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Turkey courts Tripoli and Benghazi to mediate Libya’s fragile reunification

Turkey is stepping up its presence in Libya by engaging both sides, from Tripoli to Benghazi. Ankara seeks to combine political mediation, security cooperation and investment in a country that remains divided.

Journalists prepare a broadcast in a newsroom in Tripoli, with cameras and blurred screens.

A visit that says something about Libya today

In Tripoli and Benghazi alike, every foreign visit is viewed through the same question: who really speaks for Libya? In a country still divided between rival centres of power, foreign capitals are not just seeking interlocutors. They are also testing their ability to count tomorrow in trade, security and the future political architecture. Turkey, already deeply involved in the Libyan issue, wants precisely to remain among the select group of actors able to engage both sides of the country.

The regional context is well known, but remains central. Libya does not belong to any major subregional organisation in West Africa, and its trajectory is shaped instead across North Africa, the Mediterranean and the United Nations forums. For years, the African Union and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya have called for the reunification of institutions, credible elections and an end to the armed equilibrium that followed the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. The stakes extend beyond Tripoli: they affect Sahelian borders, migration routes and the Mediterranean’s energy security.

Tripoli, Benghazi and Turkey’s strategy

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made a two-day visit to Libya before travelling to Egypt on Thursday 13 August. He met officials in Tripoli and Benghazi in turn, a significant move in a country where the west and east remain politically divided. On the Libyan side, the institutions recognised in Tripoli continue to engage with actors in the east, dominated by the camp of Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the administration based in Benghazi. Turkey has chosen to speak to both.

In Benghazi, Hakan Fidan championed a role as mediator and said his country would continue to support dialogue between east and west, putting the phrase “united Libya” at the heart of his message. This approach reflects a shift already visible over recent months. Ankara has stepped up contacts with the eastern authorities, even as it remains a major partner of the Tripoli government. In July 2026, Turkey’s top diplomat also received Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the Libyan National Army, in Ankara, signalling that a political channel with the eastern camp is now openly acknowledged.

This repositioning does not erase the longstanding agreement with Tripoli. It broadens it. Turkey wants to retain its security and military leverage, but is now also cultivating an image as a stabilising actor. Ankara presents its presence as a restraining force. Turkish authorities say they prevented a return to war and want to turn this influence into diplomatic capital. This is a reading that serves Turkey, but also highlights Libya’s need for partners able to speak to several camps without imposing a single victor.

Economy, security and a still fragile situation

Turkey’s interest is also economic. Libyan and Turkish authorities have recently discussed regularising the status of Turkish companies operating in Libya and preparing a joint commission. Energy, construction, infrastructure and services remain the sectors most in demand. This approach is not new, but is gaining importance in a country where reconstruction is progressing slowly and public funding remains dependent on a fragile political balance. The adoption of a unified Libyan budget in 2026 was welcomed by several international partners as a useful step towards co-ordinating spending between east and west.

Security, however, remains the real test. Hakan Fidan’s visit coincided with fresh signs of tension on the ground, including drone strikes on oil facilities in Zawiya and the death of an intelligence official in Benghazi after his vehicle exploded. These incidents are a reminder of a simple reality: in Libya, diplomatic gestures and armed power struggles often proceed in parallel. Coastal areas where revenues, ports and some hydrocarbon exports are concentrated remain more vulnerable than the grand speeches about national unity suggest.

The effects are uneven for Libyans. In Tripoli, businesses, ministries and banking networks are waiting for investment and less security pressure. In Benghazi and the east, the authorities are seeking greater political recognition and partnerships no longer based solely on confrontation with the western authorities. In both cases, the population is above all waiting for regular services, electricity, salaries paid on time and elections that do not remain an abstract prospect. Turkish diplomacy, like that of other powers active in Tripoli and Benghazi, will have to be judged by that standard, rather than by its rhetoric.

Across Africa, this episode confirms a clear trend: Libya has once again become a space where local rivalries, Mediterranean interests and outward-looking diplomacy intersect. The African Union, the United Nations, Italy, Turkey, as well as other Arab and African partners, are seeking to influence the future unification of institutions. The next point to watch is whether international mediation can turn bilateral contacts into a clearly defined political process. Until that happens, Tripoli and Benghazi will continue to attract visitors without guaranteeing an end to the division.

Automatic translation. Original French version

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