In Zurich, an almost empty room placed Western Sahara at the centre of a broader battle: the struggle for international visibility. On 30 September 2026, a debate held on the sidelines of the Zurich Film Festival brought together Greta Thunberg, Sahrawi activist Najla Mohamed Lamin and director Patrick Wally. Of the 300 seats reserved, about 40 people are said to have attended the event.
Controversy born in a sparsely populated room
The event had been fully booked for several days. Free reservations had even been limited to four tickets per person. Yet on the night, most of the seats remained empty.
The festival confirmed the scale of the phenomenon, without establishing that it was a coordinated action. Greta Thunberg nevertheless accused Morocco of helping to empty the room. The Moroccan Embassy, approached by a Swiss media outlet, did not respond publicly to the episode.
This caution is important. The number of unused bookings is documented. However, the existence of an organised operation and its possible sponsor have not been independently established. At this stage, the controversy therefore rests on one confirmed fact and one unsubstantiated accusation.
The episode nevertheless went beyond the cultural sphere. It comes as the United Nations Security Council is due to consider the future of MINURSO, the mission established in 1991 to help resolve the conflict and monitor the ceasefire in Western Sahara.
Western Sahara, an issue involving Rabat, the Polisario and the UN
The conflict is primarily between Morocco and the Polisario Front, which claims independence for the territory. Morocco regards Western Sahara as its “Southern Provinces” and has advocated a plan for autonomy under its sovereignty since 2007. The Polisario continues to demand self-determination, with independence as the central option.
The UN still classifies Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory. This classification does not, in itself, settle the question of sovereignty. It does, however, keep the issue within the framework of decolonisation and the right of peoples to determine their political status.
MINURSO remains one of the few international presences on the ground. Its mandate was extended until 31 October 2026 by Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025. The next renewal could therefore indicate the importance attached to negotiations, Morocco’s autonomy plan and the Polisario’s demands.
In this context, a film and a public debate become instruments of indirect diplomacy. They do not replace negotiations. They do, however, influence how the conflict is perceived by young European audiences, cultural circles and organisations engaged in human rights.
A Sahrawi voice carried by cinema
The documentary My Home of Wind and Sand follows Najla Mohamed Lamin’s journey over about a decade. Born in 1989 in the Smara camp, near Tindouf, she belongs to a Sahrawi generation born in exile and amid a long wait for a political settlement.
Her story is not limited to her status as a refugee. After leaving school, she resumed her studies in the United States. On returning to the camps, she founded the Almasar centre, a library that has become an environmental education space for women and children. The BBC included her in its “100 Women” list in 2023.
This trajectory gives the film a reach beyond that of a simple diplomatic narrative. It shows the conflict’s concrete effects on education, mobility, family life and civic engagement. It also serves as a reminder that the Tindouf camps are home to an organised society, with its institutions, initiatives and internal debates.
Greta Thunberg became more closely involved with the cause in 2025, after visiting the Tindouf camps. Since then, she has linked the Sahrawi issue to climate justice and the power relations surrounding the energy transition.
Renewable energy and resources: the new front
Morocco presents investment in the Southern Provinces as a driver of regional development. Rabat highlights infrastructure, ports, renewable energy, water desalination and an Atlantic opening towards Africa.
In March 2025, the Moroccan government announced the selection of five investors for six green hydrogen projects in the regions of Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra, Dakhla-Oued Eddahab and Guelmim-Oued Noun. The announced investment totalled 319 billion dirhams. The projects form part of the national strategy to position Morocco in an emerging energy market.
For the Moroccan authorities, these programmes strengthen the economic and social integration of the Southern Provinces. For their opponents, they raise a prior question: who can authorise the exploitation of resources in a territory whose final status remains unresolved?
The Court of Justice of the European Union reinforced this controversy on 4 October 2024. It ruled that the agricultural and fisheries agreements concluded between the European Union and Morocco in 2019 could not apply to Western Sahara without the consent of the people of the territory. The Court also held that agricultural products from Western Sahara had to be labelled as originating from that territory, and not from Morocco.
This ruling does not directly address green hydrogen projects. It does, however, provide a legal framework used by their critics. The question of consent, distinct from that of local economic benefits, has thus become central to debates about investment.
An image battle that extends beyond Zurich
The festival episode reveals a shift in the debate. Western Sahara is no longer discussed solely through a military or diplomatic lens. It is also viewed through the prism of culture, the environment, supply chains and energy policy.
For Morocco, this shift carries a risk of international misunderstanding. Projects in the south are presented as proof of tangible economic transformation. But their exposure in activist campaigns can link them directly to the political conflict.
For the Polisario and Sahrawi organisations, the presence of a well-known figure such as Greta Thunberg offers a way to reach audiences beyond traditional circles of solidarity. It does not, on its own, alter the diplomatic balance of power. It does, however, make it harder for the issue to disappear from the media.
The next milestone is now clear: the Security Council vote on MINURSO, expected before 31 October 2026. The mandate’s wording, the place given to negotiations and the language used on self-determination will all need to be watched. In Zurich, the empty seats drew attention. The next question is whether that visibility will lead to a more precise debate on the territory’s status, its people’s rights and the future of its resources.



