Thursday, November 19, 2026

Subscribe

PoliticsEdition EthiopiaEthiopia

In Tigray, distrust of TPLF compounds fighting and clouds Ethiopia’s path to peace

Renewed fighting and the TPLF’s decline are deepening divisions in Tigray. Distrust of the movement and opposition to the federal administration leave the return to peace uncertain.

Unnamed African delegates gathered around a negotiation table in Addis Ababa, with documents and translation earpieces.

In Tigray, the weakening of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) does not mean its former voters are rallying behind Addis Ababa. The region in northern Ethiopia is experiencing a new round of fighting and political upheaval. In this context, criticism from former supporters points to a breakdown in trust, but is not enough to establish that the movement has lost all popular support.

A region caught between war and political realignment

The TPLF led the rebellion that toppled the Derg military regime in 1991. It then dominated Ethiopia’s ruling coalition until Abiy Ahmed became head of the federal government in 2018. The war that broke out in November 2020 between the federal authorities and Tigrayan forces lasted two years. It ended with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022.

The agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the African Union, ended the main fighting without resolving several political and territorial disputes. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisation in the Horn of Africa, also supported the peace process. But the agreement’s incomplete implementation and rivalries within the Tigrayan camp have weakened the interim administration established after the war.

The crisis reached a new threshold in 2026. Clashes resumed in September. On 4 October, forces allied with the federal government entered Mekele, the regional capital, after TPLF fighters withdrew. On 16 October, Addis Ababa announced a new interim administration for six months, tasked in particular with restoring public services and preparing elections. The TPLF rejected the body, which it regards as imposed by the central government. These developments have been reported by the Associated Press and covered by Ethiopian media.

Criticism from within Tigrayan society

In this climate, residents once close to the TPLF accuse it of becoming detached from everyday concerns and exposing the population to new dangers. Some say they supported the movement during the 2020-2022 war, particularly in response to atrocities attributed to Eritrean and federal forces. They now see the renewed hostilities as a decision that risks plunging the region back into violence.

The rapprochement between the TPLF and Eritrea is a particular source of distrust. Eritrean soldiers fought alongside federal forces in the previous war, and human rights organisations have documented abuses against civilians in Tigray. Allegations about the motives and actions of the various actors must nevertheless be attributed and examined with care. Residents’ accounts bear witness to important experiences and perceptions, but do not, on their own, provide a measure of opinion across the region.

Critics also point to forced recruitment and pressure on civilians. Human Rights Watch reported allegations of forced recruitment in the region in 2026 and called for independent investigations. The TPLF has disputed these accusations in public statements. In the absence of independent verification of each case, these claims cannot be presented as established facts about the movement or its forces as a whole.

The disagreement is not simply a divide between former supporters and government backers. Some Tigrayans still see the TPLF as a bulwark against a federal government they consider hostile to their interests. Others reject the choices of its leaders without trusting the administration put in place by Addis Ababa. This divide matters: control of a regional capital is not enough to secure lasting political legitimacy.

A weakened party, but not necessarily a defunct one

The TPLF’s institutional standing has also deteriorated. Ethiopia’s National Election Board revoked its legal status as a political party on 14 May 2025, following a period of suspension and a dispute over its electoral obligations. The decision, reported by the state-run Ethiopian News Agency, limits its participation in official political life. It does not, however, in itself allow the conclusion that the movement has ceased to exist on the ground.

The renewed fighting has shifted the balance of power. The TPLF’s withdrawal from Mekele and the establishment of an administration under federal supervision give Addis Ababa greater institutional leverage. For residents, the immediate stakes are also very practical: continuity of healthcare, public services and transport, and the return of displaced people. Promises to restore administration will need to be assessed by how they are implemented, in towns as well as rural areas.

The region also remains scarred by the consequences of the previous conflict and by tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Mutual accusations and the presence of armed forces in border areas pose a regional risk. A further escalation could further undermine the return to peace and affect trade in the Horn of Africa, already beset by several crises.

What happens next will also depend on Addis Ababa

The TPLF’s future will depend on its ability to regain the trust of some of the population, address allegations of abuses and clarify its political aims. But it will also depend on the federal government’s decisions. An interim administration seen as imposed, or the lasting exclusion of Tigrayan actors from regional decision-making, could deepen distrust rather than reduce it.

The announced six-month period for the interim administration is therefore as much a political test as an administrative one. The holding of credible elections, civilians’ access to essential services and the resumption of dialogue in line with the Pretoria agreement will shape what happens next. For the African Union and IGAD, the stakes go beyond the fate of one party: the aim is to prevent the breakdown of the peace process in Tigray from further destabilising the Horn of Africa.

Automatic translation. Original French version

The quiz

African institutions: the quiz

6 questions