A new academic year that is about more than the university calendar
In Goma and Bukavu, the question is no longer simply when classes will resume. It now touches on a more fundamental issue: who has the power to appoint, pay and certify in cities where the Congolese state and the AFC/M23 are still contesting the levers of authority. In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, universities have become markers of authority as much as places of study.
The Ministry of Higher and University Education, Scientific Research and Innovation has suspended academic activities at several public institutions in Goma and Bukavu, while providing for a catch-up option for final-year students in the 2025-2026 academic year. The de facto authorities linked to the AFC/M23, meanwhile, say they want teaching to continue locally, without explaining the mechanism, funding arrangements or body that would validate diplomas.
Kinshasa, the AFC/M23 and the battle over control
The conflict over universities has not come out of nowhere. Since the AFC/M23 captured Goma and Bukavu, the question of parallel administration has taken centre stage in eastern Congo. In its 2025 final report, the United Nations described the scale of the movement’s territorial gains and the shift in these areas towards competing power structures. At the same time, UN monitoring documents noted that the AFC/M23 had already overseen state examinations, introduced new school report cards and demanded a break with the relevant Congolese ministry.
In this context, the decree published by Kinshasa applies to several public institutions, including the University of Goma, ISC-Goma, ISTM-Goma and ISP-Goma, as well as, in Bukavu, the Official University of Bukavu, ISC-Bukavu, ISTM-Bukavu, ISP-Bukavu, ISDR-Bukavu and ISAM-Bukavu. The ministry has also provided an option to continue studies at legally recognised institutions outside conflict zones, in order to avoid a complete break in students’ education.
The decision is part of a pattern that has been visible for several months. In June 2026, the government rejected appointments made by the AFC/M23 to head the University of Goma. In August, it declared new appointments at ten higher education institutions in Goma and Bukavu illegal. Kinshasa’s position is clear: oversight of universities remains an attribute of sovereignty, not an area for local negotiation.
The AFC/M23 camp, by contrast, is pursuing the opposite approach. In areas under its control, it is seeking to operate parallel administrations, including in education. UN experts have already noted that the movement has imposed school and university directives, seeking to bring local institutions into line with its own power structure. This strategy goes beyond the management of campuses. It touches on the very symbols of the state: diplomas, pay, appointment powers and national recognition.
Students caught between forced mobility and legal uncertainty
For students, the issue is tangible. A course interrupted at a public institution can lead to a burdensome administrative process: applying for equivalencies, retaking examinations, covering transfer costs, and sometimes having no guarantee that the diploma will ultimately be recognised. The ministry is trying to limit the damage by allowing final-year students to complete their studies elsewhere. But this solution requires host institutions, transferable records and clear accreditation criteria. Without these, mobility becomes an additional burden for families.
The situation of staff is equally sensitive. Kinshasa has suspended the pay of 48 staff members of the ESU-RSI, accused of joining the AFC/M23, pledging allegiance to the movement or accepting positions under its authority. The measure, announced after a joint commission’s review, sends a strong disciplinary signal. It also marks a turning point: the government is no longer merely challenging its opponents’ appointments, but is now acting on pay, and therefore on the material link between the state and its staff.
The problem, however, extends beyond the staff targeted. In the east, teachers, administrators and education officials remain exposed to the effects of war on banking channels, transport and public services. Congolese authorities have already acknowledged, in other sectors, that salaries remain a weak point in occupied or contested areas. Here, the university standoff reveals the same difficulty: maintaining a national civil service when the area in which it operates is fragmented.
Beyond Goma and Bukavu, a test of educational sovereignty in Central Africa
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not alone in facing this kind of tension. In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, protracted conflicts have often produced competing administrations and parallel systems of taxation, followed by destabilised education systems. But the Congolese case has particular significance because it affects two provincial capitals, major public institutions and the national value of diplomas. It is a question of the state, but also of social mobility and academic continuity for an entire generation.
The regional implications are immediate. The conflict in the east is still being discussed in several diplomatic forums, from the Doha process to discussions backed by the African Union and international partners. The United Nations has again warned of the risk of the DRC’s gradual fragmentation, linked to the AFC/M23’s territorial expansion and the weakening of the state’s presence in some areas. In this context, universities have become a strategic arena: if the institution that imparts knowledge loses its chain of validation, sovereignty is eroded from the top down as well.
The next point to watch is straightforward: whether the mechanisms announced by the AFC/M23 will actually be put in place, and under what legal form. At the same time, it will be important to see whether Kinshasa can organise credible pathways for displaced students without depriving them of their right to a recognised diploma. At this stage, the university dispute says something broader than the start of the academic year. It measures, in very concrete terms, who still governs in eastern Congo, and how far that authority extends.



