A political signal, but not yet proof on the ground
In Kinshasa, the move is presented as another step towards easing tensions in the east of the country. But in Walikale territory, in North Kivu, the question remains the same: who is really in command on the ground, and who will agree to lay down their arms for good? In a fragmented war, signing a document does not yet amount to effective disarmament.
This issue forms part of a broader diplomatic framework. On 27 June 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, facilitated by the United States and supported by the United Nations. Kinshasa links the neutralisation of the FDLR, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, to a broader security disengagement process. The African Union continues to monitor the crisis in eastern DR Congo as an issue of sovereignty, regional security and civilian protection.
What Kinshasa says it has secured
On 28 July 2025, the Congolese government announced that a protocol on demilitarisation, demobilisation and encampment had been signed by a branch of the FDLR. According to the Congolese authorities, the text gives practical effect to the commitments made under the Washington agreement. Kinshasa has cited a 90-day countdown to complete the operation. But the exact date on which that period begins has not been made public, leaving a first grey area.
The government also insists that the plan must not remain theoretical. A monitoring committee, bringing together regional and international partners, is to be set up in the coming days. The announced coordination is to be aligned with the National Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Programme, known as P-DDRCS, which provides the national framework for the reintegration of former combatants. Workshops and field activities also resumed in Kinshasa, Beni and other parts of North Kivu during 2025.
The key uncertainty: who has really committed the FDLR?
The most sensitive issue remains the identity of the signatories and their actual authority over the fighters. The Congolese authorities say General Omega, described as the central military figure in one FDLR branch, is said to have approved the protocol before it was signed by Victor Byiringiro, the political leader of that same branch. This claim will need to be verified on the ground, especially in areas where the FDLR remain active or dispersed.
UN documents and analyses point out that the FDLR are not a fully cohesive bloc. A 2025 report by the United Nations Group of Experts noted movements of fighters, local reorganisations and the return of former demobilised members to areas of North Kivu, particularly around Walikale, Masisi and Rutshuru. In this context, the ability of a single leader to impose a common line remains difficult to establish without independent monitoring.
This caution is all the more necessary because the region remains militarised. In July 2025, fighting and tensions continued in several parts of North Kivu, while the United Nations and humanitarian actors continued to report displacement and persistent insecurity. In such an environment, a political announcement can coexist with very different local balances of power from one village to another.
The practical stakes for eastern DR Congo
For Kinshasa, there is a twofold interest. First, to show that it is honouring its part of the commitments made in Washington. Second, to deprive Kigali of a recurring argument: the presence on Congolese soil of a Rwandan armed group hostile to Rwanda. The Congolese foreign ministry has described the neutralisation of the FDLR as an element explicitly incorporated into the agreement, as part of a framework of sovereignty and orderly disengagement.
But the equation is broader. In the east, security does not depend on the FDLR alone. Fighting linked to the M23, pressure on civilians, the activity of self-defence groups and the circulation of weapons continue to shape daily life. In Resolution 2773, adopted on 21 February 2025, the United Nations Security Council condemned the M23 offensives and called for Rwandan forces to withdraw from Congolese territory, while urging de-escalation measures. Disarming the FDLR therefore addresses only part of the problem.
On the humanitarian front, people in Walikale, North Kivu and neighbouring areas expect more than an exchange of statements. They want roads to remain open, markets to resume, access to farmland and reduced risks for displaced people and families who have stayed behind. Humanitarian organisations continued to warn in 2025 about the fragility of access to healthcare and the pressure on rural communities.
What to watch in the coming weeks
The next steps will hinge on three straightforward indicators. First, the actual composition of the monitoring committee and its work schedule. Second, whether the protocol can produce visible assembly points, weapons handovers and verifiable encampments. Third, the response of other armed actors and regional mediators, as the African Union, the United Nations, the United States and several African partners remain involved in managing the Great Lakes crisis.
At the continental level, the implications extend beyond the DRC alone. This case tests a method that has become central in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region: combining regional mediation, international pressure and national DDR mechanisms, without confusing a diplomatic announcement with restored security. For the DRC and its neighbours, the true measure of progress will remain the same: fewer weapons in the hills, greater public authority on the ground, and tangible guarantees for civilians.



