When the gateway to public services becomes a central concern
In a digital administration, the most costly vulnerability is not always a sophisticated piece of software. It is often hidden in everyday practices: a shared account, an employee who has left but remains active in the system, a document sent via unofficial messaging. This is precisely the area Tunisian authorities now want to regulate more effectively.
Tunisia has made digital public services a driver of modernisation for several years. But the more services move online, the greater the exposure. Administrations, state-owned companies and public service institutions therefore become obvious targets, because any disruption affects users, service counters and the continuity of the state at the same time. In North Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, cybersecurity is no longer an issue reserved for data centres: it concerns the entire administrative production chain.
What the circular requires of Tunisia’s public bodies
On 2 September 2026, Prime Minister Sarra Zaafrani Zenzri issued a circular on securing public digital systems. The text applies to ministries, governorates, public institutions and state-owned companies. It follows the approach of the National Cybersecurity Agency, which relayed the measure and outlined its main provisions.
The framework has two main pillars. On one side is the technical protection of platforms: the HTTPS protocol, multi-factor authentication, regular security audits and measures to defend against distributed denial-of-service attacks. On the other is discipline in internal practices: deactivating inactive accounts, removing access left open after an employee’s departure, prohibiting account sharing, and requiring the use of official channels to circulate administrative documents. Email linked to the national “.tn” domain is to become the norm for professional exchanges.
The circular is not limited to tools. It also emphasises staff training, risk awareness and operational preparedness. Public bodies must keep business continuity plans and disaster recovery plans up to date. They must also report incidents promptly to the competent agency. The idea is simple: if an attack occurs, the administration must not have to improvise.
Numerous incidents, a threat that has become commonplace
This shift is not theoretical. The ANCS says that, in the first half of 2026, tunCERT issued 336 security advisories related to vulnerabilities and malware. The agency also says it recorded 657,540 incidents affecting various actors in the national cyberspace, including 35,000 DDoS attacks. It notes that the volume of denial-of-service attacks has increased compared with the previous year.
These figures shed light on a reality that is often underestimated: the most common attack is not necessarily spectacular. It may simply overwhelm a service portal, disrupt a payment platform, delay an administrative process or block access to a document portal. For citizens, this means an inaccessible service counter, a delayed certificate or an interrupted online procedure. For administrations, the cost is measured in time, reputation and public trust.
The Tunisian text also reflects a broader shift in public policy. Digital security no longer rests solely on technical barriers. It also depends on staff members’ digital hygiene, the traceability of exchanges and a clear separation between personal use and official channels. This approach aligns with good practices already recommended by the ANCS for securing accounts, email and administrative access to official pages or services.
A signal for Tunisia, but also for the Maghreb and Africa
The circular is part of a broader framework. Tunisia has a national cybersecurity strategy covering 2020-2025 and is preparing a new 2026-2030 cycle. This timetable shows that the challenge is no longer simply to respond to incidents, but to establish a lasting public policy, with rules, audits and the capacity to anticipate threats.
Internationally, Tunisia remains ranked in Tier 3 in the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2024, a category described as “establishing”, in which countries have begun to put institutional and technical foundations in place but still need to strengthen their capabilities. The ranking places Tunisia in a group that also includes several African countries pursuing comparable paths.
The announcement therefore carries weight beyond Tunis. In a region where administrations are expanding online services, the same dilemma arises everywhere: how can more services be opened up without opening up more vulnerabilities? Tunisia’s response emphasises a point often overlooked in African digital policies: security is not determined only by equipment, but by behaviour, procedures and day-to-day governance. This is where digital sovereignty and the continuity of public services are built—or weakened.



