Wednesday, November 18, 2026

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In DR Congo, Doha process inches forward amid fragile trust

The Doha process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is advancing, but slowly. Prisoner releases, ceasefire monitoring and incomplete protocols show real progress, still hampered by mistrust and fighting.

Editorial meeting in Kinshasa with Congolese journalists, microphones and blurred screens around a topic of peace in DR Congo.

In Kinshasa, peace advances in small steps

In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, every gesture counts. The release of detainees, a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, the signing of a protocol: it is often these details that show whether a peace process is still breathing or is bogging down.

The Doha process illustrates this reality well. Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the AFC/M23, the dialogue launched in 2025 under Qatari mediation has established institutional foundations, but implementation remains slow and uneven. A report by the African Peace Agreements Barometer, an independent initiative monitoring agreements across the continent, puts the level of implementation at 18.6% for the period July 2025-August 2026, according to an article by Actualité.cd. This assessment reflects the view that progress is real, but still fragile.

Doha is part of a broader diplomatic tangle

The Doha process does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a broader diplomatic sequence in which the crisis in eastern Congo also involves Washington, the African Union, Togolese mediation and several regional partners. The UN Security Council confirmed that the Declaration of Principles signed in Doha on 19 July 2025 was intended to establish a permanent ceasefire and confidence-building measures between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23. A broader framework, signed later in November 2025, set out the foundations for a comprehensive peace agreement.

At the same time, African efforts remain central. The African Union has been involved in the discussions, while the Doha talks were followed in August 2026 by a meeting in Switzerland bringing together representatives of the Congolese government, the AFC/M23, Qatar, the United States, Togo, the African Union Commission and Switzerland. The meeting aimed to assess progress and difficulties in implementing the Doha framework agreement.

Concrete progress, but still too limited

The most tangible development remains the first operation to release detainees linked to the conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross said it facilitated the transfer, on 6 and 7 August 2026, of 15 people released by the Congolese authorities to the AFC/M23, under the Doha mechanism. The operation passed through Beni, in North Kivu, then Uganda before reaching Rutshuru.

But this sequence was not enough to dispel tensions. The Barometer report cited by Actualité.cd says 477 detainees had been identified during the discussions, but only 15 were actually received by the ICRC in this exchange. The same document notes disagreements over the identity and status of some individuals, weakening confidence in the mechanism.

The picture is similar for ceasefire monitoring. The verification mechanism has an implementation rate of just over 17%, according to the same report. The second mission planned for Masisi territory in North Kivu could not take place. In other words, the tools exist on paper, but the movement of teams, site security and access to contested areas remain major obstacles.

Politically, the framework agreement has yet to deliver on all its promises. Only two of the eight planned protocols are said to have been signed so far. Here again, the problem is not merely administrative. It goes to the heart of the negotiations: the return of state authority, the terms of withdrawal, the fate of detainees, the security of displaced people, and how the ceasefire, territorial control and political guarantees fit together.

Why the process is stalling

The slow pace is not entirely surprising. Since 2025, the crisis in eastern Congo has proceeded along two parallel diplomatic tracks: Doha for Kinshasa and the AFC/M23, and Washington for relations between the DRC and Rwanda. This overlap can widen room for manoeuvre. It can also fragment responsibilities and dilute political pressure. The African Peace Agreements Barometer has also noted, in another assessment of the issue, that the existence of several peace frameworks could create coordination ambiguities.

Then there is the reality on the ground. Hostilities have not disappeared. In the east, front lines, population displacement and mistrust between the parties weigh on every diplomatic advance. For residents of Masisi, Rutshuru, Beni and neighbouring areas, the question is not whether a protocol has been initialled. It is simpler: can people travel, farm, trade, send their children to school and sleep without fear? The answer remains incomplete.

The diplomatic factor also plays a role. The report cites waning international attention as several simultaneous crises absorb the focus of foreign capitals. In this kind of negotiation, political energy is a resource. When it ebbs, commitments are delayed, verification becomes less frequent and trust erodes.

For Kinshasa, the stakes go beyond the negotiating table

For the Congolese government, an agreement that is not implemented remains a political risk. It can create the illusion of control while leaving conditions on the ground unchanged. For the AFC/M23, the challenge is the opposite: without concrete guarantees, every gesture is viewed with suspicion and as a test of strength. Between them, civilians pay the highest price, as an unfinished peace leaves diplomacy and insecurity side by side.

The regional significance is clear. The crisis in eastern DRC affects Central Africa and the Great Lakes, but also spills over into East Africa and the continent’s mediation mechanisms. It tests the African Union’s ability to coordinate initiatives, that of neighbouring countries to avoid competing calculations, and that of international partners to support, without replacing, an African-led resolution of the conflict.

What happens next will depend less on declarations than on a few very concrete steps: resuming verification on the ground, expanding detainee exchanges, signing the remaining protocols and, above all, proving that the commitments made in Doha can withstand the pressure of armed conflict. In eastern Congo, that is often what distinguishes an announced peace from a real one.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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