A truce still hanging by a fragile thread
In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, every diplomatic advance counts twice. It reassures civilians, but also reminds them that the guns have not yet fallen silent. In Kinshasa and South Kivu alike, many measure these announcements against a single question: will the ceasefire finally become visible on the ground, or will it remain one more text in a war of positions?
The latest step taken in Switzerland is part of the long, tangled web of mediation efforts around eastern Congo. The Doha process, led by Qatar, has been complemented by support from the United States, Switzerland, Togo in its capacity as mediator for the African Union, the African Union itself and MONUSCO, the UN mission in DR Congo. This framework matters because it shows that no single actor can currently impose a lasting way out of the crisis in the Kivus.
A roadmap to clear the first hurdle
According to the joint communiqué issued after discussions held in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August 2026, representatives of the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 agreed on a roadmap designed to sequence the next stages of negotiations and set a timetable for the remaining protocols under the Doha framework. The text also refers to the establishment of a mechanism to track progress, identify obstacles and better address allegations of ceasefire violations.
This process did not start from scratch. In July 2025, Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 had already signed a declaration of principles on a permanent ceasefire in Doha. Then, in 2026, further rounds helped clarify the monitoring of the truce and the operationalisation of an expanded verification mechanism, presented as EJVM+, with a secretariat and a reconnaissance mission ahead of the first monitoring mission in Minembwe, scheduled for 24 August 2026.
The communiqué also emphasises a standardised method for reporting alleged violations. This may seem technical, but it is central. In a conflict where each side accuses the other of breaking the truce, the verification mechanism becomes almost as important as the agreement itself. Without shared evidence, every military incident turns into a political argument for slowing the dialogue.
Minembwe, the real test of credibility
The mission announced in Minembwe, in South Kivu, is the first visible test of this roadmap. The area symbolises a broader challenge: the difficulty of enforcing diplomatic commitments in a zone where front lines shift, armed groups remain active and information often travels faster than observers. A verification mission has value only if it can enter, observe, document and return with evidence accepted by the parties.
Progress is real, but limited. Congolese observers have noted that the process remains at the stage of initial commitments, while several protocols still need to be negotiated. Other analyses highlight that diplomatic time and military time do not always coincide. On the ground, allegations of attacks, troop movements and tensions around certain localities continue to fuel mistrust.
The underlying issue is well known: since the M23’s resurgence in late 2021, eastern DR Congo has experienced a new phase of destabilisation, with territorial gains, population displacement and constant pressure on provincial and national authorities. In several recent documents, the United Nations has recalled that Rwandan support for the armed movement continues to be raised in reports and diplomatic debates, keeping the crisis regional in scope.
What Kinshasa, the Kivus and the region stand to gain — or lose
For the Congolese government, this roadmap may offer useful political space: it allows it to show that a channel for discussion remains open, without abandoning its sovereignty rhetoric. For the AFC/M23, it provides procedural recognition and maintains its role in an internationalised framework. For the people of Goma, Bukavu, Uvira, Minembwe and more isolated rural areas, the stakes are simpler: fewer clashes, less displacement, fewer roads cut off and, above all, less uncertainty about everyday security.
But caution is warranted. In DR Congo, partial agreements have often been undermined by two things: continued military operations on the one hand, and the temptation to buy time on the other. The communiqué issued in Switzerland makes clear that the parties are still seeking to define how violations should be established, which amounts to an acknowledgement that trust remains low. As long as this foundation remains thin, the roadmap may speed up discussions without guaranteeing peace.
The implications, however, extend beyond the Congolese issue alone. The crisis in eastern DR Congo weighs on relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, the stability of border provinces and the security balance in the Great Lakes region. It also affects the credibility of African mediation frameworks, from SADC to the African Union, as the continent continues to champion the idea of African solutions led by African mediators, with international support when useful.
The next steps will therefore unfold over a short period. The verification mission in Minembwe must show whether the ceasefire can be jointly monitored. Then will come the test of the remaining protocols and their timetable. That is where the roadmap’s real significance will be determined: not in its announcement, but in the parties’ ability to turn a political commitment into a concrete, transparent and lasting mechanism.



