Tripoli under strain, with a key institution at the centre
In Libya, the central bank is never just a bank. It oversees the flow of oil revenues, the payment of public-sector salaries and, in practice, part of the political balance between the east and west of the country. When its governor is in jeopardy, the entire machinery of the state tightens, from Tripoli to the oil terminals in the south and east.
The latest developments come in a country where two centres of power continue to coexist. In Tripoli, the national unity government of the capital claims the legitimacy recognised by the United Nations. In the east, the House of Representatives in Benghazi and allied structures retain decisive influence over appointments and public finances. The UN notes that the September 2024 agreement was specifically designed to end the Central Bank’s institutional paralysis.
In this context, Naji Issa sent resignation letters to the two main rival legislative institutions, according to documents dated 9 August that he confirmed to Reuters. He said he was no longer able to perform his duties, without detailing the reasons, which he described as sensitive. The High Council of State has asked him to remain in office until his request is formally considered, in the name of the country’s financial and political stability, while the House of Representatives had not yet reacted publicly by Monday evening.
Succession still open at a central bank already under strain
The announced departure revives an issue Libya thought it had resolved in autumn 2024. At the time, the two chambers approved Naji Issa and his deputy governor, Maree al-Barassi, following UN mediation. The agreement ended a crisis triggered by the abrupt removal of former governor Seddik al-Kabir, who was challenged by officials in Tripoli accusing him of favouring the east.
The Central Bank of Libya is still listed on the institution’s official website as being headed by Naji Issa, suggesting that no formal change had yet been made when the letters circulated. The bank’s website also states that its governance remains structured around a board of directors based in Tripoli.
This uncertainty is not abstract. In August 2024, the rupture over the central bank triggered a chain reaction. Factions in the west sought to replace the incumbent leadership. The east responded with force majeure measures on oil. The National Oil Corporation then reported a fall in production to about 600,000 barrels per day, well below usual levels. Reports by AP and market coverage confirmed the scale of the shock to exports.
The link between the central bank and hydrocarbons therefore remains direct. Almost all of Libya’s budget resources depend on oil. When monetary governance comes under strain, the foreign exchange market, the distribution of liquidity and the financing of public spending are weakened in turn. In everyday life, this affects government employees, businesses that rely on cash and households exposed to fluctuations in the Libyan dinar.
What the crisis says about Libya, and what it signals for the region
Naji Issa’s resignation also comes at a time when several economic indicators remained sensitive. In April 2026, the Central Bank and the finance ministry of the Tripoli government had discussed the stability of the currency and the exchange rate. In July, the Central Bank said it intended to defend its independence and its ability to preserve economic stability. These exchanges show that, even before the political crisis, the institution was under pressure to maintain monetary balance.
The country also remains under international scrutiny. In 2026, the UN Security Council extended the sanctions regime linked to Libya until 2027, with a panel of experts tasked with monitoring the implementation of the measures. This is a reminder that the Libyan issue goes beyond internal power struggles: it also affects the movement of assets, the security of infrastructure and the credibility of financial institutions.
For authorities in both the east and the west, the central bank remains a centre of power rather than simply a technical body. For the population, above all, it represents the possibility of a state that pays, supplies and protects the value of the currency. For oil industry players, it determines whether exported barrels can be turned into available budget revenue. For external partners, it remains a barometer of Libyan stability.
At the North African level, the episode is also a reminder of a broader reality: as long as Libya’s institutions remain contested, regional balances will be fragile, from the energy market to the diplomatic initiatives of the African Union and the United Nations. The immediate issue is now procedural. It comes down to a simple question: will the resignation be accepted, suspended or turned into a new power struggle between Benghazi and Tripoli?



