For a state, protecting its data does not necessarily mean manufacturing every computer or hosting every service on its territory. In Cotonou, the debate on digital sovereignty instead posed a question of choice: how can countries gain greater control without cutting themselves off from the tools and expertise on which security depends?
This question concerns Benin directly, but extends beyond its borders. Public services, businesses and individuals use digital infrastructure often designed or operated abroad. At the same time, attacks cross from one country to another. The response therefore depends as much on national capabilities as on regional co-operation.
Protecting systems without cutting off the world
The sixth edition of the Cyber Africa Forum opened on Monday 16 November 2026 in Cotonou. The forum, devoted this year to digital trust, brings together public- and private-sector stakeholders to discuss topics such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and data governance. Beninese media reported that the opening session focused on strategic choices related to digital sovereignty.
The issue is also one of security. According to INTERPOL’s 2026 report on cyber threats in Africa, artificial intelligence is involved in 55 per cent of cybercrimes reported by the countries surveyed. The study draws on data from 36 member countries. This figure describes cases reported within that scope; it does not mean that 55 per cent of all digital offences on the continent have necessarily been recorded.
At the forum, Benin’s Minister of Digital Transformation and Innovation, Mahuna Akplogan, warned against an approach to protection that would leave systems cut off from the latest technologies. Justice Minister Yvon Détchénou, for his part, highlighted the practical limits of complete autonomy: no country can reasonably produce all its own phones, servers and software.
The debate thus distinguishes sovereignty from autarky. The former means being able to decide where data goes, who can access it and how services are controlled. The latter would aim to produce and host everything within national borders. For speakers quoted at the forum, such closure could reduce access to advanced tools, at a time when cybercriminals can exploit new technologies quickly.
Choosing dependencies and retaining the ability to switch
Using international providers does not eliminate power imbalances. An administration or business can become vulnerable if it depends on a single provider, cannot move its data or does not understand how the tools it uses work. The issue is therefore not just where a technology comes from: it also concerns contracts, local expertise and the ability to exit.
During the discussions, Ambroise Depouilly, managing partner at Deloitte French-speaking Africa, said that a blanket requirement to localise data could weigh on investment decisions. He also argued that a well-designed sovereignty policy could make a country more attractive. These remarks, reported in the context of the forum, illustrate the trade-off between control, costs and the ability to attract operators.
Chançard Moïse Kanga, HCLSoftware’s managing director for Africa, stressed the risk of dependence on a single provider. A more open strategy can combine local, regional and international services. It would nevertheless benefit from providing for reversible contracts, monitoring access to sensitive data and the ability to change solutions without interrupting essential services.
The choices do not have the same effects for everyone. Administrations must protect public data and ensure services continue. Businesses, particularly those operating in several countries, need compatible tools and predictable rules. For users, the issue translates more concretely into the security of payments, the confidentiality of information and the availability of digital services.
Local skills, a condition for control
The ability to negotiate with providers is not enough if national teams cannot audit, operate and secure systems. Mahuna Akplogan presented training as a central lever: mastering a technology also means understanding how it works and being able to adapt it. Tools whose code is accessible can contribute to this learning, provided teams have the time and resources they need.
Mohamed Dembélé, managing partner of Cybastion’s cybersecurity division, also advocated strengthening African teams responsible for critical infrastructure. He referred in particular to their role in managing access and providing technical support. Training specialists on the continent could improve responses to incidents, while also ensuring that a share of the value created by digital investment stays there.
This ambition faces significant gaps in infrastructure and skills between countries, as well as differences between capitals and regions. A digital policy therefore cannot be limited to buying software or building data centres. It must also take account of connectivity, energy, training and the ability of public services to maintain equipment over time.
Regional co-operation as a tool for security
Cyber attacks do not stop at national borders. For Benin and its West African neighbours, sharing information and co-ordinating investigations are therefore practical elements of digital defence. ECOWAS, the regional economic community of West Africa, provides a framework for co-operation between states, although the discussions in Cotonou do not in themselves establish a new decision by the organisation.
INTERPOL’s report recommends, among other measures, strengthening cross-border co-operation, law enforcement agencies’ artificial intelligence capabilities and public-private partnerships. The organisation says that four co-ordinated operations in Africa led to more than 1,500 arrests and the recovery of more than $100mn. In a separate update published in October 2026, INTERPOL detailed Operation Serengeti III: conducted with 21 countries, it resulted in 1,462 arrests and the recovery of more than $105mn.
These results do not replace common rules or institutions capable of handling digital evidence and requests for mutual legal assistance. They nevertheless show why co-operation can serve national interests: dismantling a network operating across several countries is difficult if each investigation remains isolated.
At continental level, the Cotonou debate thus connects with a broader question: how can digital technology become a space in which African states have real decision-making power, without giving up the exchanges that support innovation and security? What happens next will depend on measurable choices: training teams, contractual clauses, protecting sensitive data and operational co-operation between countries.
Beninese report on the opening of the Cyber Africa Forum 2026 · Daabaaru coverage of the forum in Cotonou · INTERPOL’s 2026 report on cyber threats in Africa · INTERPOL’s update on Operation Serengeti III · Cyber Africa Forum 2026 programme



