When international justice becomes a test of sovereignty
In Chad, the debate is no longer solely about a proposed withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. It also touches on how the authorities treat their opponents, detainees and political contradictions. In a country where public speech is closely monitored, COSADT’s call raises a simple question: how can a country speak of judicial sovereignty while, at the same time, leaving political figures behind bars?
This tension comes amid a sensitive regional context. Chad, a pivot of Central Africa, belongs to CEMAC and remains a major military and diplomatic player in the Sahel and around the Lake Chad Basin. The United Nations still describes the country as a pillar of stability in a region shaken by crises in neighbouring countries, particularly Sudan.
ICC withdrawal, then domestic opposition
On 27 July 2026, N’Djamena notified the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC. The process takes effect one year after notification, in July 2027, unless the decision is withdrawn before then. The Chadian authorities justified the move by criticising the Court’s “selectivity”, at a time when several African states have recently taken the same path.
This official position has no consensus at home. Meeting in N’Djamena, COSADT officials called on the government to reverse the withdrawal and grant presidential pardons to several political detainees. The coalition was founded in January 2026 by several opposition parties, as Chad’s political landscape was already closing down amid arrests, speedy trials and a disputed political dialogue.
Succès Masra and GCAP prisoners at the heart of the case
The name of Succès Masra remains central to these developments. The former prime minister and leader of the Les Transformateurs party was sentenced on 9 August 2025 to 20 years in prison in the so-called Mandakaou case, following a trial that divided Chadian public opinion and drew criticism from human rights organisations. Human Rights Watch said at the time that the proceedings were based on politically motivated accusations.
COSADT is also calling for the release of members of GCAP, the Group of Political Actors for Consultation. In May 2026, several prominent members of the coalition were sentenced to eight years in prison following a banned march in N’Djamena. African media and human rights observers described the detainees as political prisoners, while their supporters denounced an unfair trial.
The message sent by COSADT is clear. Its officials believe that the closure of political space cannot be offset by a mere discourse of sovereignty. They argue that a state which criticises the ICC in the name of African justice must also demonstrate visible safeguards at home: justice, due process and restraint in the use of criminal penalties. This is a political reading of the problem, but also an institutional one.
What this means for the authorities, the opposition and society
For the authorities, withdrawal from the ICC can serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, it allows them to project a sovereign stance towards an institution often accused in Africa of concentrating its prosecutions on the continent. On the other, it gives the authorities another argument with which to control the domestic narrative, presenting the break with the Court as an act of national assertion. But this interpretation runs up against a simpler reality: if domestic avenues of redress are seen as weak, the symbolism of sovereignty loses credibility.
For the opposition, the issue is less theoretical. It concerns the possibility of political activity without the constant risk of criminal prosecution. In N’Djamena and several other cities across the country, groups critical of the authorities say they operate in a narrow space, caught between police surveillance, bans on demonstrations and the judicialisation of dissent. In working-class neighbourhoods as well as political circles, this fuels a sense of suffocation rather than genuine public debate.
For the population, the stakes are tangible. When arrests are seen as arbitrary, trust in institutions erodes. When political trials multiply, justice no longer appears to act as an arbiter, but as an instrument. In a country where territorial inequalities remain stark between N’Djamena, secondary urban centres and peripheral areas, this distrust also widens the gap between the state and some of its citizens.
A signal to watch across Central Africa
The Chadian case extends beyond national borders. In the CEMAC region and, more broadly, across Central Africa, it is a reminder that debates about the ICC are not limited to a confrontation between Africa and The Hague. They also point to a deeper question: do African states want more reformed international institutions, or regional and national justice systems genuinely able to adjudicate serious crimes and political abuses?
Chad already has a long history with international justice. The conviction of former president Hissène Habré showed, through the trial held in Dakar under the African framework sought by the African Union, that a judicial response led by the continent was possible. That precedent is also what makes the current debate more sensitive: leaving the ICC does not erase the demand for justice; it shifts it to national and regional courts.
What happens next will depend on two milestones. First, the course of the ICC withdrawal through to July 2027. Second, the handling of political prisoners and domestic opposition in the coming months. This is where the consistency between the rhetoric of sovereignty and the exercise of power in N’Djamena will be judged.



