Cooperation now seeking critical mass
Between Cotonou and Kigali, the challenge is no longer signing agreements. It is making a relationship spanning more than 4,500 kilometres tangible in the daily lives of businesses, public administrations and travellers. Beninese President Romuald Wadagni’s working visit to Kigali, where he was received by Paul Kagame on 16 September 2026, is part of this drive to deepen ties. The two capitals now want to turn an already substantial partnership into measurable results.
This visit points to a broader trend in African diplomacy today. Several states on the continent are seeking alliances based on shared approaches rather than geographical proximity. Benin is looking to Rwanda for solutions in digital governance, security and public administration. Kigali, for its part, sees Benin as a gateway to West Africa and a testing ground for its public- and private-sector operators.
From political agreements to administrative machinery
The current framework dates back to 2017. That year, the two countries held their first Joint Commission for Cooperation in Rubavu, Rwanda, and signed agreements on ICT, land administration, the environment and sustainable development. The same process paved the way for a “seventh freedom” agreement granted to RwandAir by Benin, an aviation mechanism that allows an airline to operate between two third countries without returning to its country of origin.
In practice, this opening served as an aviation test case. RwandAir announced that it would make Cotonou its second hub, basing two Boeing 737s there, and launched services to several West and Central African capitals. The ambition was clear: to give Benin better regional connectivity and provide the Rwandan carrier with a commercial foothold in the west of the continent.
The partnership then expanded into more sensitive areas. In 2022, Beninese military and police officials held talks in Kigali on security and counter-terrorism. In 2023, the two states formalised a military cooperation agreement. The decision reflects a well-established reality in Benin: for several years, the north of the country has been exposed to attacks and incursions by armed groups from the Sahel region.
Cooperation has also extended to state reform. In November 2023, a Beninese delegation travelled to Rwanda to study the online recruitment of public servants, performance management and the integrated payroll system. Benin subsequently appointed Pascal Nyamulinda, the former head of Rwanda’s national identification agency, to lead its National Agency for the Identification of Persons. A mission by the Rwandan company Irembo also supported the digitisation of Beninese public services.
The economic test remains the most demanding
The most eagerly anticipated task remains generating business. During Paul Kagame’s visit to Cotonou in April 2023, the two governments signed agreements on agriculture, digital services, tourism, trade and industrial cooperation, and investment promotion. The same process produced a double-taxation avoidance agreement, which was later ratified in Kigali. These instruments reduce legal barriers, but they are not enough on their own to create lasting investment.
The figures show a clear gap between the institutional framework and actual trade. In 2024, Benin’s imports from Rwanda reached $116,020, according to UN Comtrade data reported by Trading Economics. Trade flows in the opposite direction remain marginal. In other words, bilateral relations are active in ministerial offices, but remain very limited at the trading counter.
This is precisely where the issue becomes interesting for African economies. Benin is seeking to diversify its partners beyond a purely subregional or Francophone approach. Rwanda wants to put its administrative and technological capabilities to use in other parts of the continent. If businesses follow governments, bilateral cooperation can have an impact on employment, air connectivity, digital services and value chains. Otherwise, it will remain a diplomacy of protocols.
A relationship vulnerable to regional shocks
Aviation also highlights the limits of these arrangements. In February 2025, after Congolese airspace was closed to aircraft registered in Rwanda, RwandAir reorganised its network and suspended several services, including Cotonou on some West African rotations. The conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo thus ended up affecting a connection between two countries that do not share a border. It is a concrete example of African interdependence: tensions in a neighbouring country can weaken a commercial route several countries away.
This vulnerability should not obscure the main achievement: the two capitals have learned to work together on an ongoing basis, through exchanges of delegations, study visits and long-term agreements. Benin gains a partner offering approaches to public administration and the security of public services. Rwanda gains an outlet in the west of the continent and a useful diplomatic showcase in Africa’s competition for projects, funding and air corridors.
The continental significance is clear. This relationship shows that South-South cooperation can move beyond symbolism, provided it is followed up by the private sector, technical administrations and regulators. The next steps to watch will be investment announcements, the resumption or adjustment of air services, and above all the translation of signed agreements into contracts, digital services and stronger trade flows. It is by these measures, not the number of communiqués, that the strength of the ties between Cotonou and Kigali will be judged.



