In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an initiative presented as political mediation is already running up against a decisive question: who can speak in the name of peace, and under what conditions, in an eastern city controlled by an armed movement? The government’s response could affect the opposition’s room for manoeuvre as much as the prospects for national dialogue.
A meeting in Goma at the heart of a conflict
The Coalition Article 64 (C64), a platform of opposition parties, wants to meet President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa, followed by former head of state Joseph Kabila in Goma. Moïse Katumbi has presented the initiative as an effort in favour of national dialogue. No firm timetable for either meeting has been announced, however.
The choice of Goma changes the scope of the plan. The capital of North Kivu has been under AFC/M23 control since January 2025. The politico-military coalition announced the creation of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), with Kabila at its head, on 12 October 2026. This declared rapprochement between the former president and an armed movement places any meeting in a particularly sensitive security and political context.
On 30 September 2025, the Kinshasa High Military Court sentenced Kabila to death in absentia for treason, war crimes and other charges linked to his alleged involvement with AFC/M23. This is a Congolese judicial decision, contested by his camp. The sentence and the accusations should therefore not be conflated with guilt established by a judgment delivered in his presence and following adversarial proceedings.
Kinshasa’s red line
On 5 November 2026, Deputy Prime Minister for the Interior Jacquemain Shabani Lukoo warned that C64 officials could face prosecution if they went to Goma without government authorisation. He argues that contacts with actors present in occupied territories cannot be undertaken outside the framework set by the state.
To justify this position, Shabani cites Article 192 of the Penal Code, which, according to his interpretation, provides for a sentence of one to five years’ penal servitude for maintaining relations during wartime, without government authorisation, with the subjects or agents of an enemy power. This is the legal characterisation advanced by the minister, not a judicial ruling on the proposed trip. The text provides for an offence; its application to a particular political meeting would have to be assessed by the competent authorities.
The minister says his administration will monitor the activities of political parties and document facts it considers potentially criminal. He also announced his intention to approach the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate, on the grounds that some of the parties concerned are represented in parliament. So far, no legal proceedings against C64 officials have been announced, and the precise nature of the sanctions mentioned remains unclear.
The proposed meeting with Tshisekedi has not been confirmed either. Shabani described the president as open to it, while making clear that he does not manage his diary. The C64 will therefore have to contend both with political uncertainty in Kinshasa and with an official warning concerning Goma.
Political dialogue or risk of legal action?
For the coalition, speaking separately to the head of state and his predecessor could open a channel for discussion in a crisis where political avenues remain narrow. But the plan raises a practical question: can a meeting with Kabila in Goma be separated from the territorial control exercised by AFC/M23 and the political role the movement claims? The government invokes sovereignty and security; the C64 emphasises dialogue.
This clash of positions does not, in itself, determine the legality of the initiative. It does, however, expose the possible costs for each actor. Coalition officials risk a confrontation with the authorities or prosecution if the authorities consider the law applicable. Kinshasa, for its part, could be accused of restricting political initiative if the warning turns into a sanction without an independent examination of the facts.
For the people of North Kivu, the stakes go beyond rivalry between leaders. Goma is a major city where movement, trade and everyday services depend on a context of armed control and uncertainty. A political visit could draw attention to a path towards negotiations, but could also heighten tensions around an area where the state’s authority is contested.
A regional dimension to watch
The crisis in eastern DRC also affects relations with neighbouring countries and regional peace mechanisms. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) have both been involved in regional security efforts. A C64 initiative does not replace these frameworks or discussions between Kinshasa and armed actors, but it could alter political dynamics around any potential dialogue.
The next turning point will therefore be less the announcement of mediation than the conditions attached to it: will a meeting with Tshisekedi be scheduled? Will the C64 go ahead with the trip to Goma? Will the government clarify the procedure it envisages? The answers will show whether the initiative opens up political space or becomes a new front in the confrontation between opposition and government, as the armed conflict continues to reshape the balance of power in the Great Lakes region.



