A mineral supply chain under strain
In the south of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cobalt never travels alone. It carries secondary metals, residues and impurities with it. Among them is uranium, an element the country has long associated with its mining and nuclear history, but whose commercial exports are supposed to remain strictly regulated. In the current context, this issue goes beyond industrial technique: it touches on mineral traceability, radiation safety and Kinshasa’s place in a global supply chain dominated by China.
The heart of the matter lies in Katanga, the copper belt in the south-east where copper and cobalt have been extracted from the same mining basins for decades. Flows have grown in scale with the rise of batteries, and DR Congo has become one of the linchpins of the global energy transition. Several recent studies recall that the country still accounts for a very large share of the world’s cobalt supply, while ore processing is concentrated largely in China.
What the investigation, backed by scientific research, says
An investigation published in late July brought back into circulation a confidential 2009 internal memorandum from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had for years referred to the presence of significant quantities of uranium in cobalt ores from Katanga and the possibility that it was being exported as a by-product. The document did not stand alone. It served as the starting point for a scientific study published in Nature Communications, based on geochemical estimates and production data. The authors conclude that between 2,000 and 5,000 tonnes of uranium may have left DR Congo for China between 2000 and 2024, mixed in with shipments of cobalt hydroxide.
This range has serious implications. Even the lower estimate represents a volume capable of supplying a large-capacity reactor for an extended period. The key point, however, lies elsewhere: the study does not establish the final use of this uranium in China. Rather, it documents a loss of visibility in the export chain, where the ore should be cleared of radioactive elements before leaving the country.
The methodology also matters. The researchers cross-referenced measured concentrations in Katanga’s ores, mining production data, commercial information on chemical reagents and companies’ internal documents. This body of evidence is no substitute for a customs seizure, but it indicates that a longstanding problem may have persisted across several export routes.
Tenke Fungurume, an emblematic case
The best-documented case concerns Tenke Fungurume Mining, in Lualaba. The site changed hands in 2016, coming under Chinese control. Internal documents cited in the investigation refer to cobalt samples heavily contaminated with uranium, with a peak of 1,100 parts per million recorded in December 2016. They also mention tests aimed at removing the uranium, although several sources interviewed said this was not implemented systematically. More recent documents reportedly indicate significant levels still present in 2021.
The debate is not only about the presence of uranium, but also when it is removed. The standard process is to eliminate it before export, using phosphoric acid. This is central, because several operators in DR Congo have already shown that industrial reconfiguration is possible. Glencore suspended exports from Kamoto Copper Company for several months in 2018 to adjust its facilities. ERG also faced a similar case at its Metalkol site. In other words, the problem is not an unavoidable geological fact. It is also a matter of investment, oversight and industrial choices.
CMOC, TFM’s current owner, disputes the investigation’s findings and says it complies with local standards and customer requirements. The company says it has radiological controls across the entire production chain and rejects any uranium extraction in DR Congo or China. This denial is consistent with a standard defensive strategy in a sector exposed to reputational and compliance risks. But it does not remove the fundamental question: how can it be guaranteed, across thousands of tonnes exported, that radioactive impurities are removed at source and not merely detected afterwards?
What Kinshasa wants to put right, and what remains fragile
Congolese authorities do not deny the oversight gap. The CNPRI, the radiation safety authority, says it is stepping up safety measures at mining operations. The Congolese nuclear energy agency, for its part, considers uranium separation technically possible and even likely in some flows, while acknowledging that it has no direct evidence of the phenomenon’s exact scale. This assessment is important: it shows that the state sees the risk, but still lacks the means to measure it at a level commensurate with export volumes.
The government has also tightened control over cobalt itself. Since 2025, exports have been subject to a quota system managed by ARECOMS, with a ceiling announced at 96,600 tonnes a year for 2026 and 2027. This tightening reflects a political will to regain control of a strategic market, after years in which DR Congo’s main influence came from the volume it extracted, without fully controlling the value captured or the standards applied at the point of export. Quota measures, reported by several Congolese and international sources, also aim to stabilise highly volatile prices.
The uranium issue adds another layer. It concerns not only industry, but also public health, radiation protection and the credibility of mining oversight. The authorities in Kinshasa know that a truck loaded with cobalt may also be carrying an invisible share of risk. In an economy where mining sites feed formal exports, local employment and state revenues alike, the ability to detect these flows has become an issue of sovereignty.
A Congolese issue with continental significance
This case goes beyond DR Congo. It is a reminder that the critical-minerals supply chain linking Central Africa to Asia remains incompletely controlled, even as the continent seeks to capture more value from the energy transition. It also shows that the challenge is not simply to produce more, but to produce with traceability, using verifiable standards from the mine site to the port of shipment. In Africa’s debate on industrialisation, this is a crucial distinction.
In the coming weeks, attention will focus on the operators’ response, any additional export checks and the ability of Congolese institutions to enforce systematic radiation testing. The case says something broader about Central Africa: when a strategic mineral moves through long supply chains, a lack of measurement becomes an industrial and political risk in its own right.



