern has been fuelled by public debate over constitutional reform, which has featured prominently in Congolese politics for several months.
The opposition is not simply saying no. It has also set a timetable. Following consultations led by the National Episcopal Conference of Congo, CENCO, and the Church of Christ in Congo, ECC, C64 agreed to suspend a march planned in Kinshasa for 22 July 2026. It has nevertheless set 15 August 2026 as the deadline for the official convening of an inclusive national dialogue. If that does not happen, it threatens to resume its peaceful civic actions.
This timetable makes one thing clear: in DR Congo, institutional balances are shaped as much by legal texts as by the streets, the churches and the relationship between the majority and its opponents. Kinshasa remains the centre of gravity of the debate, but its political implications are already extending to the provinces, where parties are gauging their ability to mobilise and establish a presence.
What this means in practice for Congolese people
For the government, this sequence of events offers room for manoeuvre. The Constitutional Court’s approval provides procedural safeguards and gives President Félix Tshisekedi institutional backing to promulgate the law. The government can therefore argue that it is acting within the framework of the rule of law. But that argument is not enough to dispel the opposition’s suspicions, especially in a climate where the question of a third term regularly returns to public debate.
For the population, the stakes are more concrete than they might appear. Constitutional reform that is poorly explained, or seen as a foregone conclusion, can erode civic trust. Conversely, a credible framework for dialogue could prevent another institutional crisis in a country already facing security, economic and territorial challenges. The presidency itself continues to put these issues at the centre of its political agenda, alongside security, the modernisation of the state and administrative reforms.
The role of the churches is particularly important here. CENCO and ECC remain influential mediators in Congolese society. Their intervention reflects a recurring reality in DR Congo: when political rhetoric hardens, efforts to find a channel for de-escalation often rely on moral and social actors able to engage with several sides at once.
Regional implications to watch closely
The Democratic Republic of the Congo does not operate in a vacuum. A member of the Southern African Development Community, SADC, and the East African Community, EAC, it already influences several regional balances, particularly in the Great Lakes region. Any institutional tension in Kinshasa therefore has repercussions beyond its borders, as it affects diplomatic, security and economic stability in Central and Southern Africa.
The precedent also matters. In 2011, the revision of certain articles of the Constitution had already altered the balance of the fundamental text. That political memory is now fuelling concern about any new move towards a referendum. In DR Congo, the question is not simply whether a referendum is possible. It is what its purpose would be, what method would be used and how much trust exists between institutions.
The coming weeks will therefore be decisive. Between the announced promulgation, the 15 August deadline set by C64 and the prospect of a national dialogue, the Congolese government will have to clarify its roadmap. In Kinshasa, the battle is not solely a legal one. It is political, institutional and symbolic. And in a country of this size, a sequence of events like this rarely remains strictly a domestic matter.



