Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Subscribe

NewsEdition MoroccoMorocco

Morocco’s digital arsenal sustains pressure on opponents

An Amnesty International report describes a Moroccan system combining Pegasus, telecoms interception, booby-trapped devices and hidden cameras. Journalists, activists and human rights defenders are among its main targets.

Moroccan passengers at a bus station in Tangier, with a phone and document check taking place among the travellers

In Morocco, digital surveillance is no longer limited to breaking into a phone. It can also involve a gifted device, a hidden camera or access installed in telecommunications networks. This is the picture of a coordinated system painted by a new Amnesty International report, published on 1 October 2026.

The investigation draws on the testimony of a former agent of the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST), Morocco’s domestic intelligence service, identified by the pseudonym “Safir”. It cross-references this account with internal documents, targeting data and technical analyses conducted with the Forbidden Stories network.

A surveillance operation extending beyond Pegasus

The Pegasus spyware occupies a central place in the case. Developed by Israeli company NSO Group, it can extract messages, calls, photos and location data from a phone. Some versions can infect a device without the target having to click anything.

Amnesty says the DGST allegedly began deploying Pegasus in September 2017, before using it on a large scale from the following month. This timeline is consistent with technical evidence previously published by the organisation and its partners as part of the Pegasus Project.

The presence of a number on a targeting list does not, on its own, prove that the phone was infected. It does, however, indicate that it was selected as a potential target. In the Moroccan case, Amnesty estimates that around 13,000 unique numbers were associated with NSO Group’s Moroccan client in the data analysed.

For the period from September to December 2017, investigators were able to link 103 numbers to identified individuals. The group included 65 civil society members, among them 34 human rights defenders, 22 journalists or media professionals, five lawyers and four academics. Politicians, civil servants, diplomats and representatives of international organisations were also included.

This data adds to revelations published in 2021 by Amnesty International about the Pegasus Project in Morocco. It is not a complete inventory of the people who were actually infected. It does, however, show the scale of the operation attributed by the investigation to Moroccan intelligence.

Physical operations at the heart of the system

The report also describes more conventional, but particularly intrusive, methods. During the Hirak movement in the Rif, the protest movement that shook northern Morocco between 2016 and 2017, Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge phones were allegedly equipped with RCS software from Italian company Hacking Team.

The devices were then allegedly handed to second-hand phone shops frequented by activists. They were presented as new or recently refurbished devices. According to Amnesty, an image from surveillance data shows the moment when an activist unboxed one of these phones.

The same tool was allegedly introduced into internet café computers using USB drives. This method targeted places frequented by people involved in the Rif movement. It illustrates a form of surveillance that does not rely solely on the target’s digital behaviour.

Other equipment is cited: GPS trackers, devices capable of mimicking mobile phone masts, tools for extracting phone data and systems providing access to some private cameras. The report also refers to the use of informants recruited from among neighbours, shopkeepers and café employees.

An episode involving activist Fouad Abdelmoumni illustrates the intimate nature of these alleged practices. In January 2021, videos filmed in his home circulated on WhatsApp. “Safir” says a camera had been hidden in an air conditioner. Amnesty says it has not been possible to establish the origin of the footage independently, while judging the available evidence sufficiently concerning to warrant an investigation.

The sensitive role of telecoms infrastructure

Access to telecommunications networks is another issue. According to the testimony gathered, a national operator allegedly facilitated the interception of calls and the retrieval of technical identifiers linked to targeted phones.

This claim must be distinguished from proof of the company’s direct involvement. Amnesty notes that the installation of equipment in telecoms infrastructure does not necessarily mean that the operator knew about the attacks or took part in them.

In 2020, the organisation documented network injection attempts against the phone of Moroccan journalist Omar Radi while it was connected to Maroc Telecom’s 4G network. This technique redirects browsing to an infected page without requiring the victim to open a link voluntarily.

Verint sales documents made public in 2022 also mentioned the sale in Morocco of an interception system called Reliant 12. Maroc Telecom appeared among the potential buyers of some equipment. The operator did not respond to the requests for comment reported in the investigation.

Surveillance to neutralise, then discredit

The report does not present surveillance as mere intelligence-gathering. Amnesty believes it may also have been used to undermine journalists, human rights defenders and critical voices.

In several cases, private information was allegedly followed by smear campaigns on social media. Sexually explicit content was reportedly used in particular against women activists and the partners of prominent protesters. The organisation is cautious: it has not been able independently to attribute every image or conversation to the Moroccan authorities.

This caveat does not erase the context. Journalists such as Omar Radi and Soulaiman Raissouni, as well as academic Maâti Monjib, have been prosecuted or imprisoned in cases contested by human rights organisations. All three received a royal pardon in 2024, but digital campaigns targeting opponents did not necessarily stop when they were released.

The operation described is therefore twofold. Surveillance gathers information. The circulation of some material is then used to exert social, professional and judicial pressure. For those targeted, the risk does not end with arrest or conviction: it can continue online, at home and in family life.

Rabat faces repeated accusations

The Moroccan authorities have regularly rejected accusations that Pegasus was used. In July 2021, the government said it had never acquired software designed to infiltrate communications devices. This position was reported by the official news agency MAP in a statement on the Pegasus Project revelations.

For its new investigation, Amnesty says it sent its findings to the Moroccan authorities before publication. The organisation says it received no response. NSO Group also disputes the accusations and argues that the presence of numbers in a database does not prove infection.

The case therefore rests on several levels of evidence. Forensic analyses establish some infections on specific phones. The leaked lists document the selection of numbers. Commercial documents provide information about tools sold. Finally, “Safir’s” testimony describes the alleged internal practices and operational chain.

An issue extending beyond Morocco’s borders

The case has regional significance. Morocco is an important player in the Maghreb and maintains close relations with Europe, West Africa and the institutions of the African Union. Foreign officials, diplomats and journalists working on Moroccan-African relations are among the categories of people mentioned in previous investigations.

The case also raises the question of digital sovereignty. Israeli, European and American companies have supplied Morocco with tools capable of accessing phones, computers and networks. Responsibility therefore concerns not only the end user, but also export rules and the mechanisms for overseeing suppliers.

The next step will depend on the Moroccan authorities’ response and whether an independent investigation is opened. It will also depend on whether exporting states can verify the actual use of technologies presented as intended to combat serious crime and terrorism.

Automatic translation. Original French version

The quiz

Edition MoroccoMorocco in 5 questions

5 questions