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Mali: JNIM and FLA forge tactical pact against junta

In Mali, JNIM is adapting its rhetoric and cooperating with the Azawad Liberation Front against the junta. The pragmatic understanding increases military pressure but remains fragile because their ideological goals are opposed.

Anonymous Malian delegates gathered in Bamako against a neutral backdrop during a regional political meeting

In Mali, JNIM is seeking not so much to disappear as to change its face. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated group retains its religious objectives and armed capabilities, but its public rhetoric is increasingly rooted in the country’s divisions. This shift accompanies unprecedented cooperation with the Azawad Liberation Front, a Tuareg separatist movement pursuing a very different political project.

A convergence born of a common adversary

The turning point came on 25 April 2026. That day, JNIM — Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims — and the FLA claimed coordinated attacks on several Malian military positions. The operations hit the north, the centre and the outskirts of Bamako.

In Kidal, a strategic city in northern Mali, the FLA announced that it had retaken control of several areas. At the same time, JNIM claimed attacks on Bamako International Airport and other military sites. The Malian government acknowledged a series of attacks but did not immediately publish a full casualty count. The Associated Press confirmed the nationwide scale of the offensive.

This was not an isolated episode. A new wave of attacks struck several localities on 4 July 2026. The FLA and JNIM again targeted positions held by the Malian army and its Russian partners. The two organisations also maintained pressure on supply routes, particularly in the north and centre.

Their rapprochement remains limited, however. The FLA describes it as “operational convergence” or cooperation of convenience. It does not present the relationship as a political alliance. This distinction is crucial: the Tuareg movement is calling for autonomy, or even independence for Azawad, while JNIM aims to establish an Islamic order based on sharia.

JNIM adapts its language without abandoning its foundations

JNIM’s communications have gradually refocused on Mali and the Sahel. Its messages increasingly emphasise security, justice, governance and economic hardship. The group is thus seeking to present itself as an actor rooted in local realities, rather than simply as an outpost of a global jihadist network.

This shift does not amount to a demonstrated break with Al-Qaeda. JNIM remains officially linked to the organisation. It also retains its commitment to sharia and continues to carry out armed operations against the Malian state. Its public statements, however, give less prominence to the international causes traditionally promoted by Al-Qaeda propaganda.

The choice of languages is part of this strategy. Several recent messages have been broadcast in French, the language of administration and political debate in Mali. The group is thus addressing soldiers, local officials, urban young people and communities affected by the conflict. It is also seeking to persuade some actors that it could have a role in future negotiations.

According to an analysis by the Institute for Security Studies, this adaptation is above all a sign of tactical pragmatism. JNIM is not abandoning its ideological project. It is adjusting its vocabulary to broaden its audience and reduce the fear generated by its international affiliation.

A useful but deeply unstable alliance

The FLA and JNIM share an immediate interest: weakening the transitional authorities led from Bamako by General Assimi Goïta. Their coordinated operations force the Malian army to spread its forces across a vast territory. They also make it harder to protect roads, bases and energy infrastructure.

For the FLA, cooperation with JNIM increases military pressure on the state. It allows the movement to regain the initiative in the north after the Malian army retook Kidal in November 2023. But the understanding carries a political cost. JNIM is still regarded as an Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group. Its presence could therefore alarm northern communities and narrow the FLA’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

For JNIM, the benefits are different. The group has networks, fighters and a foothold in several regions of Mali. Cooperation with the FLA also gives it indirect political space. The Tuareg movement has longstanding contacts, detailed knowledge of the north and the ability to engage with some regional actors.

This logic explains why JNIM can give the FLA prominence in the north while communicating more about its own operations in the centre. It limits its political exposure in areas where the cause of independence has particular legitimacy. This division of roles looks more like a strategy of complementarity than a merger of the two movements.

The precedent of 2012 nevertheless illustrates the limits of such an understanding. Islamist groups and Tuareg movements cooperated against the Malian state before turning on one another. Their disagreements over authority, territory and the place of religion quickly made coexistence impossible.

Mali’s junta faces a two-pronged challenge

This new configuration is putting Mali’s military transition under intense pressure. The government must fight a territorial rebellion in the north and a jihadist insurgency active in the centre and south at the same time. This dispersal strains manpower, public finances and the security of major routes.

Bamako’s Russian partners are also involved. Following the gradual replacement of the Wagner Group by Africa Corps, which is linked to Russia’s Ministry of Defence, their presence remains central to Mali’s security apparatus. JNIM and the FLA have nevertheless sent distinct signals to Moscow, suggesting that a future relationship could be negotiated if Russian forces limited their direct involvement.

These messages do not prove that a lasting agreement exists. Rather, they show that armed groups are trying to manage several fronts at once: military, political and diplomatic. In this context, talk of negotiations can be used to buy time, divide adversaries or reassure some communities.

For the population, the consequences are more immediate. In cities, attacks disrupt travel, supplies and public services. In rural areas, residents face restrictions imposed by armed groups, military operations and displacement. Traders and transport operators also bear the cost of checkpoints, kidnappings and insecurity along the corridors connecting Bamako to the northern regions.

A West African issue

The crisis in Mali now extends beyond the national arena. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which previously coordinated some regional responses. Their grouping within the Alliance of Sahel States has yet to produce a security mechanism capable of replacing the existing regional framework.

Cooperation between JNIM and the FLA could therefore deepen the fragmentation of the Sahel. It brings together a jihadist insurgency and a territorial and national claim. This model could inspire other local arrangements without necessarily producing a stable alliance.

The central question is not yet whether JNIM has left Al-Qaeda. No publicly available evidence supports that claim. The decisive issue is instead its adaptation: the group is trying to turn a burdensome international affiliation into a lever for local political influence.

The coming months will show how robust this strategy is. Developments in the fighting around Kidal, Gao and the routes to Bamako will need to be watched, as will the FLA’s position on possible negotiations. The Malian authorities’ ability to protect economic corridors and maintain their external alliances will be another key indicator.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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