In Kinshasa, a reparations case that goes beyond the fate of a former minister
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, money intended for victims has once again become a test of the state’s credibility. The FRIVAO case is about more than alleged embezzlement. It touches on a broader question: how can communities scarred by violence be compensated when the mechanisms for providing reparations are themselves weakened by poor governance?
On 18 September 2026, the Court of Cassation in Kinshasa sentenced Constant Mutamba to ten years of forced labour for embezzlement of public funds in the FRIVAO case. His co-defendant, Chançard Bolukola Osony, the fund’s former acting co-ordinator, received a seven-year sentence for embezzlement and money laundering. The court also imposed five years’ deprivation of the right to vote and stand for election, as well as a ban on holding public and para-state office.
The sums cited by the court give a sense of the scale of the case: according to information made public, the disputed transfers included $14m paid to Congo Energy, $4m to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation, and payments to other organisations, bringing the total to more than $20m. The court also ordered the return to FRIVAO of the embezzled sums, and lifted an attachment on nearly $15m to enable the funds to be transferred back.
FRIVAO, the Special Fund for Reparation and Compensation for Victims of Uganda’s Illicit Activities in the DRC, was established following the reparations Kampala was ordered to pay for atrocities committed in the east of the country between 1998 and 2003. In 2022, the International Court of Justice set total compensation at $325m, payable in five annual instalments of $65m from 1 September 2022. The ruling is central because it provides a legal framework for reparations that victims have been awaiting for years.
The fund has not remained untouched. FRIVAO’s accounts were frozen in the summer of 2025 while several investigations examined its management. In November 2025, a note presented to the Council of Ministers cited alleged embezzlement, fictitious victims, kickbacks and governance deadlock. In January 2026, the Prime Minister’s Office said the suspension of the co-ordination committee had been lifted and that corrective measures were under way to prevent the institution’s collapse.
A second verdict further damages an already weakened political standing
The conviction comes less than a year after another ruling by the same court. On 2 September 2025, Constant Mutamba had already been sentenced to three years of forced labour for embezzling funds linked to the construction of a prison in Kisangani. On that occasion, too, the Court of Cassation imposed an additional penalty of ineligibility for office, exclusion from public office and the return of $19m.
The repeated convictions change the meaning of the case. It no longer points to an isolated incident, but to a crisis of confidence over the management of public funds. In a country where access to basic services remains uneven, every dollar diverted from compensation or judicial infrastructure has a tangible cost for victims, communities and administrations already under pressure. The judicial debate is centred in the capital, Kinshasa, but the effects are felt in Kisangani, Tshopo, Ituri, Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé, where reparations have yet to make a real difference.
The contrast is all the sharper because Constant Mutamba had made urban security and the fight against the Kulunas — gangs of criminals active in particular in Kinshasa — key features of his time in office as minister. Operation Ndobo, launched in late 2024 alongside the Zero Kuluna initiative, was presented as a robust response to local insecurity. Human rights organisations had, however, denounced irregularities in some trials held under the initiative.
The FRIVAO case therefore raises a broader question than the conduct of a single political figure. It calls into question the entire reparations process: fund collection, budgetary oversight, payment traceability, the identification of beneficiaries and judicial scrutiny. The Congolese courts have chosen a severe criminal response. But the public demand remains, above all, for effective reparations and transparency. Without them, the fund set up to compensate victims risks becoming, in the public’s eyes, yet another tool in the contest between government bodies, networks of influence and power struggles.
A regional issue for the DRC, with implications far beyond Kinshasa
The issue extends beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also concerns how a state handles reparations linked to an international conflict and violence against civilians. At regional level, the case resonates with debates on state responsibility, compensation for victims and the credibility of public compensation mechanisms — an issue closely watched in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.
On 9 September 2026, the Congolese government announced an initial phase of collective reparations worth $120m for Ituri, Tshopo, Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé. The announcement is politically significant: it shows that the executive wants to restart the reparations process despite the judicial turbulence. But it also makes it more urgent to secure spending channels and vet beneficiaries, since any delay or lack of transparency weakens the programme’s impact.
Across Africa, the events in the DRC are a reminder that reparations are meaningful only if they are transparent, traceable and protected from political capture. In Kinshasa and in the north-eastern provinces, the challenge is not simply to convict. It is also to ensure that the funds reach victims, rather than being siphoned into new channels of predation. Beyond the Mutamba case, this is where some of the Congolese state’s public credibility is at stake.



